Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company v. Elbert/Concurrence Frankfurter

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring.

Not deeming it appropriate now to question Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9, I join the Court's opinion. But our holding results in such a glaring perversion of the purpose to which the original grant of diversity jurisdiction was directed that it ought not to go without comment, as further proof of the mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction.

The stuff of diversity jurisdiction is state litigation. The availability of federal tribunals for controversies concerning matters which in themselves are outside federal power and exclusively within state authority, is the essence of a jurisdiction solely resting on the fact that a plaintiff and a defendant are citizens of different States. The power of Congress to confer such jurisdiction was based on the desire of the Framers to assure out-of-state litigants courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias. That the supposed justification for this fear was not rooted in weighty experience is attested by the fact that so ardent a nationalist as Marshall gave that proposal of the Philadelphia Convention only tepid support in the Virginia Convention. 3 Elliot's Debates 556 (1891). But in any event, whatever 'fears and apprehensions' were entertained by the Framers and ratifiers, there was fear that parochial prejudice by the citizens of one State toward those of another, as well as toward aliens, would lead to unjust treatment of citizens of other States and foreign countries.

Such was the reason for enabling a citizen of one State to press a claim or stand on a defense, wholly state-created, against a citizen of another in a federal court of the latter's State. The abuses to which this opportunity was put when, more than a hundred years ago, corporations began their transforming influence on American economic and social life are familiar history. Their classic exposition in Gerard C. Henderson's Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law has lost neither its vividness nor force during the intervening decades. The short of the matter is that by resorting to the federal courts the out-of-state corporation sought to gain, and much too frequently did, an advantage as against the local citizen. Instead of protecting out-of-state litigants against discrimination by state courts, the effect of diversity jurisdiction was discrimination against citizens of the State in favor of litigants from without the State.

Diversity jurisdiction aroused opposition from its very inception, but the modern manifestation of these evils through corporate litigation gathered increasing hostility and led to repeated congressional attempts at restriction and eventually of abolition. The proliferation of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865, brought into lurid light the discriminatory distortions to which diversity jurisdiction could be subverted by judicial sanction of professional astuteness. The growing sense of the injustice of these developments and its serious hurt to the prestige of the federal courts in the exercise of their essential jurisdiction, came to a head with the decision in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681. The federal courts became the target of acrimonious political controversy. In the course of our history this was not the first time that diversity jurisdiction played the federal courts an ill turn. Again and again in the 60's and the 70's and the 80's such a conflict had flared up, but in the earlier periods it was by way of being a conflict between the financial East and the agrarian West. This time President Hoover's Attorney General and Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska united against the disclosed evils of diversity jurisdiction.

Attorney General Mitchell urged on Congress a measure whereby a corporation should be deemed, for diversity purposes, a citizen of any State in which it carries on business 'as respect all suits brought within that State between itself and residents thereof and arising out of the business carried on in such State.' Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 937, S. 939 and S. 3243, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 4. At the same time, the Senate Judiciary Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Norris, went further. Twice it reported bills for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 530, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. Legislative attempts at correction have thus far failed. But by overruling the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, despite its century-old credentials, this Court uprooted the most noxious weeds that had grown around diversity jurisdiction. What with the increasing permeation of national feeling and the mobility of modern life, little excuse is left for diversity jurisdiction, now that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, has put a stop to the unwarranted freedom of federal courts to fashion rules of local law in defiance of local law.

A legal device like that of federal diversity jurisdiction which is inherently, as I believe it to be, not founded in reason, offers constant temptation to new abuses. This case is an instance. Here we have not an out-of-state litigant resorting to a federal court to be sure of obtaining for himself the same treatment which state courts mete out to their own citizens. Here we have a Louisiana citizen resorting to the federal court in Louisiana in order to avoid consequences of the Louisiana law by which every Louisiana citizen is bound when suing another Louisiana citizen. If Florence R. Elbert, the present plaintiff, had to sue the owner of the offending automobile which caused her injury, or if she were suing an insurance company chartered by Louisiana, she would have no choice but to go, like every other Louisiana plaintiff who sues a fellow citizen of Louisiana, to a Louisiana state court and receive the law as administered by the Louisiana courts. But by the fortuitous circumstance that this Louisiana litigant could sue directly an out-of-state insurance company, she can avoid her amenability to Louisiana law. In concrete terms, she can cash in on the law governing jury trials in the federal courts, with its restrictive appellate review of jury verdicts, and escape the rooted jurisprudence of Louisiana law in reviewing jury verdicts. There is, to be sure, a kind of irony for corporate defendants to discover that two can play at the game of working, to use a colloquial term, the perverse potentialities of diversity jurisdiction. But it is not the less unreason and no greater fairness for a citizen of the forum to gain a discriminatory advantage over fellow citizens of his State, than it is for an out-of-state citizen to secure more than the same treatment given local citizens, by going to a federal court for the adjudication of state-created rights.

