McDonald v. Williams/Opinion of the Court

It will be noticed that the first question is based upon the facts that the bank, at the time the dividends were declared and paid, was solvent, and that the stockholders receiving the dividends acted in good faith, and believed that the same were paid out of the profits made by the bank.

The sections of the Revised Statutes which are applicable to the questions involved herein are set forth in the margin.

The complainant bases his right to recover in this suit upon the theory that the capital of the corporation was a trust fund for the payment of creditors entitled to a portion thereof, and, having been paid in the way of dividends to the shareholders, that portion can be recovered back in an action of this kind for the purpose of paying the debts of the corporation. He also bases his right to recover upon the terms of section 5204 of the Revised Statutes.

We think the theory of a trust fund has no application to a case of this kind. When a corporation is solvent, the theory that its capital is a trust fund upon which there is any lien for the payment of its debts has in fact very little foundation. No general creditor has any lien upon the fund under such circumstances, and the right of the corporation to deal with its property is absolute, so long as it does not violate its charter or the law applicable to such corporation.

In Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 148, 161, it was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, in the course of his opinion, that: 'When a corporation becomes insolvent, it is so far civilly dead that its property may be administered as a trust fund for the benefit of its stockholders and creditors. And a court of equity, at the instance of the proper parties, will then make those funds trust funds which in other circumstances are as much the absolute property of the corporation as any man's property is his.'

And in Hollins v. Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, it was stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court, and speaking of the theory of the capital of a corporation being a trust fund, as follows:

'In other words,-and that is the idea which underlies all these expressions in reference to 'trust' in connection with the property of a corporation,-the corporation is an entity, distinct from its stockholders as from its creditors. Solvent, it holds its property as any individual holds his,-free from the touch of a creditor who has acquired no lien; free also from the touch of a stockholder who, though equitably interested in, has no legal right to, the property. Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together with their conditional liability to the creditors, places the property in a condition of a trust, first for the creditors, and then for the stockholders. Whatever of trust there is arises from the peculiar and diverse equitable rights of the stockholders, as against the corporation, in its property, and their conditional liability to its creditors. It is rather a trust in the administration of the assets after possession by a court of equity, than a trust attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either creditor or stockholder.'

'The officers of a corporation act in a fiduciary capacity in respect to its property in their hands, and may be called to an account for fraud, or sometimes even mere mismanagement in respect thereto; but, as between itself and its creditors, the corporation is simply a debtor, and does not hold its property in trust, or subject to a line in heir favor, in any other sense than does an individual debtor. That is certainly the general rule, and, if there by any exceptions thereto, they are not presented by any of the facts in this case. Neither the insolvency of the corporation, nor the execution of an illegal trust deed, not the failure to collect in full all stock subscriptions, nor all together, gave to these simple-contract creditors any lien upon the property of the corporation, nor charged any direct trust thereon.'

Other cases are cited in the opinion as holding the same doctrine.

In Railway Co. v. Ham. 114 U.S. 587, 594, 5 Sup. Ct. 1081, Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

'The property of a corporation is doubtless a trust fund for the payment of its debts, in the sense that when the corporation is lawfully dissolved, and all its business wound up, or when it is insolvent, all its creditors are entitled, in equity, to have their debts paid out of the corporate property before any distribution thereof among the stockholders. It is also true, in the case of a corporation as in that of a natural person, that any conveyance of property of the debtor, without authority of law, and in fraud of existing creditors, is void as against them.'

These cases, while not involving precisely the same question now before us, show there is no well-defined lien of creditors upon the capital of a corporation while the latter is a solvent and going concern, so as to permit creditors to question at the time the disposition of the property.

The bank, being solvent, although it paid its dividends out of capital, did not pay them out of a trust fund. Upon the subsequent insolvency of the bank and the appointment of a receiver, an action could not be brought by the latter to recover the dividends thus paid, on the theory that they were paid from a trust fund, and therefore were liable to be recovered back.

