Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri/Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court of Missouri (233 S. W. 425) affirmed a judgment of the Cole county circuit court, which sustained an order of the Public Service Commission of Missouri, effective December 1, 1919. That order undertook to reduce rates for exchange service and to abolish the installation and moving charges theretofore demanded by plaintiff in error. It is challenged as confiscatory and in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.

During the period of federal control-August 1, 1918, to August 1, 1919-the Postmaster General advanced the rates for telephone service and prescribed a schedule of charges for installing and moving instruments. The Act of Congress approved July 11, 1919-41 Stat. 157-directed that the lines be returned to their owners at midnight July 31, 1919, and further—

'that the existing toll and exchange telephone rates as     established or approved by the Postmaster General on or prior      to June 6, 1919, shall continue in force for a period not to      exceed four months after this act takes effect, unless sooner      modified or changed by the public authorities-state,      municipal, or otherwise-having control or jurisdiction of      tolls, charges, and rates or by contract or by voluntary      reduction.' Section 1.

August 4, 1919, the commission directed plaintiff in error to show why exchange service rates and charges for installation and moving as fixed by the Postmaster General should be continued. After a hearing, it made an elaborate report and directed that the service rates should be reduced and the charges discontinued.

The company produced voluminous evidence, including its books, to establish the value of its property dedicated to public use. The books showed that the actual cost of 'total plant, supplies, equipment, and working capital' amounted to $22,888,943. Its engineers estimated the reproduction cost new as of June 30, 1919, thus: Physical telephone property, $28,454,488; working capital, $1,051,564; establishing business, $5,594,816; total $35,100,868. They also estimated existing values (after allowing depreciation) upon the same date: Physical telephone property, $24,709,295; working capital, $1,051,564; establishing business, $5,594,816; total, $31,355,675.

The only evidence offered in opposition to values claimed by the company were appraisals of its property at St. Louis, Caruthersville, and Springfield, respectively, as of December, 1913, February, 1914, and September, 1916, prepared by the commission's engineers and accountants, together with statements showing actual costs of additions subsequent to those dates.

Omitting a paragraph relative to an unimportant reduction $17,513.52-from working capital account, that part of the commission's report which deals with property values follows:

The company offered in evidence exhibits showing the value of     its property in the entire state (outside the cities of      Kansas City and Independence, whose rates are not involved in      this case), and also at 46 of its local exchanges in the      state. It shows by such exhibits that the value of the     property in the entire state (and when speaking of the      property in the state in this report we mean exclusive of      Kansas City and Independence) is as follows: Reproduction      cost new, $35,100,471; reproduction cost new, less      depreciation, $31,355,278; and cost as per books,      $22,888,943. It also shows the company's estimate of     reproduction cost new, less depreciation, and the prorated      book cost, at each of the 46 local exchanges mentioned.

The engineers of this commission have made a detailed     inventory and appraisal, and this commission has formally      valued the company's property at only three of its exchanges,      viz.: At the city of Caruthersville, reported in Re      Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Company, 2 Mo. P. S.C.. 492; at the     city of St. Louis in cases No. 234 and No. 235, as yet      unreported; and at the city of Springfield reported in Re Missouri and Kansas Telephone Company, 6 Mo. P. S.C.. 279-and as a result we have only the estimates and appraisals     of the company before us in relation to the value of the      property at the other exchanges. We think it is clear,     however, from the data at hand, that the values placed by the      company upon the property are excessive, and not a just basis      for rate-making.

The values fixed by this commission at Caruthersville, St. Louis, and Springfield in the cases above entioned aggregate      $11,003,898, while the company estimates the aggregate cost      of reproduction new of these plants in this case at      $18,971,011. The ratio of the latter figure is 172.4 per     cent. This percentage, divided into $35,100,471, the     company's estimate of the aggregate cost of the reproduction      new of its property in Missouri in this case, equals      $20,350,000, which might be said to be one measure of the      value of the property.

