Local Union No. 10, United Association of Journeymen, Plumbers and Steamfitters v. Graham/Opinion of the Court

The basic question here is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, may enjoin peaceful picketing when it is carried on for purposes in conflict with the Virginia Right to Work Statute. A question also before us is whether the record in this case justifies the finding, made below, that the picketing was for such purposes. We answer each in the affirmative.

A bill of complaint was filed September 25, 1950, in the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, by respondents, doing a general contracting business there. They named as defendants Local Union No. 10, United Association of Journeymen, Plumbers and Steamfitters of the United States and Canada of the American Federation of Labor, here called the Plumbers Union, three other local unions, the business agents of each of the unions and the Richmond Building & Construction Trades Council. The complaint alleged in substance that respondents had begun work under their contract with the City of Richmond to build the George Washington Carver School, that early completion of the school was urgent, that respondents had made contracts with all necessary subcontractors, that some of the subcontractors employed only union labor while others employed nonunion as well as union labor, that in July certain of the defendants had requested that all nonunion labor on the project be laid off and had said that, unless that were done, 'every effort would be made to prevent any union labor employed * *  * on that project from continuing work thereon,' that on September 25 certain of the defendants had picketed the project, carrying a sign reading 'This Is Not a Union Job. Richmond Trades Council,' that, as a result of such picketing, union members on the job had refused to continue to work there and that, therefore, the project had 'slowed to a standstill.' The complaint further alleged that the foregoing demands sought to induce respondents to take action which would subject them to criminal and civil liabilities under the Virginia Right to Work Statute and to break respondents' contracts with such of their subcontractors as did not employ all union labor. Finally, it alleged that the objectives of defendants in making such demands and conducting such picketing were to prevent nonunion employees from working on the project. On the strength of such allegations, the trial court granted respondents the temporary injunction they sought and the picketing ceased. A motion to dissolve the injunction was denied, an answer was filed, depositions were taken and the temporary injunction was continued in effect until July 17, 1951. On that date, the trial court made the injunction permanent. The court rendered no opinion but included the following statement in its decree:

'(I)t appearing to the Court that the picketing complained of     was conducted and carried on by the defendants, except for      those defendants hereinafter noted, and for aims, purposes      and objectives in conflict with the provisions of the Right      to Work laws of the State of Virginia and, therefore,      illegal, that a permanent injunction is necessary to prevent      irreparable harm and damage to the complainants, and that      complainants have already been damaged to the extent of One Hundred and Ninety ($190.00) Dollars, the Court      doth so find; *  *  * .' (Emphasis supplied.)

January 23, 1952, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, also without opinion, refused to hear an appeal but said in its order 'the court being of opinion that the said decrees (of the trial court) are plainly right, doth reject said petition and refuse said appeal and supersedeas, the effect of which is to affirm the decree of the said law and equity court.' Because of the importance of the issue in the practical administration of labor law, we granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 811, 73 S.Ct. 16. Respondents filed no brief here other than that in opposition to the petition for certiorari and submitted their case without oral argument.

A few days before our grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in another case, reached a result which petitioners claim is in conflict with its judgment in the instant case. Painters & Paperhangers Local Union No. 1018 v. Rountree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 72 S.E.2d 402. We find that decision helpful as upholding the constitutionality of the Right to Work Statute and interpreting its meaning, but we do not find it inconsistent with the result below. See also, Edwards v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d 916; Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872; American Federation of Labor v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 260, 93 L.Ed. 222; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212.

In the Rountree case, 194 Va. at 154, 72 S.E.2d at 405, the highest court of Virginia holds that the Statute does not prohibit peaceful picketing 'unless * *  * for an unlawful purpose.' It adds that 'a purpose to compel the complainants to discharge the non-union painters or to compel the painters to join the union as a condition of their continued employment' would be an unlawful purpose, but it fails to find the existence of such a purpose. On the other hand, in the instant case, the same court states that the injunctive decrees of the trial court 'are plainly right.' It thereby sustains the trial court's finding that 'the picketing complained of was * *  * carried on by the defendants *  *  * for aims, purposes and objectives in conflict with the provisions of the Right To Work laws of the State of Virginia *  *  * .' The Rountree case thus reflects an instance of picketing so conducted as not to be in violation of the Right to Work Statute, whereas the facts in the instant case reflect conduct that is in conflict with the provisions of that Statute. However innocent the picketing appeared while in progress, the Virginia courts found that it was combined with conduct and circumstances occurring before and during the picketing that demonstrated a purpose on the part of petitioners that was in conflict with the Right to Work Statute.