It is contended on the part of the complainant, however, that, if the assets of the bank are impressed with a trust in favor of its creditors when it is insolvent, they must be impressed with the same trust when it is solvent; that the mere fact that the value of the assets of the corporation has sunk below the amount of its debts, although as yet unknown to anybody, cannot possibly make a new contract between the corporation and its creditors. In case of insolvency, however, the recovery of the money paid in the ordinary way without condition is allowed, not on the ground of contract to repay, but because the money thus paid was in equity the money of the creditor; that it did not belong to the bank, and the bank, in paying, could bestow no title in the money it paid to one who did not receive it bona fide and for value. The assets of the bank while it is solvent may clearly not be impressed with a trust in favor of creditors, and yet that trust may be created by the very fact of the insolvency, and the trust enforced by a receiver as the representative of all the creditors. But we do not wish to be understood as deciding that the doctrine of a trust found does in truth extend to a shareholder receiving a dividend, in good faith believing it is paid out of profits, even though the bank at the time of the payment be in fact insolvent. That question is not herein presented to us, and we express no opinion in regard to it. We only say that, if such a dividend be recoverable, it would be on the principle of a trust fund.

Insolvency is a most important and material fact, not only with individuals but with corporations; and with the latter, as with the former, the mere fact of its existence may change radically and materially its rights and obligations. Where there is no statute providing what particular act shall be evidence of insolvency or bankruptcy, it may be, and it sometimes is, quite difficult to determine the fact of its existence at any particular period of time. Although no trust exists while the corporation is solvent, the fact which creates the trus is the insolvency, and, when that fact is established, at that instant the trust arises. To prove the instant of creation may be almost impossible, and yet its existence at some time may very easily be proved. What the precise nature and extent of the trust is, even in such case, may be somewhat difficult to accurately define, but it may be admitted, in some form, and to some extent, to exist in a case of insolvency.

Hence it must be admitted that the law does create a distinction between solvency and insolvency, and that from the moment when the latter condition is established the legality of acts thereafter performed will be decided by very different principles than in a case of solvency. And so of acts committed in contemplation of insolvency. The fact of insolvency must be proved, in order to show the act was one committed in contemplation thereof.

Without reference to the statute, therefore, we think the right to recover the dividend paid which the bank was solvent would not exist.

But it is urged on the part of the complainant that section 5204 of the Revised Statutes makes the payment of a dividend out of capital illegal and ultra vires of the corporation, and that money thus paid remains the property of the corporation, and can be followed into the hands of any volunteer.

The section provides that 'no association, or any member thereof, shall, during the time it shall continue its banking operations, withdraw, or permit to be withdrawn, either in the form of dividends or otherwise, any portion of its capital.' What is meant by this language? Has a shareholder withdrawn or permitted to be withdrawn, in the form of a dividend, any portion of the capital of the bank, when he has simply and in good faith received a dividend declared by a board of directors of which he was not a member, and which dividend he honestly supposed was declared only out of profits? Does he, in such case, within the meaning of the statute, withdraw or permit to be withdrawn a portion of the capital? The law prohibits the making of a dividend by a national bank from its capital, or to an amount greater than its net profits then on had, deducting therefrom its losses and bad debts. The fact of the declaration of a dividend is, in effect, the assertion by the board of directors that the dividend is made out of profits. Believing that the dividend is thus made, the shareholder, in good faith, receives his portion of it. Can it be said that in thus doing he withdraws, or permits to be withdrawn, any portion of the capital of the corporation? We think he does not withdraw it by the mere reception of his proportionate part of the dividend. The withdrawal was initiated by the declaration of the dividend by the board of directors, and was consummated on their part when they permitted payment to be made in accordance with the declaration. We think this language implies some positive or affirmative act on the part of the shareholder by which he knowingly withdraws the capital or some portion thereof, or with knowledge permits some act which results in the withdrawal, and which might not have been so withdrawn without his action. The permitting to be withdrawn cannot be founded upon the simple receipt of a dividend under the facts stated above.