Again, the company's estimate of the aggregate cost of     reproduction new, less depreciation, of its properties at      Caruthersville, St. Louis, and Springfield, in this case is      $16,913,673. The ratio of this figure to the aggregate value     fixed by the commission at these exchanges, plus additions      reported by the company, is 153.7 per cent. This percentage     divided into $31,355,278, the company's estimate of the      aggregate cost of reproduction new, less depreciation, of its      property in Missouri in this case, equals $20,400,000, which      may be said to be another measure of the value of the      property.

The company also shows by Exhibits 19 and 212 that its return     under the Postmaster General's rates on $22,888,942, the book      value of its property in the state, is at the rate of 11.65      per cent. per annum for depreciation and return on the     investment, which would yield the company 6 per cent. for     depreciation and 5.65 per cent. for return on the book cost     of the property. As stated, however, we do not think that the     book cost or the 'prorated book cost' of the property as claimed by the      company would be a fair basis for rate making.

As we understand it, the 'prorated book cost' given in     evidence by the company for the various exchanges is simply      the percentage relation of reproduction cost new, which the      original cost of all property bears to reproduction cost new      of all property and in individual instances the actual cost      might vary greatly, either up or down, from what an appraisal      would show. If the company, to eliminate competition, paid a     price in excess of the value or because of discouraged local      operation were enabled to purchase a plant far below its      actual value, the 'prorated book cost' basis would not      reflect anything like the original cost.

We also think that the figure of $22,888,943, claimed by the     company to represent the book cost or original of the      property cost in the state, is subject to certain adjustments      with reference to the amount of nonuseful property included,      working capital, and the amounts to be deducted account      extinguished value recouped from patrons by charges to      depreciation.

In the St. Louis Case, supra, the original cost of the     nonuseful property deducted and disallowed by the commission      amounted to $454,689.16. It appears from the company's     Exhibit 256 that the 'prorated book cost' of the St. Louis      exchange is just about half of that given for the state. However, it is clear that the proportion of nonused and     nonuseful property in St. Louis bears a much larger      percentage relation to useful property than would obtain      throughout the state. It would appear that estimating the     company's property not used and useful for the entire state      at $500,000 would be a fair approximation. This sum at least     should be deducted. * *  *

The depreciation reserve applicable to the Missouri property     is not shown by the company. However, on the the Company's Exhibit 15, the balance sheet as of June 30,     1919, of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Missouri      corporation), operating in Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas,      the reserve for accrued depreciation and reserve for      amortization of intangibles is given as $7,963,082.37. The     same exhibit shows the original cost of fixed capital for      Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas property as $46,061,162.76. The total fixed capital of the Missouri property shown on the     Company's Exhibit 19 is $21,837,759, which is 47.4 per cent. of $46,061,162.76 and 47.4 per cent. of the reserve for     depreciation. $7,963,082.37 equals $3,774,501 or the portion     assignable to the Missouri property.

Adjusting in accordance with the above, we have: Total plant     and equipment, including working capital, as per Company's      Exhibit No. 19, $22,888,943; deduct property not used or      useful, $500,000.00; deduct excess working capital,      $17,513.52; deduct depreciation reserve, $3,774,501.00;      [total to be deducted] $4,292,014.52. [Net total]     $18,596.928.48; add for intangibles, 10 per cent.,      $1,859,692.85; total adjusted original cost, $20,456,621.33.

After carefully considering all the evidence as to values     before us in this case, we are of the opinion that the value      of the company's property in the state, exclusive of Kansas      City and Independence, devoted to exchange service, will not      exceed the sum of $20,400,000, and we will tentatively adopt      this sum as the value of the property for the purposes of      this case. As stated, supra, this commission has formally     valued only a part of this property, and we should not be      understood as authoritatively fixing the value of the      property at this time.

The three earlier valuations to which the commission referred are: St. Louis, December, 1913, $8,500,000; Caruthersville, February, 1914, $25,000; Springfield, September, 1916, $815,000; total, $9,340,000. Between those dates and June 30, 1919, additions were made to these properties, which cost, respectively, $1,623,765, $5,992, and $34,141. Adding these to the original valuations gives $11,003,898, the base sum used by the commission for the estimates now under consideration.