This case, however, stirs anew an issue that cuts deeper than the natural selfishness of litigants to exploit the law's weaknesses. My concern is with the bearing of diversity jurisdiction on the effective functioning of the federal judiciary. Circuit Judge Rives agreed with the district judge that this kind of action has no business in a federal court. In dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing, he stated with impressive bluntness the effect on the work of the federal and state courts in allowing diversity jurisdiction to be put to such purposes:

'On the original hearing, I had strong misgivings which were     submitted to my brothers, but I was unable to crystallize my thinking clearly enough to justify a      dissent. Continued consideration of the question has     convinced me that there is something fundamentally wrong with      our legal theories when they permit the great bulk of the      casualty damage suit litigation in Louisiana to clog the      dockets of the federal courts, while, I understand, some of      the state judges actually do not have enough litigation to      keep them busy.' Elbert v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,      202 F.2d 744.

In Louisiana, plaintiffs in negligence suits have suddenly found the federal courts their protectors and insurance companies have discovered the virtues of the state courts. In New York, insurance companies run to cover in the federal courts and plaintiffs feel outraged by the process of attrition in enforcing their claims, due to a delay of from three to four years before a case can come to trial. As to both situations, the vice is the availability of diversity jurisdiction. What is true of New York is true, in varying degrees, of every big center.

Diversity cases have long constituted a considerable portion of all civil cases filed in the federal courts. For the last ten years the proportion of diversity cases has greatly increased, so that it is safe to say that diversity cases are now taking at least half of the time that the District Courts are devoting to civil cases. (This is the conclusion of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.) The rise in motor-vehicle registration from 32 million in 1940 to 56 million in 1953 has inevitably been reflected in increasing resort to diversity jurisdiction in ordinary negligence suits. The consequences that this entails for the whole federal judicial system-for increase in the business of the District Courts means increase in the business of the Courts of Appeals and a swelling of the petitions for certiorari here-cannot be met by a steady increase in the number of federal judges. The business of courts, particularly of the federal courts, is drastically unlike the business of factories. The function and role of the federal courts and the nature of their judicial process involve impalpable factors, subtle but far-reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the judicial plant. A recent report of the House Committee on the Judiciary proposed an increase of the required amount in controversy for jurisdiction of the federal courts from $3,000 to $10,000. Referring to the consequences of 'a tremendous increase in the number of cases filed,' it felt that appointment of additional judges 'has done much to alleviate the problem' but recognized that merely multiplying judges is no solution. See H.R.Rep. No. 1506, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1. In the farthest reaches of the problem a steady increase in judges does not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to affect the whole system.

Since diversity jurisdiction is increasingly the biggest source of the civil business of the District Courts, the continuance of that jurisdiction will necessarily involve inflation of the number of the district judges. This in turn will result, by its own Gresham's law, in a depreciation of the judicial currency and the consequent impairment of the prestige and of the efficacy of the federal courts. Madison believed that Congress would return to the state courts judicial power entrusted to the federal courts 'when they find the tribunals of the states established on a good footing.' 3 Elliot's Debates 536 (1891). Can it fairly be said that state tribunals are not now established on a sufficiently 'good footing' to adjudicate state litigation that arises between citizens of different States, including the artificial corporate citizens, when they are the only resort for the much larger volume of the same type of litigation between their own citizens? Can the state tribunals not yet be trusted to mete out justice to nonresident litigants; should resident litigants not be compelled to trust their own state tribunals? In any event, is it sound public policy to withdraw from the incentives and energies for reforming state tribunals, where such reform is needed, the interests of influential groups who through diversity litigation are now enabled to avoid state courts?