McKnight v. James/Opinion of the Court

As under Rev. St. § 709, a writ of error will go from this court only to the final judgment of the highest court of the state in which a decision in the suit can be had, it is evident that our jurisdiction in this case cannot be sustained unless an order of a judge at chambers remanding a prisoner in a habeas corpus proceeding can be regarded as an order of a 'court,' within the meaning of this section.

We held, however, in Carper v. Fitzgerald, 121 U.S. 87, 7 Sup. Ct. 825, that an appeal did not lie to this court from an order of a circuit judge of the United States, sitting as a judge, and not as a court, discharging a prisoner brought before him on a writ of habeas corpus, for the reason that the act of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. 437), gave an appeal to this court in habeas corpus cases only from the final decision of a circuit court; and that rule 34 (6 Sup. Ct. iii.) did not make his decision as judge a decision of the court, the purpose of that rule being to regulate appeals to the circuit court from the final decision of any court, justice, or judge inferior to that court, as well as appeals from the final decision of such circuit court to the supreme court. As a writ of error from this court can only go to the highest court of a state, it follows by analogy that it will not lie to review the order of a judge at chambers.

The jurisdiction of this court was treated in the brief of plaintiff in error as if it turned upon the question whether, under the pratice in Ohio, a writ of error lay from the supreme court of that state to an order of a circuit judge at chambers; the argument being that it did not, and hence that such judge was the highest court of the state in which a decision in the suit could be had, and a writ of error would therefore lie from this court. In this view, petitioner should at least have applied to that court for a writ of error, or had the order of the circuit judge at chambers made the order of the circuit court. If it be true that, under the laws of Ohio, the final order of a circuit judge at chambers be the judgment or decree of a circuit court, then it is undoubtedly reviewable by the supreme court of Ohio, which is the highest tribunal of Ohio, and is expressly given jurisdiction by statute to review the judgments and orders of the circuit court. But, if this order be not a judgment or decree of a court, then it is not reviewable here, because this court, under section 709, is given authority to review only the judgment and decree of the highest court of the state. In other words, the order cannot be the order of a judge to defeat the jurisdiction in error of the supreme court of Ohio, and at the same time an order of a court to confer jurisdiction upon this court to issue a writ of error. The argument in reality defeats itself. Its very strength is also its weakness. By proving that a writ of error will lie from this court, it also proves that a writ of error will lie from the supreme court of Ohio, and this fact of itself defeats the jurisdiction of this court. Whether the principle of this case applies to other than habeas corpus cases we do not undertake to determine.

The writ of error must therefore be dismissed.