Obviously, the commission undertook to value the property without according any weight to the greatly enhanced costs of material, labor, supplies, etc., over those prevailing in 1913, 1914, and 1916. As matter of common knowledge, these increases were large. Competent witnesses estimated them as 45 to 50 per centum.

In Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 41, 52, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 195, 200 (53 L. Ed. 382, 48 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1134, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034), this court said:

There must be a fair return upon the reasonable value of the     property at the time it is being used for the public. * *  *      And we concur with the court below in holding that the value      of the property is to be determined as of the time when the      inquiry is made regarding the rates. If the property, which     legally enters into the consideration of the question of      rates, has increased in value since it was acquired, the      company is entitled to the benefit of such increase.

In the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 762 (57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18), this was said:

The making of a just return for the use of the property     involves the recognition of its fair value, if it be more      than its cost. The property is held in private ownership, and     it is that property, and not the original cost of it, of      which the owner may not be deprived without due process of      law.

See, also, Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 191, 38 Sup. Ct. 278, 62 L. Ed. 649, Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 258 U.S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538 (March 6, 1922), and Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678 (April 10, 1922).

It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair return upon properties devoted to public service, without giving consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the time the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent forecast of probable future values, made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances, is essential. If the highly important element of present costs is wholly disregarded, such a forecast becomes impossible. Estimates for to-morrow cannot ignore prices of to-day.

Witnesses for the company asserted-and there was no substantial evidence to the contrary-that, excluding cost of establishing the business, the property was worth at least 25 per cent. more than the commission's estimates, and we think the proof shows that, for the purposes of the present case, the valuati n should be at least $25,000,000.

After disallowing an actual expenditure of $174,048.60 for rentals and services by the American Telephone & Telegraph Company and some other items not presently important, the commission estimated the annual net profits on operations available for depreciation and retrun as $2,828,617.60-approximately 11 1/3 per cent. of $25,000,000. That 6 per cent. should be allowed for depreciation appears to be accepted by the commission. Deducting this would leave a possible 5 1/3 per cent. return upon the minimum value of the property, which is wholly inadequate, considering the character of the investment and interest rates then prevailing.

The important item of expense disallowed by the commission $174,048.60-is 55 per cent. of the 4 1/2 per cent. of gross revenues paid by plaintiff in error to the American Telephone & Telegraph Company as rents for receivers, transmitters, induction coils, etc., and for licenses and services under the customary form of contract between the latter company and its subsidiaries. Four and one-half per cent. is the ordinary charge paid voluntarily by local companies of the general system. There is nothing to indicate bad faith. So far as appears, plaintiff in error's board of directors has exercised a proper discretion about this matter requiring business judgment. It must never be forgotten that, while the state may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not the owner of the property of public utility companies, and is not clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership. The applicable general rule is well expressed in States Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 291 Ill. 209, 234, 125 N. E. 891, 901:

'The commission is not the financial manager of the     corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its      judgment for that of the directors of the corporation; nor      can it ignore items charged by the utility as operating      expenses, unless there is an abuse of discretion in that      regard by the corporate officers.'

See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 209 U.S. 108, 28 Sup. Ct. 493, 52 L. Ed. 705; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491, 35 Sup. Ct. 869, 59 L. Ed. 1423, L. R. A. 1916A, 1133; People ex rel. v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1, 90 N. E. 60.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, with whom Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs.

I concur in the judgment of reversal. But I do so on the ground that the order of the state commission prevents the utility from earning a fair return on the amount prudently invested in it. Thus, I differ fundamentally from my brethern concerning the rule to be applied in determining whether a prescribed rate is confiscatory. The court, adhering to the so-called rule of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819, and further defining it, declares that what is termed value must be ascertained by giving weight, among other things, to estimates of what it would cost to reproduce the property at the time of the rate hearing.