One is not usually said to permit an act which he is wholly ignorant of; nor would he be said to consent to an act, of the commission of which he had no knowledge. Ought it to be said that he withdraws or permits the withdrawal by ignorantly, yet in entire good faith, receiving his proportionate part of the dividend? Is each shareholder an absolute insurer that dividends are paid out of profits? Must he employ experts to examine the books of the bank previous to receiving each dividend? Few shareholders could make such examination themselves. The shareholder takes the fact that a dividend has been declared as an assurance that it was declared out of profits and not out of capital, because he knows that the statute prohibits any declaration of a divid nd out of capital. Knowing that a dividend from capital would be illegal, he would receive the dividend as an assurance that the bank was in a prosperous condition and with unimpaired capital. Under such circumstances, we cannot think that congress intended, by the use of the expression, 'withdraw or permit to be withdrawn, either in the form of dividends, or otherwise,' any portion of its capital, to include the case of the passive receipt of a dividend by a shareholder in the bona fide belief that the dividend was paid out of profits, while the bank was in fact solvent. We think it would be an improper construction of the language of the statute to hold that it covers such a case.

We are strengthened in our views as to the proper construction of this act by reference to some of its other sections. The payment of the capital within a certain time is provided for by sections 5140 and 5141. Section 5151 provides for the individual responsibility of each shareholder to the extent of his stock at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested therein. (These shareholders have already been assessed under this section.) And section 5205 provides for the case of a corporation whose capital shall have become impaired by losses or otherwise, and proceedings may be taken by the association against the shareholders for the payment of the deficiency in the capital within three months after receiving notice thereof from the comptroller. These various provisions of the statute impose a very severe liability upon the part of holders of national bank stock, and, while such provisions are evidently imposed for the purpose of securing reasonable safety to those who deal with the banks, we may nevertheless say, in view of this whole system of liability, that it is unnecessary, and that it would be an unnatural construction of the language of section 5204, to hold that, in a case such as this, a shareholder, by the receipt of a dividend from a solvent bank, had withdrawn, or permitted to be withdrawn, any portion of its capital.

We may concede that the directors who declared the dividend under such circumstances violated the law, and that their act was therefore illegal; but the reception of the dividend by the shareholder in good faith, as mentioned in the question, was not a wrongful or designedly improper act. Hence the liability of the shareholder should not be enlarged by reason of the conduct of the directors. The may have rendered themselves liable to prosecution, but the liability of the shareholder is different in such a case; and the receipt of a dividend under the circumstances is different from an act which may be said to be generally illegal, such as the purchase of stock in one national bank by another national bank for an investment merely, which is never proper. Bank v. Hawkins (just decided), 19 Sup. Ct. 739.

The declaration and payment of a dividend is part of the course of business of these corporations. It is the thing for which they are established, and its payment is looked for as the appropriate result of the business which has been done. The presumption of legality attaches to its declaration and payment, because declaring it is to assert that it is payable out of the profits. As the statute has provided a remedy, under section 5205, for the impairment of the capital, which includes the case of an impairment produced by the payment of a dividend, we think the payment and receipt of a dividend, under the circumstances detailed in the question certified, do not permit of its recovery back by a receiver appointed upon the subsequent insolvency of the bank.

The facts in the various English cases cited by counsel for complainant are so entirely unlike those which exist in this case that no useful purpose would be subserved by a reference to them. Not one holds that a dividene declared under such facts as this case assumes can be recovered back in such an action as this.

We answer the first question in the negative.

The sec nd question relates to the jurisdiction of a court of equity over an action of this nature. It is evident that the question was propounded to meet the case of an affirmative answer to the first question.

In that event the second would require an answer. As we answer the first question in the negative, and the second question was scarcely touched upon in the argument, we think it unnecessary to answer it in order to enable the court below to proceed to judgment in the case. The first question will be certified in the negative.