Message to King Prajadhipok of July 27, 1926

Saranromya Palace,

July 27th 1926.

May it please Your Majesty,

In the memorandum which Your Majesty gracious enough to send me on July 23 Your Majesty asked me to reply to the following nine questions:

1st Question: Should the King have the right to choose any prince as his heir? If the King has this right, ought not this right to be extended to a Council of High Prince and Ministers of State in the case when the King dies without having chosen an heir? At present the King alone has the right to nominate an heir. It would be perhaps more logical to allow a Council of some sort to exercise that right when the King has not done so. This would be more consistent with the idea an elected King.

2nd Question: Should the principle of choice be admitted at all, or ought the succession to be by birth alone, and ought there to be more amendments to the present law or not?

3rd Question: Must this country have a parliamentary system one day, and is really the Anglo-Saxon type of parliamentary government to an eastern people?

4th Question: Is this country ready to have some sort of representative government?

5th Question: What is the best form to give to the Supreme Council? In it worth while to make it a permanent institution of this country, or should it be allowed to die a natural death?

6th Question: Should we have a Prime Minister? Should this system be inaugurated now?

7th Question: Should we have a Legislative Council? What should be the constitution of such a Council?

8th Question: Have you any opinion as to our financial policy?

9th Question: Can something be done to make the Chinese become Siamese as in the old days?

In attempting to answer these questions I cannot but feel very humble. The solutions of the problems underlying the questions depend upon such an intimate knowledge of the internal affairs of Siam and of the personalities of her leaders that I cannot but recognize that there are others whose opinions must be worth for more than mine. Indeed my only excuse for venturing these opinions must be that Your Majesty has asked me to do it and that perhaps value can be found in the ideas of an impartial and detached observer whose only object is to promote the welfare of a country he loves.

The answers to the above nine questions deal with a variety of subjects and perhaps can best be answered by dealing with each subject separately.

PRINCIPLE OF SUCCESSION
In viewing these problem one must realize at the very outset that the situation in Siam is totally different from that existing in Great Britain and other similar limited Monarchies. What works well in Great Britain might work disastrously in Siam. Siam should not slavishly copy the system of any Western nation, but should evolve out of her own experience what seems best adapted to her own genius and conditions.

In Great Britain the power of the King is so much limited and attenuated and he wields so little power that if an important or corrupt King should come to the throne he could not do vital injury to the country. In Siam, in the other hand, the Monarch wields all power. In Siam if a King lacking in ability, in strength of character, or in integrity of purpose, should ascend the throne, he might easily make shipwreck of the country. At the least, he would be almost sure to do it tragic injury. It is therefore infinitely more important for Siam to have a competent and strong King than for any country like England.

It would seem to follow that although a country like England can afford to fix the line of succession to the throne by an absolute principle such as primogeniture, Siam, even were such a principle practicable, cannot afford to do so. Since it is absolutely vital that Siam should have a competent and able Monarch, since the welfare of Siam so directly depends upon the degree of competency and ability of her Monarch, it seems clear that Siam's welfare vitally and directly depends upon her being able freely to select as the Monarch the ablest, the most competent and the strongest of the Royal Princes. Any law which prevents such a freedom of choice and which therefore might necessitate the crowning of an incompetent or weak Monarch because he happens to be the next in line of succession, must make against the ultimate national welfare. In England, where the Premier wields the actual power of government, no one would tolerate the idea of following a fixed line of succession for Premiers, or of adopting any system which would run the country of its complete freedom of choice. If the King is to continue in absolute power, Siam's future welfare would seem to depend upon her being free to choose for her Monarch the best man available among the Royal Princes, regardless or rank or age; unless Siam has this freedom she must expect to have from time to time Monarchs who are incompetent suffer tragically. For these reasons I feel that there should be, no hard and fast law of succession based upon rank, seniority, or any other absolute principle, but rather that the choice should be left free and unhindered so long as it falls upon a Prince of Royal Blood. In order to prevent undue pretensions from those scheming for personal self advancement, it would seem wise that the choice of the heir apparent should be limited to a son of some King and of a Queen of any rank or to persons of Royal Blood; presumable the choice should not be open to some sons of concubines.

