Lewis v. Monson/Opinion of the Court

No question is more clearly a matter of local law than one arising under the tax laws. Tax proceedings are carried on by the state for the purpose of collecting its revenue, and the various steps which shall be taken in such proceedings, the force and effect to be given to any act of the taxing officers, the results to follows the nonpayment of taxes, and the form and efficacy of the tax deed, are all subjects which the state has power to prescribe, and peculiarly and vitally affecting its well-being. The determination of any questions affecting them is a matter primarily belonging to the courts of the state, and the national tribunals universally follow their rulings except in cases where it is claimed that some right protected by the federal constitution has been invaded.

Turning to the decisions of the supreme court of Mississippi, we find in Richter v. Beaumont, 67 Miss. 285, 7 South. 357, a case almost precisely like the one at bar. It is true that the question there presented arose upon the admissibility of testimony; but the views expressed by the court in its opinion, if accepted as controlling, as they must be, are decisive of this case. In that case there was an old and a new map,-an old and a new description. The owner in possession paid according to the old, and in ignorance of the new, intending to pay on all the land that he owned. But by the new map and description the number of lots in the section had been increased, and the tract described by the added number was sold for nonpayment of taxes. The lot thus numbered and sold was a part of the land belonging to him, and upon which he was intending and attempting to pay all the taxes. The court, by Mr. Justice Campbell, thus disposes of the question: 'By the ancient division of the town and designation of lots, lot six embraced the parcel of land sued for in this action, which parcel is, by the modern map, a part of lot seven. The defendant (appellant) was in 1883, and prior and subsequent thereto, in the actual possession of lot six, and he gave the description of his land to the assessor as lot six, and it was so assessed, he intending and understanding that lot six extended eastward according to the ancient order, so as to include what, by the new map, is part of lot seven. He paid the taxes on lot six, and lot seven, not being paid on, was sold for taxes. It does not appear that the appellant had ever done anything in recognition of the new map, or that he knew that the new map was conformed to by the assessor in assessing lots in Woodville. It may be inferred from the fact of his residence in the town, and the recognition by citizens and officials of the new map, that he was aware of it, and that the assessor was governed by it in assessing. If so, he should not be allowed to defeat the assessment and sale by his secret understanding or purpose. A mental reservation of the owner cannot be permitted to defeat assessment. On the other hand, if, until a recent date, lot six was understood to embrace what, by a new map, is part of lot seven, and the owner and occupant was governed by the former description in giving it in to the assessor, and did not know, and should not have known, that the assessor would deal with it as designated by the new map, he should not lose his land.'

Little need be added to this extract from the opinion in that case. The suggestion there made as to a mental reservation is out of this case by the finding of the court. That the owner was not bound, as matter of law, to take notice of the new map, is shown by that decision, and if he was not bound to know, and did not in fact know, and paid under a mistake, relying upon the ancient descriptions and the old map, and intended in good faith to pay all his taxes, then clearly, within the scope of that decision, the sale was invalid, and the deed fails. Upon the authority of that case the judgment of the court below is affirmed.