The so-called rule of Smyth v. Ames is, in my opinion, legally and economically unsound. The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise. Upon the capital so invested the federal Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity to earn a fair return. Thus it sets the limit to the power of the state to reg late rates. The Constitution does not guarantee to the utility the opportunity to earn a return on the value of all items of property used by the utility or of any of them. The several items of property constituting the utility, taken singly, and freed from the public use, may conceivably have an aggregate value greater than if the items are used in combination. The owner is at liberty, in the absence of controlling statutory provision, to withdraw his property from the public service, and, if he does so, may obtain for it exchange value. Compare Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana, 251 U.S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323; Erie Railroad Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394, 411, 41 Sup. Ct. 169, 65 L. Ed. 322; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 42 Sup. Ct. 281, 66 L. Ed. 566. But, so long as the specific items of property are employed by the utility, their exchange value is not of legal significance.

The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its charges to the public shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute for the state in the performance of the public service, thus becoming a public servant. The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes, not only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges cover the allowance, by way of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the nature of the security issued therefor, the allowance for risk incurred, and enough more to attract capital. The reasonable rate to be prescribed by a commission may allow an efficiently managed utility much more. But a rate is constitutionally compensatory, if it allows to the utility the opportunity to earn the cost of the service as thus defined.

To decide whether a proposed rate is confiscatory the tribunal must determine both what sum would be earned under it and whether that sum would be a fair return. The decision involves ordinarily the making of four subsidiary ones:

(1) What the gross earnings from operating the utility under the rate in controversy would be. (A prediction.)

(2) What the operating expenses and charges, while so operating, would be. (A prediction.)

(3) The rate base; that is, what the amount is on which a return should be earned. (Under Smyth v. Ames, an opinion, largely.)

(4) What rate of return should be deemed fair. (An opinion, largely.)

A decision that a rate is confiscatory (or compensatory) is thus the resultant of four subsidiary determinations. Each of the four involves forming a judgment, as distinguished from ascertaining facts; and as to each factor there is usually room for difference in judgment. But the first two factors do not ordinarily present serious difficulties. The doubts and uncertainties incident to prophecy, which affect them, can often be resolved by a test period; and meanwhile protection may be afforded by giving a bond. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 18, 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 148, 53 L. Ed. 371; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. McKnight, 244 U.S. 368, 37 Sup. Ct. 611, 61 L. Ed. 1200. The doubts and uncertainties incident to the last two factors can be eliminated, or lessened, only by redefining the rate base, called value, and the measure of fairness in return, now applied under the rul of Smyth v. Ames. The experience of the 25 years since that case was decided has demonstrated that the rule there enunciated is delusive. In the attempt to apply it insuperable obstacles have been encountered. It has failed to afford adequate protection either to capital or to the public. It leaves open the door to grave injustice. To give to capital embarked in public utilities the protection guaranteed by the Constitution, and to secure for the public reasonable rates, it is essential that the rate base be definite, stable, and readily ascertainable, and that the percentage to be earned on the rate base be measured by the cost, or charge, of the capital employed in the enterprise. It is consistent with the federal Constitution for this court now to lay down a rule which will establish such a rate base and such a measure of the rate of return deemed fair. In my opinion, it should do so.

The rule of Smyth v. Ames sets the laborious and baffling task of finding the present value of the utility. It is impossible to find an exchange value for a utility, since utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not commonly bought and sold in the market. Nor can the present value of the utility be determined by capitalizing its net earnings, since the earnings are determined, in large measure, by the rate which the company will be permitted to charge, and thus the vicious circle would be encountered. So, under the rule of Smyth v. Ames, it is usually sought to prove the present value of a utility by ascer taining what it actually cost to construct and install it, or by estimating what it should have cost, or by estimating what it would cost to reproduce or to replace it. To this end an enumeration is made of the component elements of the utility, tangible and intangible; then the actual, or the proper, cost of producing, or of reproducing, each part is sought; and finally it is estimated how much less than the new each part, or the whole, is worth. That is, the depreciation is estimated. Obviously each step in the process of estimating the cost of reproduction, or replacement, involves forming an opinion, or exercising judgment, as distinguished from merely ascertaining facts. And this is true, also, of each step in the process of estimating how much less the existing plant is worth than if it were new. There is another potent reason why, under the rule of Smyth v. Ames, the room for difference in opinion as to the present value of a utility is so wide. The rule does not measure the present value either by what the utility cost to produce, or by what it should have cost, or by what it would cost to reproduce, or to replace it. Under that rule the tribunal is directed, in forming its judgment, to take into consideration all those and also other elements, called relevant facts.