TIME OF CHOICE
It would seem to me that the choice of the heir apparent should be made before the death of the King, there in great danger that various factions will arise each backing its own candidate, and there is always danger that this might lead to civil war, It is manifestly of the greatest importance that upon the death of the King, all the Royal Princes should be united and stand together in the choice of a successor. This could hardly be assure unless the heir apparent is chosen during the lifetime of the King.

BY WHOM THE CHOICE SHOULD BE MADE
I feel quite strongly that the choice of the heir apparent should not be left solely to the King, but that the choice should be made by the King with the advise and consent of the Privy Council. If the choice will be a very real danger that a group of Royal Princes or Ministers may not believe in the wisdom or the King's choice, or may not concur in it. If this should be the case it would result in a lack of loyalty on the part of such Princes or Ministers to the person chosen by the King; and the result upon the death of the King might be disastrous. To give a concrete illustration of what I mean, the King might designate as his successor his newly born infant son. The most patriotic and ablest of the High Princes and Ministers might fell that Siam was at the time in such a critical position that a long period of regency would spell disaster for the country, and night therefore conclude that the only patriotic thing for them to do would be to put aside the infant child and instead place upon the throne a strong and able ruler. Should a considerable faction support the infant child, civil war might result.

In other words, my feeling is that the unquestioning loyalty of the Princes and Ministers to the heir apparent upon the death of the King is absolutely vital for Siam's welfare and that the only way to insure such loyalty is to give to the Privy Council a voice is choosing the heir apparent. I therefore feel that the action of His late Majesty in claiming the right ti choose his successor alone and unaided, was exceedingly unwise and should not be followed.

It would seem that this choice should be made by means of a secret ballot. If there is to be an actual freedom of choice on the part of the Privy Councillors they must be freed from the embarrassment of having to give an open and non-secret vote possibly not in accordance with the wishes and desires of the King. The only way to ensure real freedom of choice is by secret balloting. Presumably it should require more that a bare majority to choose the heir apparent, The concurrence of three quarters of those present within against the possibility of a substantial proportion being disloyal to the heir apparent.

A further question arises as to whether the choice of heir apparent should be made by the Privy Council or by the Council of High Princes and Ministers of State. If the foregoing ideas are sound, it would seem clear that the choice should be made by the body which is most truly representative of the various and diversified interests of the Kingdom and which most nearly reflects the opinion of the controlling people. This would seem to be the Privy Council. Also, if the Premier form of Government as suggested below is adopted, the choice closely should be made by the Privy Council, for, since the Council of High Princes and Ministers of State is so small that the Ministers form a majority of the group, a scheming Premier could absolutely control the choice of the heir apparent by compelling the Ministers to vote for his own choice. This would not be possible in a body as large as the Privy Council.

PROVISIONAL NATURE OF CHOICE
Conditions are continually changing. Children are born, boys come to age, certain individuals die, some, through the course of time prove weak or incompetent, and others gain strength and prove their worth. It therefore seems important to me that the choice of the heir apparent should not be irrevocable. I should like to see the choice made a provisional one which could be freely changed as conditions change. I should suggest that the King and Privy Council consider the question of choosing the successor to the King afresh at intervals of every five or ten years; that at the end of every such period the new conditions should be given consideration, and the best man as viewed in the light of that time should them be chosen. This choice should be regarded in the light of a purely provisional choice rather than of an appointment. Clearly thee should be no actual appointment and no official announcement should be made. Neither should additional rank be given to the person chosen, Otherwise his position should a different man later be chosen, would be too hard. The suggestion of making the choice purely a provisional one would have the additional advantage that no one could feel secure that he would ascend the throne upon the death of the existing King. The position of the heir apparent is a very difficult one. He becomes surrounded with men seeking to flatter him in order to gain his good opinion and thus to acquire power when he comes to the throne. Conditions all seem to tend in the direction of warping his character and thereby rendering him less fit later to perform his duties as King. If no one could feel secure in the position of heir apparent and if the choice were recognized as an entirely provisional one, it seems to me that it would be advantageous from the view-point of shaping the character of the person provisionally chosen as the heir apparent.

