Lyle v. Patterson/Opinion of the Court

The Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad, claiming to have earned the land under the act of 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 72, chap. 84), sold a quarter section in 1887, to Pasco, who bought in good faith, believing that the company was entitled to a grant from the state. He conveyed his interest to Patterson, who, pending the litigation between the United States and the railroad company, in reference to the land, made a contract as to the amount to be paid him in the event the company lost the suit. The government prevailed, and the land being specially valuable because of its having been cultivated and improved, there was a race to acquire the pre-emption right. Lyle and others, claiming to have entered into possession, made applications for a homestead. Patterson, relying on the rights of a good-faith purchaser under the act of March 3, 1887, filed his claim. After a lengthy contest in the Land Department he received a patent. Lyle insists that the action of the Secretary of the Interior was based upon a misconstruction of the law, and that Patterson and his assignee should be decreed to hold the title in trust for Lyle as the first entryman.

In the lengthy briefs filed in this court various arguments are presented to show that the benefit of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 557, chap. 376), was confined to those who bought before that date, and that Patterson's subsequent contract with the railroad company deprived him of the priority he otherwise might have had. It is not necessary to consider these contentions, for even if they were sound, it could not avail Lyle in the present suit, since he can only recover on the strength of his equity, and not on the defects in defendant's title.

When, on October 22, 1895, he made the so-called entry and settlement, the quarter section was not an open and unoccupied part of the public domain, but in the possession of Thomas Beacom, who had bought from those who, having acquired the property in good faith, cultivated the land and made valuable and permanent improvements thereon. This prior possessory title was good as against all except the United States, and Lyle's entry was a trespass which neither gave nor initiated any right in the property. The fact that by the threats and violence of another trespasser, he was prevented from continuing his forcible entry and detainer, deprived him of no right in the land, though it does illustrate what would be the result if possession secured by violence and maintained with force and arms could furnish the basis of a right enforceable in law.

Such a claim, originating in trespass, cannot be recognized; for 'to create a right of pre-emption there must be settlement, inhabitation, and improvement by the preemptor,-conditions which cannot be met when land is in the possession of another.' Hosmer v. Wallace, 97 U.S. 579, 24 L. ed. 1131. This is equally true of the initiation of a homestead right by settlement. The land here had been cultivated and improved by those who were in possession under a purchase from the railroad, the apparent owner of the equitable title. Lyle's entry, though made under a pretense of effecting a homestead settlement, was but a naked unlawful trespass which could not initiate a right. Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U.S. 516, 24 L. ed. 733; Swanson v. Sears, 224 U.S. 182, 56 L. ed. 724, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455. He therefore had no standing in court, and the bill was properly dismissed.

Decree affirmed.