Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009


 * Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

{{SECTION|SEC. 1.|SECTION 1}}. SHORT TITLE.

 * This Act may be cited as the “Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009”.

{{SECTION|SEC. 2.|SEC. 2}}. FINDINGS.

 * Congress makes the following findings:


 * (1) For over 2 decades, the Government of Uganda engaged in an armed conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda that led to the internal displacement of more than 2,000,000 Ugandans from their homes.


 * (2) The members of the Lord’s Resistance Army used brutal tactics in northern Uganda, including mutilating, abducting and forcing individuals into sexual servitude and forcing a large number of children and youth in Uganda, estimated by the Survey for War Affected Youth to be over 66,000, to fight as part of the rebel force.


 * (3) The Secretary of State has placed the Lord's Resistance Army on the Terrorist Exclusion list pursuant to section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)), and LRA leader Joseph Kony has been designated a “specially designated global terrorist” pursuant to Executive Order 13224.


 * (4) In late 2005, according to the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Lord’s Resistance Army shifted their primary base of operations from southern Sudan to northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and the rebels have since withdrawn from northern Uganda.


 * (5) Representatives of the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army began peace negotiations in 2006, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba, Sudan, and signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on August 20, 2006, which provided for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people to return home in safety.


 * (6) After nearly 2 years of negotiations, representatives from the parties reached the Final Peace Agreement in April 2008, but Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement in May 2008 and his forces launched new attacks in northeastern Congo.


 * (7) According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Relief and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the new activity of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northeastern Congo and southern Sudan since September 2008 has led to the abduction of at least 1,500 civilians, including hundreds of children, and the displacement of more than 540,000 people.


 * (8) In December 2008, the military forces of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and southern Sudan launched a joint operation against the Lord’s Resistance Army’s bases in northeastern Congo, but the operation failed to apprehend Joseph Kony, and his forces retaliated with a series of new attacks and massacres in Congo and southern Sudan, killing an estimated 900 people in 2 months alone.


 * (9) Despite the refusal of Joseph Kony to sign the Final Peace Agreement, the Government of Uganda has committed to continue reconstruction plans for northern Uganda, and to implement those mechanisms of the Final Peace Agreement not conditional on the compliance of the Lord’s Resistance Army.


 * (10) Since 2008, recovery efforts in northern Uganda have moved forward with the financial support of the United States and other donors, but have been hampered by a lack of strategic coordination, logistical delays, and limited leadership from the Government of Uganda.

{{SECTION|SEC. 3.|SEC. 3}}. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

 * It is the policy of the United States to work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and other affected areas by—


 * (1) providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the Lord’s Resistance Army, to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield in the continued absence of a negotiated solution, and to disarm and demobilize the remaining Lord’s Resistance Army fighters;


 * (2) targeting assistance to respond to the humanitarian needs of populations in northeastern Congo, southern Sudan, and Central African Republic currently affected by the activity of the Lord’s Resistance Army; and


 * (3) further supporting and encouraging efforts of the Government of Uganda and civil society to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda as affirmed in the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–283) and subsequent resolutions, including Senate Resolution 366, 109th Congress, agreed to February 2, 2006, Senate Resolution 573, 109th Congress, agreed to September 19, 2006, Senate Concurrent Resolution 16, 110th Congress, agreed to in the Senate March 1, 2007, and House Concurrent Resolution 80, 110th Congress, agreed to in the House of Representatives June 18, 2007.

{{SECTION|SEC. 4.|SEC. 4}}. REQUIREMENT OF A STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE DISARMAMENT OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY.

 * (a) .—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to guide future United States support across the region for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.


 * (b) .—The strategy shall include the following:


 * (1) A plan to help strengthen efforts by the United Nations and regional governments to protect civilians from attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army while supporting the development of institutions in affected areas that can help to maintain the rule of law and prevent conflict in the long term.


 * (2) An assessment of viable options through which the United States, working with regional governments, could help develop and support multilateral efforts to eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.


 * (3) An interagency framework to plan, coordinate, and review diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military elements of United States policy across the region regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army.


 * (4) A description of the type and form of diplomatic engagement across the region undertaken to coordinate and implement United States policy regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army and to work multilaterally with regional mechanisms, including the Tripartite Plus Commission and the Great Lakes Pact.


 * (5) A description of how this engagement will fit within the context of broader efforts and policy objectives in the Great Lakes Region.


 * (c) .—The strategy under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

{{SECTION|SEC. 5.|SEC. 5}}. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR AREAS OUTSIDE UGANDA AFFECTED BY THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY.

 * In accordance with section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2292) and section 2 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (22 U.S.C. 2601), the President is authorized to provide additional assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan, and Central African Republic to respond to the humanitarian needs of populations directly affected by the activity of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

{{SECTION|SEC. 6.|SEC. 6}}. ASSISTANCE FOR RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA.