If the newly elected King should die before his successor has been chosen, then it would seem best to follow out the same principles, i.e. the Privy Council should meet and choose from the Royal Princes freely and without restriction whoever seems to them best fitted and most competent to carry out the duties of the King.

The foregoing suggestion, it would seem to me are those best calculated to secure the most competent and ablest man for the Kingship. It would probably also lessen the likelihood, of regencies which are apt to be exceedingly dangerous in a country like Siam, where absolute power is vested in the King.

Therefore, for all these reasons, my answer to the 1st. and 2nd. questions which Your Majesty proposed are as follows:

The King should have the right to choose any Royal Princes whatever as his heir, but not without the advice and consent of the Privy Council. This suggestion, as Your Majesty intimated would be more consistent with the idea of an elected King; and influence of the new King,

If these ideas are sound, the present law of succession should be dropped and a new fundamental law in accordance with these ideas should be framed and promulgated.

II. FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT
I do not think that it is practicable to consider at this time the organization of a popular representative parliament in Siam. A workable parliament is absolutely dependent upon an intelligent electorate. Without intelligent control by the people such a body would be sure to degenerate into a corrupt and tyrannical body. Until the rank and file of people in Siam have generally received a higher degree of education then at present it would seen therefore to be exceedingly dangerous to try to set up a popularly controlled parliamentary body. It therefore seems inescapable that at least for the present absolute power must continue to rest in the King.

Absolute Monarchy can never be free from the great and vital danger of an incompetent of weak King. In the hands of an enlightened Monarch, much as King Chulalongkorn, rapid progress can be made and national interests can be greatly advanced; but if an incompetent or weak Monarch comes to the throne all the progress of a former reign may be lost and the country may be freed with the dire alternative of disaster or revolution. Anything which will help to prevent such disastrous abuse of power will tend to promote the ultimate welfare of the Monarchy.

Viewed from this light the system of government by a Premier would seem to have distinct advantages. In the first place, if the actual work of government is committed to a Premier, if corruption creeps into the government or if intriguers or self-interested cliques manage to obtain the reign of power, as long as the King remains sincere and is accessible to others, The premier can always be removed and the group of intriguers upset, whereas a King cannot be removed. In other words, in every country there should always be held in remove some power other than revolution, to remove one who proves himself in actual practice unfit for the carrying on of the government, and in a country like Siam this reserve power logically should be exercised by the King. By the transfer of the detailed work or government from the shoulders of the King to those of an appointed Premier. Siam would achieve a reserve power which would make possible through peaceful means the removal of whoever proves unfit to do the work of government; and in this way, the country would gain a guarantee against incapacity and possible tyranny on the part of the one carrying on the actual operations of government.

In the second place, the system of government by a Premier has the advantage of allowing a complete freedom in the selection of the one responsible for the carrying on of the government. The person thus selected need not be confined necessarily to Royal Blood, nor to Kingly rank, but can be selected with absolute freedom of with a view solely to ability for the work of government, The work of carrying on the government may be placed upon the shoulders of whoever of all the men in the Kingdom in best fitted for the task by reason of the integrity, his strength of character, his executive capacity, and his ability to translate desired policies into practical achievement.

A third advantage of the system of Government by a Premier is that under a Premier the work of the separate. Ministers can be more easily unified and co-ordinated. During the last reign one could not but feel that much was lost by a lack of co-ordination among the separate Ministers, and in these fields of work which spread beyond the sphere of any single Ministry progress was often hampered or entirely blocked. It is the duty of a Premier to formulate the general policies to be followed by the Government and to unify the work of all the separate Ministries so as to attain those desired policies. To do so the Premier must be constantly accessible to everyone engaged in the work of carrying out these policies. A Premier can be thus accessible in a way which is not open to the King, many of the difficulties of the late reign were due to the feet that His late Majesty was not freely accessible to those actually carrying on the work of the government, and he therefore often made decisions based upon opinions gained from a single self-interested clique which did not make for the welfare of Siam. Because those who care most for Siam and who exercised wise judgement frequently could not reach him, he frequently failed to know the truth underlying the situations with which he dealt, and therefore noted in ignorance sometimes with regrettable results.

