MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

Donald C. MacPherson, Respondent, v. Buick Motor Company, Appellant

Court of Appeals of New York

217 N.Y. 382; 111 N.E. 1050

January 24, 1916, Argued -- March 14, 1916, Decided

1. If the nature of a finished product placed on the market by a manufacturer to be used without inspection by his customers is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril if the product is negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. This principle is not limited to poisons, explosives and things of like nature, which in their normal operation are implements of destruction.

2. The defendant, a manufacturer of automobiles, sold an automobile to a retail dealer and the retail dealer resold to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was in the car it suddenly collapsed and he was thrown out and injured. One of the wheels was made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into fragments. The wheel was not made by the defendant, but was bought from another manufacturer. There is evidence, however, that its defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection and that inspection was omitted. There is no claim that the defendant knew of the defect and willfully concealed it. On examination and analysis of the authorities in this and other states, in the Federal courts and of the English cases, held, that the defendant's liability was not confined to the immediate purchaser, and that it was not absolved from a duty of inspection because it bought the wheels from a reputable manufacturer. Since it was not merely a dealer, but manufacturer of automobiles, it was responsible for the finished product and was not at liberty to put that product on the market without [***3] subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests, and hence is liable for the injuries sustained by plaintiff.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

William Van Dyke for appellant. An automobile is not an inherently dangerous article. ( Slater v. Thresher Co., 97 Minn. 305; Danforth v. Fisher, 75 N.H. 111; Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580; Vincent v. Seymour, 131 App. Div. 200; Lewis v. Snorous, 59 S. E. Rep. [Ga.] 338; Huddy on Automobile, 15; Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 409; Jones v. Hope, 47 Wash. 633; Johnson v. Cadillac, 194 Fed. Rep. 497; 221 Fed. Rep. 801.) An automobile not being an article inherently dangerous, defendant was not liable to a third party in simple negligence -- that is, for negligence as contradistinguished from willful or knowing negligence, or in a negligence action as distinguished from an action for deceit, fraud or misrepresentation, to third parties not in contractual relations with it. ( Salisbury v. Howe, 87 N.Y. 132; Landeman v. Russell, 91 N. E. Rep. 822; Pa. Steel Co. v. Elmore & H. Co., 175 Fed. Rep. 176; Wellington v. Downer, 104 Mass. 64; Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470; Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U.S. 179; R. & D. Railroad v. Elliott, 149 U.S. 272; Penn. Ry. Co. v. Hummell, 167 Fed. Rep. 89.) A contention that defendant is liable because, though an automobile is not inherently a dangerous thing, if it has a defective wheel, it is an imminently dangerous thing, and if imminently dangerous, the same rule follows as though it were an inherently dangerous thing, cannot be sustained. ( Cadillac M. C. Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. Rep. 801; Titus v. R. R. Co., 136 Penn. St. 618; Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 125 App. Div. 71; Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478; Marquardt v. Engine Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 374.)

Edgar T. Brackett for respondent. An automobile, propelled by explosive gases, certified and put out, as here conceded, to run at a speed of fifty miles an hour, to be managed by whomsoever may purchase it, is a machine inherently dangerous. ( Texas v. Barrett, 67 Fed. Rep. 214; Statler v. Ray, 195 N.Y. 478; Torgeson v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156; Kahner v. Otis, 96 App. Div. 169; Favo v. Remington, 67 App. Div. 414; Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616; Kuelling v. Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78; Cadillac M. C. Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. Rep. 801; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397.) The defendant was the manufacturer of the machine and subject to all the liabilities of a manufacturer, even if it purchased and did not itself actually put together the defective wheel which caused the plaintiff's injury. ( People ex rel. v. Morgan, 48 App. Div. 395; Norris v. Com., 27 Penn. St. 494; Tidewater, etc., v. United States, 171 U.S. 210; Commonwealth v. Keystone, 156 Penn. St. 500; New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 34 La. Ann. 596; New Orleans v. Ernst, 35 La. Ann. 746; State v. Wiebert, 51 La. Ann. 122; Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389; Hegeman v. W. R. R. Corp., 13 N.Y. 9; Carlson v. Phoenix, etc., Co., 132 N.Y. 273.)

Cardozo, J. Hiscock, Chase and Cuddeback, JJ., concur with Cardozo, J., and Hogan, J., concurs in result. Willard Bartlett, Ch. J., reads dissenting opinion; Pound, J., not voting.