Obviously, 'value' cannot be a composite of all these elements. Nor can it be arrived at on all these bases. They are very different, and must, when applied in a particular case, lead to widely different results. The rule of Smyth v. Ames, as interpreted and applied, means merely that all must be considered. What, if any, weight shall be given to any one, must practically rest in the judicial discretion of the tribunal which makes the deter mination. WHETHER A DESIRED RESULT IS REACHED MAY DepEnd upon how any one of many elements is treated. It is true that the decision is usually rested largely upon records of financial transactions, on statistics and calculations. But as stated in Louisville v. Cumberland Telegraph & Telephone Co., 225 U.S. 430, 436, 32 Sup. Ct. 741, 742 (56 L. Ed. 1151) 'every figure * *  * that we have set down with delusive exactness' is 'speculative.'

The efforts of courts to control commissions' findings of value have largely failed. The reason lies in the character of the rule declared in Smyth v. Ames. The rule there stated was to be applied solely as a means of determining whether rates already prescribed by the Legislature were confiscatory. It was to be applied judicially after the rate had been mede, and by a court which had had no part in making the rate. When applied under such circumstances, the rule, although cumbersome, may occasionally be effective in destroying an obstruction to justice, as the action of a court is, when it sets aside the verdict of a jury. But the commissions undertook to make the rule their standard for constructive action. They used it as a guide for making or approving rates, and the tendency developed to fix as reasonable the rate which is not so low as to be confiscatory. Thus the rule which assumes that rates of utilities will ordinarily be higher than the minimum required by the Constitution has, by the practice of the commissions, eliminated the margin between a reasonable rate and a merely compensatory rate, and, in the process of rate-making, effective judicial review is very often rendered impossible. The result, inherent in the rule itself, is arbitrary action on the part of the rate-regulating body; for the rule not only fails to furnish any applicable standard of judgment. but directs consideration of so many elements that almost any result may be justified.

The adoption of present value of the utility's property, as the rate base, was urged in 1893 on behalf of the community, and it was adopted by the courts, largely, as a protection against inflated claims, based on what were then deemed inflated prices of the past. See argument in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 479, 480, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739, 757, 758, 19 Sup. Ct. 804, 43 L. Ed. 1154; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 442, 443, 23 Sup. Ct. 571, 47 L. Ed. 892; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201, 214, 24 Sup. Ct. 241, 48 L. Ed. 406. Reproduction cost, as the measure, or as evidence, of present value, was also pressed then by representatives of the public, who sought to justify legislative reductions of railroad rates. The long depression which followed the panic of 1893 had brought prices to the lowest level reached in the nineteenth century. Insistence upon reproduction cost was the shippers' protest against burdens believed to have resulted from watered stocks, reckless financing, and unconscionable construction contracts. Those were the days before state legislation prohibited the issue of public utility securities without authorization from state officials, before accounting was prescribed and supervised, when outstanding bonds and stocks were hardly an indication of the amount of capital embarked in the enterprise, when depreciation accounts were unknown, and when book values, or property accounts, furnished no trustworthy evidence either of cost or of real value. Estimates of reproduction cost were then offered, largely as a means, either of supplying lacks in the proof of actual cost and investment, or of testing the credibility of evidence adduced, or of showing that the cost of installation had been wasteful. For these purposes evidence of the cost of reproduction is obviously appropriate.