A fourth advantage of the system of Premier Government is that it allows a division of work. Upon the King falls the inescapable duty of performing innumerable ceremonials, all of which require time and strength. Upon the King also must fall the decision of all questions of large national policy, — a task exacting the best of any man's time and strength. Problems involving the family affairs of the Royal Family also fall upon the King's shoulders, as well as innumerable other duties which no King can escape. These responsibilities are more than sufficient to consume the full time and strength of any one man. If to all of these is added the weighty burden of carrying on the actual work of Government and deciding the multitudinous and endless minor questions which the conduct of government unforgivingly requires, the burden becomes too great for any single man to bear. The work of actual government is strenuous and exhausting, — far more so than most people realize. If all this work is thrown upon the King in addition to his other grave responsibilities and burdens, either he will break under the strain during a course of years, or else he will be compelled to neglect, through sheer physical incapacity, reading many State papers which the one responsible for the government ought to read and seeing many people which such a man ought to see. It is almost inevitable that he will, become tired and discouraged and in time fall in to the hands and under the power of an intriguing, clever group scheming for their own self-advancement instead of for the welfare of Siam. This was not true in the early days when the task of government had not assumed such large proportions as it does to-day, and when the work of government was simple & comparatively easy. As the work of government becomes more and more complex, however, the time will soon come, if it has not already done so, when no single man can possibly perform all the Ceremonials which the King must perform, properly decide large issues of national policy, settle questions arising in the Royal Family, and in addition at the same time carry on the arduous and strenuous work of detailed government.

For all these reasons it would seem manifest that the King should be relieved from the hard work of government and that this should be instead placed upon the shoulder of a Premier appointed by the King. Such an arrangement does not mean that the King would be shorn of his power. The ultimate power would still rest with the King. It would mean that the King would place upon the Premier the responsibilities for carrying on the government and that the Premier would always be responsible to the King. The King would be relieved of much of the detailed burden of government; but questions of large policy would still be referred for decision to the King.

Under such a scheme it would be vital and essential that all responsibility should be concentrated in the Premier, He therefore should alone have the power of appointing the Ministers of State, who would be responsible for the conduct of the work in their Ministries directly and immediately to the Premier, all questions should go from the Ministries directly to the Premier. Under such a scheme it would seem vital that the King should not himself select or choose any of the Ministers. It he did so the Premier could not be made responsible for the work of the Ministers thus chosen. Responsibility in such a case would rest rather with the King; whereas the whole underlying conception of government by a Premier is rather to concentrate responsibility in the Premier as that for any and all mistakes or errors in the work of the Ministries the King can blame and hold entirely responsible the Premier under whose control and direction the work is carried on.

There is one danger which must be faced under such a system. It is possible that the Premier might seek to absorb so much power that he would become a rival or even overshadow the King, as was a case, for example, with the Shoguns in Japan. Although this a possible danger, I do not feel it is a very real one under the conditions existing in Siam, unless indeed the King should be no manifestly incompetent or unfit for his duties that he ought ti be stripped of power. If the Premier seemed to be scheming for personal power the King could of course always remove him. If, nevertheless, such a danger were felt to be real at might be guarded against by various possible methods. For instance, the Ministry of War or of National Defense might be placed directly under the King and therefore made entirely independent of the Premier. In this way the King could keep direct control of the Army and see that only officers loyal to him were appointed. Under such a scheme the Ministry of War would have to be separately budgeted for and entirely separately budgeted for and entirely separated from the other work of government. In my opinion, however, such a precaution as keeping the Army out of the control of the Premier would under the conditions now prevailing in Siam be unnecessary.

I quite realize that there are many difficulties which must be faced in creating a form of Government by a Premier. Both the conception of making the various Ministers responsible to the Premier instead of to the King and the idea of the Premier or a Minister resigning because he personally disagrees with the policy advocate by his superior although he is well qualified for his post and entirely acceptable to his superior are quite foreign to the ideas at present generally prevailing in Siam, and would have to be developed cautiously and with care. Nevertheless, both of these ideas must be thoroughly learned before Parliamentary Government can be achieved; and if, as I hope, Siam will one day achieve some norm of Parliamentary Government, these prerequisite ideas must first be mastered and generally understood by the people. If these first steps to Parliamentary Government must be mastered some day, I see no reason why they should not be mastered now.