 * (a) .—It is the sense of Congress that the President should support efforts by the people of northern Uganda and the Government of Uganda—


 * (1) to assist internally displaced people in transition and returnees to secure durable solutions by spurring economic revitalization, supporting livelihoods, helping to alleviate poverty, and advancing access to basic services at return sites, specifically clean water, health care, and schools;


 * (2) to enhance the accountability and administrative competency of local governance institutions and public agencies in northern Uganda with regard to budget management, provision of public goods and services, and related oversight functions;


 * (3) to strengthen the operational capacity of the civilian police in northern Uganda to enhance public safety, prevent crime, and deal sensitively with gender-based violence, while strengthening accountability measures to prevent corruption and abuses;


 * (4) to rebuild and improve the capacity of the justice system in northern Uganda, including the courts and penal systems, with particular sensitivity to the needs and rights of women and children;


 * (5) to establish mechanisms for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants and those abducted by the LRA, including vocational education and employment opportunities, with attention given to the roles and needs of men, women and children; and


 * (6) to promote programs to address psychosocial trauma, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder.


 * (b) .—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State and Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should work with the appropriate committees of Congress to increase assistance in future fiscal years to support activities described in this section if the Government of Uganda demonstrates a commitment to transparent and accountable reconstruction in war-affected areas of northern Uganda, specifically by—


 * (1) finalizing the establishment of mechanisms within the Office of the Prime Minister to sufficiently manage and coordinate the programs under the framework of the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP);


 * (2) increasing oversight activities and reporting, at the local and national level in Uganda, to ensure funds under the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda framework are used efficiently and with minimal waste; and


 * (3) committing substantial funds of its own, above and beyond standard budget allocations to local governments, to the task of implementing the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda such that communities affected by the war can recover.


 * (c) .—The United States should work with other donor nations to increase contributions for recovery efforts in northern Uganda and better leverage those contributions to enhance the capacity and encourage the leadership of the Government of Uganda in promoting transparent and accountable reconstruction in northern Uganda.


 * (d) .—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should withhold non-humanitarian bilateral assistance to the Republic of Uganda if the Secretary determines that the Government of Uganda is not committed to reconstruction and reconciliation in the war-affected areas of northern Uganda and is not taking proactive steps to ensure this process moves forward in a transparent and accountable manner.

{{SECTION|SEC. 7.|SEC. 7}}. ASSISTANCE FOR RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA.

 * (a) .—It is the sense of Congress that, despite reconstruction and development efforts, a continued failure to take meaningful steps toward national reconciliation and accountability risks perpetuating longstanding political grievances and fueling new conflicts.


 * (b) .—In accordance with section 531 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346), the President is authorized to support efforts by the people of northern Uganda and the Government of Uganda to advance efforts to promote transitional justice and reconciliation on both local and national levels, including to encourage implementation of the mechanisms outlined in the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, signed at Juba February 19, 2008, namely—


 * (1) a body to investigate the history of the conflict, inquire into human rights violations committed during the conflict by all sides, promote truth-telling in communities, and encourage the preservation of the memory of events and victims of the conflict through memorials, archives, commemorations, and other forms of preservation;


 * (2) a special division of the High Court of Uganda to try individuals alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict, and a special unit to carry out investigations and prosecutions in support of trials;


 * (3) a system for making reparations to victims of the conflict; and


 * (4) a review and strategy for supporting transitional justice mechanisms in affected areas to promote reconciliation and encourage individuals to take personal responsibility for their conduct during the war.

{{SECTION|SEC. 8.|SEC. 8}}. REPORT.

 * (a) .—Not later than 1 year after the submission of the strategy required under section 4, the Secretary of State shall prepare and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the progress made toward the implementation of the strategy required under section 4 and a description and evaluation of the assistance provided under this Act toward the policy objectives described in section 3.


 * (b) .—The report required under section (a) shall include—


 * (1) a description and evaluation of actions taken toward the implementation of the strategy required under section 4;


 * (2) a description of assistance provided under sections 5, 6, and 7;


 * (3) an evaluation of bilateral assistance provided to the Republic of Uganda and associated programs in light of stated policy objectives;


 * (4) a description of the status of the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda and the progress of the Government of Uganda in fulfilling the steps outlined in section 6(b); and


 * (5) a description of amounts of assistance committed, and amounts provided, to northern Uganda during the reporting period by the Government of Uganda and each donor country.


 * (c) .—The report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

{{SECTION|SEC. 9.|SEC. 9}}. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FUNDING.

 * It is the sense of Congress that—


 * (1) of the total amounts to be appropriated for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of State and foreign operations, up to $10,000,000 should be used to carry out activities under section 5; and


 * (2) of the total amounts to be appropriated for fiscal year 2011 through 2013 for the Department of State and foreign operations, up to $10,000,000 in each such fiscal year should be used to carry out activities under section 7.

{{SECTION|SEC. 10.|SEC. 10}}. DEFINITIONS.

 * In this Act:


 * (1) .—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.


 * (2) .—The term “Great Lakes Region” means the region comprising Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, southern Sudan, and Uganda.


 * (3) .—The term “LRA-affected areas” means those portions of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and southeastern Central African Republic determined by the Secretary of State to be affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

Approved May 24, 2010

Legislative History

 * SENATE REPORTS: No. 111-108 (Comm. on Foreign Relations)
 * CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 156 (2010):
 * Mar. 10, considered and passed Senate.
 * May 12, considered and passed House.
 * DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS (2010):
 * May 24, Presidential statement.
 * May 24, Presidential statement.