At first reproduction cost was welcomed by commissions as evidence of present value. Perhaps it was because the estimates then indicated values lower than the actual cost of installation; for, even after the price level had begun to rise, improved machinery and new devices tended for some years to reduce construction costs. Evidence of reproduction costs was certainly welcomed, because it seemed to offer a reliable means for performing the difficult task of fixing, in obedience to Smyth v. Ames, the value of a new species of property to which the old tests-selling price or net earnings-were not applicable. The engineer spoke in figures-a language implying certitude. His estimates seemed to be free of the infirmi ies which had stamped as untrustworthy the opinion evidence of experts common in condemnation cases. Thus, for some time, replacement cost, on the basis of prices prevailing at the date of the valuation, was often adopted by state commissions as the standard for fixing the rate base. But gradually it came to be realized that the definiteness of the engineer's calculations was delusive, that they rested upon shifting theories, and that their estimates varied so widely as to intensify, rather than to allay doubts. When the price levels had risen largely, and estimates of replacement cost indicated values much greater than the actual cost of installation, many commissions refused to consider valuable what one declared to be assumptions based on things that never happened and estimates requiring the projection of the engineer's imagination into the future and methods of construction and installation that have never been and never will be adopted by sane men. Finally the great fluctuation in price levels incident to the World War led to the transfusion of the engineer's estimate of cost with the economist's prophecies concerning the future price plateaus. Then the view that these estimates were not to be trusted as evidence of present value was frequently expressed, and state utility commissions, while admitting the evidence in obedience to Smyth v. Ames, failed, in ever-increasing numbers to pay heed to it in fixing the rate base. The conviction is widespread that a sound conclusion as to the actual value of a utility is not to be reached by a meticulous study of conflicting estimates of the cost of reproducing new the congeries of old machinery and equipment, called the plant, and the still more fanciful estimates concerning the value of the intangible elements of an established business. Many commissions, like that of Massachusetts, have declared recently that 'capital honestly and prudently invested must, under normal conditions, be taken as the controlling factor in fixing the basis for computing fair and reasonable rates.'

To require that reproduction cost at the date of the rate hearing be given weight in fixing the rate base may subject investors to heavy losses when the high war and post-war price levels pass and the price trend is again downward. The aggregate of the investments which have already been made at high costs since 1914, and of those which will be made before prices and costs can fall heavily, may soon exceed by far the depreciated value, of all the public utility investments made theretofore at relatively low cost. For it must be borne in mind that depreciation is an annual charge. That accrued on plants constructed in the long years prior to 1914 is much larger than that accruing on the properties installed in the shorter period since.

That part of the rule of Smyth v. Ames which fixes the rate of return deemed fair, at the percentage customarily paid on similar investments at the time of the rate hearing also exposes the investor and the public to danger of serious injustice. If the replacement cost measure of value and the prevailing rate measure of fairness of return should be applied, a company which raised, in 1920, for additions to plant, $1,000,000 on a 9 per cent. basis, by a stock issue, or by long-term bond issue, may find a decade later that the value of the plant (disregarding depreciation) is only $600,000, and that the fair return on money then invested in such enterprise is only 6 per cent. Under the test of a compensatory rate, urged in reliance upon Smyth v. Ames, a prescribed rate would not be confiscatory, if it appeared that the utility could earn under it $36,000 a year; whereas $90,000 would be required to earn the capital charges. On the other hand, if a plant had been built in times of low costs, at $1,000,000 and the capital had been raised to the extent of $750,000 by an issue at par of 5 per cent. 30-year bonds and to the extent of $250,000 by stock at par, and 10 years later the price level was 75 per cent. higher and the interest rates 8 per cent. it would be a fantastic result to hold that a rate was confiscatory, unless it yielded 8 per cent. on the then reproduction cost of $1,750,000; for that would yield an income of $140,000, which would give the bondholders $37,500, and to the holders of the $250,000 stock $102,500, a return of 41 per cent. per annum. Money required to establish in 1920 many necessary plants has cost the utility 10 per cent. on 30-year bonds. These long-time securities, issued to raise needed capital, will in 1930 and thereafter continue to bear the extra high rates of interest, which it was necessary to offer in 1920 in order to secure the required capital. The prevailing rate for such investments may in 1930 be only 7 per cent., or indeed 6 per cent., as it was found to be in 1904, in Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin Co., 192 U.S. 201, 24 Sup. Ct. 241, 48 L. Ed. 406; in 1909 in Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 148, 53 L. Ed. 371; and in 1912, in Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 670, 32 Sup. Ct. 389, 56 L. Ed. 594. A rule which limits the guaranteed rate of return on utility investments to that which may prevail at the time of the rate hearing may fall far short of the capital charge then resting upon the company.