Very much, of course, depends in personalities. Is it possible at this time to secure some one competent and willing to undertake the infinitely important tank of accomplishing this transformation and carrying on the Government as Premier? The programme to be followed vitally depends upon the answer to this question.

In answer to the 3rd and 4th questions proposed by Your Majesty, my answer is that Siam I hop some day may have a parliamentary form of Government, but that the country is not yet prepared for representative government. I believe that those who are shaping the destinies of Siam should not lose sight of a representative form of Government at some future time when the spread of education makes this possible; for I believe that some much form of Government in inevitable and desirable with the growth of education and widespread intelligence among the population. Whether or not the form of Government should be the Anglo-Saxon type or parliamentary government is a question which need not be decided at this time. My own hope is that Siam will never become completely Westernized but will retain in her development her own individuality. Her institutions, governmental and otherwise, should not be blindly copied from Western nations, but should be the result and out growth of hr own genius and experience.

THE SUPREME COUNCIL
The creation of the Supreme Council at the beginning of Your Majesty's reign was to my mind a master stroke. By creating a Supreme Council endowed with high power and by placing upon this the five ablest and strongest men of the Kingdom, every one of them of unquestionable integrity and patriotism. Your Majesty struck at the very root of the intrigue and underground scheming which had been going on before Your Majesty came to the throne. The result was the gain of immediate confidence on the part of the people of Siam and a great strengthening of the position of the Monarch. In my own opinion the functioning of the Supreme Council has amply justified its creation, and personally I do not personally I do not feel that was long as it keeps free of intrigue it should be allowed to die a natural death. It seems to me that there are very distinct functions which the Supreme Council can fulfill under the Premier scheme of government which I have been suggesting.

Although the Premier should carry on the entire work of the government, large questions of national policy cannot fail to keep constantly arising, and these will have to be referred for decision to Your Majesty. Many of these must be questions which from their very nature should not be decided single-handed and without help by anyone. Your Majesty will doubtless wish to secure the advice of a few of the wisest men of the realm. Such questions might well be referred by Your Majesty to the Supreme Council for their advice and suggestion, always reserving the power of final decision to Yourself. In other words, my conception of the functions of the Supreme Council under such a scheme of government would be that it should from a purely advisory body to which the King might turn for advice on question of large policy. It should have nothing whatsoever to do with the executive work of government. Presumably the Premier should be a member of the Supreme Council, so that the person charged with the actual conduct of the government could have the benefit of the advice and views of the members of the Supreme Council. On the other hand, no member of the Cabinet other than the Premier should sit in the Supreme Council. It should be kept sharply distinct from the Cabinet and should be confined purely to the giving of advice direct to the King on questions of policy.

I realize that criticisms have been made concerning the functioning of the Supreme Council, many of them unjust, yet some of them perhaps not without foundation. To my mind the advantages of the Supreme Council outweigh the objections to it. It serves as an effective preventative of backstairs influence which must always be an overpresent danger in absolute Monarchy. It provides for an effective avenue by which outside opinion may reach the ears of the King, and thus enable him the better to understand and appreciate the truth underlying any given situation. It gives to the King the benefit of the wisdom and experience of the ablest men of the Kingdom.

On the other hand, it has its dangers if its powers are not strictly confined to the giving of advice and if its advice is not strictly confined to question of policy. There will always be the danger that the very eagerness of its members to correct abuses will lead it to interfere with the work of the various Ministries and thereby to detract from the concentration of responsibility which should centre in each if the Ministers. If the supreme council once begins to encroach upon the executive fields of government by interferings with the conduct of work in the separate Ministries, by advising as to appointments to be made under the rank of Minister of State, or in any other way taking part in the executive functions of government, it will thereby at once lessen the efficiency and increase the difficulties of every Minister. This must be an overpresent danger unless the powers pf the Supreme Council are strictly confined and limited solely to the giving of advice and to the giving of advice on questions only of policy. Questions of appointments should presumably be left to the free discretion of the Ministers.