In a case of this kind, we are justified in searching the record to determine whether the crucial finding by the state courts had a reasonable basis in the evidence. The record consists of the depositions of nine witnesses taken six to nine months after the events described. There is some conflict in the testimony as to what took place July 27, 28, and September 25, 26. The record contains, however, ample grounds for sustaining the crucial findings of the trial court. Those grounds appear particularly in the testimony of respondent O. J. Graham and his general manager, J. Q. Acree, as to what was said during their conversation, on July 28, 1950, with J. F. Joinville, business agent of the Plumbers Union and president of the Richmond Building & Construction Trades Council, together with Henry Cochran, business agent of the Engineers Union and Secretary and Treasurer of the same Trades Council.

It is undisputed that the picketing lasted from 8 a.m., September 25, until stopped by injunction the following noon. The picketing was peaceful in appearance. There usually was but one picket and there never were more than two pickets on duty at a time. There was no violence and no use of abusive language. Each picket walked up and down the sidewalk adjoining the project carrying a sign bearing substantially the language quoted in the complaint. September 25, the picketing was done consecutively by the respective business agents of the Painters, Plumbers, Plasterers and Ironworkers unions. The premises picketed were frequented by few except the construction workers. The project was in its earliest stages. Before the picketing began, there were not more than fourteen men at work. Of these, three union carpenters worked about one hour on September 25. They left the project when the picketing began and returned a few days after the picketing stopped. Two union ironworkers or rodmen gave notice on the preceding Saturday that picketing was to begin Monday, September 25, and that, therefore, they would not come to work. They never returned and the contractor was delayed several days while seeking to replace them. A nonunion plumber was assisted by a helper, who, oddly enough, belonged to a printers union. The plumber did not stop work but his helper left when the picketing began.

The others present were six or seven laborers whose status as union men was not clear. They did not quit but the work on the project as a whole came to a substantial standstill during the week of September 25, because the principal activity then called for was that of pouring concrete which required the services of rodmen as well as those of laborers.

The effect of the picketing was confirmatory of its purpose as found by the trial court. Petitioners here engaged in more than the mere publication of the fact that the job was not 100% union. Their picketing was done at such a place and in such a manner that, coupled with established union policies and traditions, it caused the union men to stop work and thus slow the project to a general stand-still. Such conduct, furthermore, was conditioned upon the fact that some of the work on this job, particularly the plumbing, was being done by a subcontractor who employed nonunion labor, whereas Joinville had demanded of the general contractor that the job be 'one hundred per cent union.'

The policy of Virginia which is expressed in its Right to Work Statute is summarized as follows by its highest court:

'It provides in substance that neither membership nor     non-membership in a labor union shall be made a condition of      employment; that a contract limiting employment to union      members is against public policy; and that a person denied      employment because he is either a member of a union or not a      member of a union shall have a right of action for damages.'      Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 880, 54 S.E.2d 872, 874.

Based upon the findings of the trial court, we have a case in which picketing was undertaken and carried on with at least one of its substantial purposes in conflict with the declared policy of Virginia. The immediate results of the picketing demonstrated its potential effectiveness, unless enjoined, as a practical means of putting pressure on the general contractor to eliminate from further participation all nonunion men or all subcontractors employing nonunion men on the project.

Assuming the above conclusions to have been established, petitioners still contend that the injunction in this case was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. On the reasoning and authority of our recent decisions, we reaffirm our position to the contrary. Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045; International Brotherhood of Teamsters etc., Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773, 94 L.Ed. 995; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985; Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-538, and 543-544, 65 S.Ct. 315, 325 326, 328-329, 89 L.Ed. 430 (concurring opinion); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777. 62 S.Ct. 816, 819 820, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (concurring opinion); Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143; Carlson v. People of State of California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-104, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744-745, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 479-481, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862-863, 81 L.Ed. 1229. See also, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations Board, 341 U.S. 694, 705, 71 S.Ct. 954, 960, 95 L.Ed. 1299.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia accordingly is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice BLACK dissents.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.