In essence, there is no difference between the capital charge and operating expenses, depreciation, and taxes. Each is a part of the current cost of supplying the service, and each should be met from current income. When the capital charges are for interest on the floating debt paid at the current rate, this is readily seen. But it is no less true of a legal obligation to pay interest on long-term bonds, entered into years before the rate hearing and to continue for years thereafter; and it is true, also, of the economic obligation to pay dividends on stock, preferred or common. The necessary cost, and hence the capital charge, of the money embarked recently in utilities, and of that which may be invested in the near future, may be more, as it may be less, than t e prevailing rate of return required to induce capital to enter upon like enterprises at the time of a rate hearing ten years hence. To fix the return by the rate which happens to prevail at such future day, opens the door to great hardships. Where the financing has been proper, the cost to the utility of the capital, required to construct, equip, and operate its plant, should measure the rate of return which the Constitution guarantees opportunity to earn.

The adoption of the amount prudently invested as the rate base and the amount of the capital charge as the measure of the rate of return would give definiteness to these two factors involved in rate controversies which are now shifting and treacherous, and which render the proceedings peculiarly burdensome and largely futile. Such measures offer a basis for decision which is certain and stable. The rate base would be ascertained as a fact, not determined as matter of opinion. It would not fluctuate with the market price of labor, or materials, or money. It would not change with hard times or shifting populations. It would not be distorted by the fickle and varying judgments of appraisers, commissions, or courts. It would, when once made in respect to any utility, be fixed, for all time, subject only to increases to represent additions to plant, after allowance for the depreciation included in the annual operating charges. The wild uncertainties of the present method of fixing the rate base under the so-called rule of Smyth v. Ames would be avoided, and likewise the fluctuations which introduce into the enterprise unnecessary elements of speculation, create useless expense, and impose upon the public a heavy, unnecessary burden.

In speculative enterprises the capital cost of money is always high-partly because the risks involved must be covered; partly because speculative enterprises appeal only to the relatively small number of investors who are unwilling to accept a low return on their capital. It is to the interest both of the utility and of the community that the capital be obtained at as low a cost as possible. About 75 per cent. of the capital invested in utilities is represented by bonds. He who buys bonds seeks primarily safety. If he can obtain it, he is content with a low rate of interest. Through a fluctuating rate base the bondholder can only lose. He can receive no benefit from a rule which increases the rate base as the price level rises; for his return, expressed in dollars, would be the same, whatever the income of the company. That the stockholder does not in fact receive an increased return in time of rapidly rising prices under the rule of Smyth v. Ames, as applied, the financial record of the last six years demonstrates. But the burden upon the community is heavy, because the risk makes the capital cost high.

The expense and loss now incident to recurrent rate controversies is also very large. The most serious vice of the present rule for fixing the rate base is not the existing uncertainty, but that the method does not lead to certainty. Under it, the value for ratemaking purposes must ever be an unstable factor. Instability is a standing menace of renewed controversy. The direct expense to the utility of maintaining an army of xperts and of counsel is appalling. The indirect cost is far greater. The attention of officials high and low is, necessarily, diverted from the constructive tasks of efficient operation and of development. The public relations of the utility to the community are apt to become more and more strained, and a victory for the utility may in the end prove more disastrous than defeat would have been. The community defeated, but unconvinced, remembers, and may refuse aid when the company has occasion later to require its consent or co-operation in the conduct and development of its enterprise. Controversy with utilities is obviously injurious, also, to the public interest. The prime needs of the community are that facilities be ample and that rates be as low and as stable as possible. The community can get cheap service from private companies, only through cheap capital. It can get efficient service only if managers of the utility are free to devote themselves to problems of operation and of development. It can get ample service through private companies only if investors may be assured of receiving continuously a fair return upon the investment.