Again, as long as the members of the Supreme Council sit in the Cabinet there is the danger of their forming a clique within the Cabinet. The Cabinet members will be ignorant of whether or not any issue under discussion in the Cabinet has already been discussed in the Supreme Council, and the members of the Cabinet will consequently be likely to feel that they are often acting in the dark. May there not be a danger that many of the Cabinet Members will simply watch which way the members of the Supreme Council vote, and will cast their vote accordingly, instead of exercising an an independent judgment and feeling a real sense of responsibility? It seems open to considerable question whether the Supreme Council, if it is to perform its most useful functions, should not be kept entirely separate from the Cabinet and the members thereof except the Premier refrain from sitting in the Cabinet meetings.

In answer to the 5th question out by Your Majesty my answer is that in my judgment the Supreme Council should be continued as a permanent institution of the country, but that its power should be carefully defined by law and should be limited to the giving of advice and to giving such advice only on questions of underlying policy. I believe it should be separated from the Cabinet and should act entirely independently of that body. It should keep rigorously free of interfering in executive matters.

In the 6th question, Your Majesty asks whether we should have a Prime Minister and whether such a system should be inaugurated now. I have already given the reasons why I believe that Siam should have a Prime Minister. I also believe that the system should be inaugurated now. If such a fundamental change is to be made, it would seem far easier to make it at the beginning of a reign when new policies are being formed and new paths are being blazed than settled in fixed channels and when restricting obligations have grown out of troublesome situations or troublesome personalities. If a change such as this is to be put into force, it would seem best to do so at the beginning of a reign so that the King can devote fresh energy and many years so he gradual moulding of the system into the most efficient form of government which can be evolved to meet the distinctive conditions and need of the country.

It may be argued that there is at present no need for such a change, since under Your Majesty's wise guidance with the resistance of the Supreme Council the government in Siam at the present time is entirely satisfactory. I cannot feel the force of such an argument. While it is quite true that the present government of Siam is functioning well, when one takes a far look into the future one must reckon with a popular demand for some parliamentary or more popular form of government. This necessitates the making at some time of fundamental changes; and if progress demands these changes, surely the time to make them is when a competent and wise Monarch is on the throne, assisted by able and patriotic leaders.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
The question has been asked whether or not Siam should have a Legislative Council. I hope that some day it will be possible to form a popular and representative legislative body charged with the framing of the laws; this seems to me highly desirable and ultimately inevitable. As already suggested, however, I do not feel that the rank and file of people in Siam are at present sufficiently educated and interested in public affairs to make the formation of such a body possible at this time.

Furthermore, I see very little advantage in the formation of a legislative body or council composed of representatives from each of the Government ministries. It seem questionable whether any useful purpose would be served by such a body other than that which is already being performed by the Cabinet and by the Department of Legislative Redaction; and such a council might add infinitely to the delay in securing the passage of new laws. Until the time when a law making body can be elected by the rank and file of people be thus directly representative of population as a whole, in my opinion the formation of a legislative council would probably serve no useful purpose.

On the other hand, I can see a decided advantage in finding some method for making possible the interpolation of government Ministers. If the policy of any Ministry is misunderstood by the people generally, as long as it is an honest policy the Minister ought to welcome the opportunity of explaining and defending the policy so as to disarm and silence criticism. If on the other hand, the policy is due to intrigue or adopted for selfish reasons the method interpolation is often the best way to bring the matter to the attention of those at the head of the government. If it is possible therefore to secure a representative body which will represent popular opinion, I would like to see such a body given the power to put questions, I would like to see such a body given the power to put questions to the Ministers of Government. Such an outlet for popular opinion would form a kind of safety valve and do much to prevent such popular opinion from becoming by reason of its suppression dangerous. If the system of Municipal Councils in the various cities proves practicable, it might later become possible to create a body containing one or more representatives from each important city with the power thus publicly to interpolate the Ministers. This is a matter, however, which should probably be left as to details until a later time when the success of the Municipal Councils has become assured. In the meantime, it might prove advantageous to allow the members of the Supreme Council to interpolate the Ministers at a meeting presided over by the King. Under the Premier system of Government if the members of the Supreme Council could thus call the Minsters to account, it would serve as an effective check against the corrupt use of power by Ministers appointed by an unscrupulous Premier. It would also serve to reduce to a Supreme Council; for the quickest way to prevent misunderstandings is frank and full discussion.

