Long v. Converse/Opinion of the Court

Our jurisdiction in this case depends upon the effect to be given to that provision of the Judiciary Act which authorizes this court to re-examine the decisions of the highest court of a State in certain cases, 'where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under' any statute of the United States.

The plaintiffs in error did not claim under the assignees in bankruptcy. They set up the title of the assignees, not to protect their own, but to defeat that of the receivers appointed by the State court. They claimed adversely to both the receivers and assignees. They did not even allege that the assignees had ever attempted to assert title. The contest was one originally for the possession of certain papers. The decree for money was given, because, pending the suit, the papers sought for had been exchanged for money, and the receivers were willing to accept the exchange. In the absence of the assignees from the case, the decree could have no effect upon their title to the coupons or money. If, when the demand was made by the receivers, the plaintiffs in error had surrendered the coupons, that surrender would have been a complete defence to a future action by the assignees, inasmuch as they had not before that time asserted their claim, either by demand or notice. The title of the assignees to the property would not have been defeated by the transfer. Whatever rights they had against the plaintiffs in error could be enforced by an appropriate proceeding against the receivers. The whole effect of the surrender, so far as the assignees were concerned, was to transfer the custody of the property from the plaintiffs in error to the receivers. In this case the transfer was not voluntary, but in pursuance of a decree rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, with the assent of the assignees. Under such circumstances, it is not easy to see how the assignees can proceed further against the parties, who have only obeyed the commands of the court. Clearly, their remedy, if they have any, is against the property in the hands of the receivers.

The second section of the act of Feb. 5, 1867 (14 Stat. 385), which was in force when this writ of error was brought, and which has been substantially re-enacted in the Revised Statutes (sect. 709), differs only from the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, so far as the provision now under consideration is concerned, in the substitution of the word 'immunity' for 'exemption.' In the old act, the words were 'title, right, privilege, or exemption;' in the last, 'title, right, privilege, or immunity.' This does not materially affect the rights of the parties in the present case. The words, when used in this connection and applied to the circumstances of this case, have substantially the same meaning.

The construction of this provision in the act of 1789 came before this court for consideration as early as 1809, in the case of Owing's Lessee v. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 344. That was an action of ejectment in a State court. The defendant, being in possession, set up an outstanding title in a third person under a treaty. The writ of error from this court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In the progress of the argument, Chief Justice Marshall used this language: 'Whenever a right grows out of or is protected by a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and decisions of the States; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected. But if the person's title is not affected by the treaty, if he claims nothing under a treaty, his title cannot be protected by a treaty. If Scarth or his heirs had claimed, it would have been a case arising under a treaty. But neither the title of Scarth nor of any person claiming under him can be affected by the decision of this case.' In Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129, a suit was brought in a State court by parties beneficially interested in a bond given to the United States by a marshal to secure the faithful performance of his official duties. The suit was in the names of the beneficiaries, and not in that of the United States for their use. It was insisted that there could be no recovery, because the action should have been prosecuted in the name of the United States; and this was assigned for error in this court. But it was said that 'the plaintiff in error did not and could not claim any right, title, privilege, or exemption by or under the marshal's bond, or any act of Congress giving authority to sue the obligors for a breach of the condition,' and that the court had no jurisdiction of the case on that ground. Again: the same question was presented and elaborately argued in Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 311, decided in 1850. That also was an action of ejectment in a State court, in which the defendant set up an outstanding title in a third person, under an Indian treaty; and there, too, the writ was dismissed. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Taney said, 'It is true, the title set up in this case was claimed under a treaty; but, to give jurisdiction to this court, the party must claim the right for himself, and not for a third person in whose title he has no interest. . . . The heirs of Miller appear to have no interest in this suit, nor can their rights be affected by the decision. The judgment in this case is no obstacle to their assertion of their title in another suit brought by themselves or any person claiming a legal title under them.' To the same effect are Hale v. Gaines, 22 How. 149, 160, and Verden v. Coleman, 1 Black, 472. This must be considered as settling the law in this class of cases; and it seems to be decisive of this case. The plaintiffs in error claim no title, right, privilege, or immunity under the Bankrupt Law. Their obligation to account for the coupons in their hands is not discharged by the law. The title of the assignees cannot be affected by the decree, except through their consent. It follows, therefore, that this case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Note.-Farwell v. Converse et al., in error to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, differs from the preceding case in this, that the decree against Farwell was for the delivery of the coupons which still remained in his hands, and not for the money collected upon them. The writ in this case was, therefore, dismissed for the reasons appearing in the opinion given in that case.