What is now termed the prudent investment is, in essence, the same thing as that which the court has always sought to protect in using the term present value. Twenty-five years ago, when Smyth v. Ames was decided, it was impossible to ascertain with accuracy, in respect to most of the utilities, in most of the states in which rate controversies arose, what it cost in money to establish the utility; or what the money cost with which the utility was established; or what income had been earned by it; or how the income had been expended. It was, therefore, not feasible, then, to adopt, as the rate base, the amount properly invested or, as the rate of fair return, the amount of the capital charge. Now the situation is fundamentally different. These amounts are, now, readily ascertainable in respect to a large, and rapidly increasing, proportion of the utilities. The change in this respect is due to the enlargement, meanwhile, of the powers and functions of state utility commissions. The issue of securities is now, and for many years has been, under the control of commissions, in the leading states. Hence the amount of capital raised (since the conferring of these powers) and its cost are definitely known, through current supervision and prescribed accounts, supplemented by inspection of the commission's engineering force. Like knowledge concerning the investment of that part of the capital raised and expended before these broad functions were exercised by the utility commissions has been secured, in many cases, through investigations undertaken later, in connection with the issue of new securities or the regulation of rates. The amount and disposition of current earnings of all the companies are also known. It is, therefore, feasible now to adopt as the measure of a compensatory rate-the annual cost, or charge, of the capital prudently invested in the utility. And, hence, it should be done.

Value is a word of many meanings. That with which commissions and courts in these proceedings are concerned, in so-called confiscation cases, is a special value for rate-making purposes, not exchange value. This is illustrated by our decisions which deal with the elements to be included in fixing the rate base. In Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 669, 32 Sup. Ct. 389, 56 L. Ed. 594; and Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165, 35 Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. 1244, good will and franchise value were excluded from the rate base in determining whether the prescribed charges of the public utility were confiscatory. In Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678, the cost of developing the business as a financially successful concern was excluded from the rate base. In Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines 238 U.S. 153, 171, 35 Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. 1244, the fact that the street had been paved (and hence the reproduction cost of laying gas mains greatly increased) was not allowed as an element of value. But, obviously, good will and franchise value are important elements when exchange value is involved; and where the community acquires a public utility by purchase or condemnation, compensation must be made for its good will and earning power, at least under some circumstances. Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 202, 203, 30 Sup. Ct. 615, 54 L. Ed. 991, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084; National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853, 865, 10 C. C. A. 653, 27 L. R. A. 827. Likewise, as between buyer and seller, the good will and earning power due to effective organization are often more important elements than tangible property. These cases would seem to require rejection of a rule which measured the rate base by cost of reproduction or by value in its ordinary sense.

The rule by which the utilities are seeking to measure the return is, in essence, reproduction cost of the utility or prudent investment, whichever is the higher. This is indicated by the instructions contained in the Special Report on Valuation of Public Utilities, made to the American Society of Civil Engineers, October 28, 1916, Proceedings, vol. 42:

'So long as the company owner keeps a sum equivalent to the     total investment at work for the public, either as property      serving the public, or funds held in reserve for such      property, no policy should be followed in estimating      depreciation that will reduce the property to a value less      than the investment. * *  * ' Page 1726.

'Estimates of the cost of reproduction should be based on the     assumption that the identical property is to be reproduced, rather than a substitute property' (page 1719),      'although such a substitute property, much less costly than t      e existing plant, might furnish equal or better service, it      is not reproduction of service, but of property, that is      under consideration; and clearly the estimate should be of      existing property created with public approval, rather than      of a substituted property' (page 1772).

If the aim were to ascertain the value (in its ordinary sense) of the utility property, the enquiry would be, not what it would cost to reproduce the identical property, but what it would cost to establish a plant which could render the service, or in other words, at what cost could an equally efficient substitute be then produced. Surely the cost of an equally efficient substitute must be the maximum of the rate base, if prudent investment be rejected as the measure. The utilities seem to claim that the constitutional protection against confiscation guarantees them a return both upon unearned increment and upon the cost of property rendered valueless by obsolescence.