In reply therefore to the 7th question proposed by Your Majesty, I do not in favour of creating a Legislative Council; but I should suggest the giving of serious consideration to the later formation of some body representing popular opinion which should have the power to interpolate Cabinet Ministers, and until such time the giving of this power to the Supreme Council.

III. FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
In the 6th question Your Majesty asks whether I have any opinion as to Siam's financial policy. Since I am not a financial expert, I think I should leave such question for the advice of a man like Sir Edward Cook, who is far better equipped than I to advice on the financial policy of Siam. Nevertheless, there are one or two matters concerning which I feel rather strongly, but upon which because they are quite unrelated to the other subjects of this Memorandum, I shall speak very briefly.

Siam in my opinion, should not be so largely dependent upon a single crop. In the case of unfavourable weather conditions and a consequent shortage or failure of the rice crop, it means that Siam suffers unduly, and is sometimes placed in a temporarily precarious financial situation. It does not seem wise to place on one's eggs in a single basket. I therefore sometimes wonder whether Siam ought not to take steps to engage in the cultivation of some secondary crop, such as tobacco. I have been informed that there is no reason, so far as climate conditions are concerned, why tobacco should not be produced in Siam and that could be produced in the off seasons between the rice crops. Why should Siam not profit, as Java has done from large tobacco crops? Not only would this diversify Siam's crops, but it would of course considerably increased the national production and the consequent revenues of the government. Similarly, there seems no reasons why Siam should not grow hemp and other similar products.

Might not more assistance also be given to efforts to obtain the sowing of a more standard and better rice seed, and thus to standardize the rice produced in Siam and to improve the quality of the crop? Again, might not the fisheries he protected and the production of fish thus increased? I believe that certain kinds of fisheries are now being injured through lack of protection. With proper fish protection and an efficient Fishery Department not only could this injury be stopped but the amount of fish available for feed actually increased.

The idea which I am trying to suggest is that the production of Siam should be stimulated and increased in order to increase the prosperity of the country. All this would seem largely dependent upon the efforts of the Department of Agriculture; but that Department, of course, is funds. In as much as the future prosperity of Siam depends largely upon the stimulation and increase of her agricultural resources, does it not seem that perhaps a greater proportion of the revenues of the Kingdom should be allotted to the Ministry of Agriculture than that at present allowed? Might not a similar remark he made with regard to the Ministry of Education, whose work again vitally concerns the future development of Siam? The thought in the back of my mind with regard to the question of financial policy is the fundamental problem of whether it might not be wise to reconsider afresh the proportion of revenues allotted to each Ministry in the light of the future hope of Siam.

During the year B.C. 2467 cut of a total national expenditure of Tes. 96,452,497.00 the expenditure of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture was only Tes. 4,177,700.00 and the Ministry of Education only Tes, 2,640,344.00. Should not the allotment of revenue as between the different Ministries be freshly considered and determined more in accordance with what will make for the greatest prosperity and strongest Siam of the future?

The 9th question which Your Majesty proposed is whether anything can be done to make the Chinese become Siamese as in the old days. This is a matter of such far reaching importance that I do not feel that I ought to venture an opinion as to it without considerably more study that that which I have been able to devote to it in the two days since Your Majesty's questions were put to me. I should like before coming to any definite conclusions to discuss further with Your Majesty certain underlying problems of policy upon which this question must ultimately depend.

In order to put into concrete shape some of the ideas which I have expressed to Your Majesty, and in compliance with Your Majesty's desire, I have put into the form of a preliminary draft of a short constitution the framework of the government discussed above. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that this is not intended in any sense as a finished document but merely as a hasty prepared starting point upon which to base later discussions.

SD/ PHYA KALYAN MAITRI.

(Francis B. Sayre)