Leon v. Galceran

GALCERAN and two other sailors brought each a suit in personam, in one of the State courts of Louisiana, against Maristany, owner of the schooner Gallege, to recover mariners' wages, and had the schooner, which was subject to a lien and 'privilege' in their favor, according to the laws of Louisiana, similar in some respects to the principles of the maritime law, sequestered by the sheriff of the parish. The writ of sequestration was levied upon the schooner, which was afterwards released upon Maristany's giving a forthcoming bond, with one Leon as surety, for the return of the vessel to the sheriff on the final judgment. Judgments having been rendered by default against Maristany, the owner, in personam, for the amounts claimed, with the mariner's lien and privilege upon the property sequestered, a writ of ''fi. fa.'' was issued and demand made without effect, of the defendant in execution, by the sheriff, for the return of the property bonded. On the return of the sheriff that the property bonded could not be found, suits (the suits below) were brought in the same court by the three sailors against Leon, to enforce in personam against him the obligation of the forthcoming bonds, and judgments were rendered in personam against Leon, the surety, in their favor, for the amounts fixed by the original judgments. From the judgments thus rendered in the court below (that having been the highest court in Louisiana where a decision in the suit could be had), Leon took these writs of error.

Messrs. Cushing and Drew, for the plaintiff in error.

Even if the State court could entertain a personal action against the owner, it had no jurisdiction over the vessel by conservatory writ and proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime lien by seizure before judgment. This is settled in The Moses Taylor, and in The Hine v. Trevor. Having no jurisdiction, therefore, over the vessel in a proceeding in rem, the judicial bond given in that court for its delivery was null and void; and the court having no authority of law, or jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the order of the court to bond is also an absolute nullity.

'The rule, that as one binds himself he shall remain bound, may be true in mere conventional obligations, but the effect of judicial bonds must be tested by the law directing them to be taken. That which is superadded must be rejected and that which is omitted supplied. So, if there be no law authorizing such a bond to be taken, or if the prerequisites required for the taking thereof be not fulfilled, the bond will not bind; there is error, and the consideration falls.'

Galceran, by brief signed propri a persona, contra:

The right of mariners to bring suits in personam against the owners of the vessel on which they have earned their wages, in the State courts, is expressly reserved to them by the Judiciary Act of 1789, under the proviso, 'saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.'

This is the right which has been exercised in this case. The State court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the controversy, inasmuch as the suits were brought in personam, which is clearly a common law remedy, and judgments obtained personally against the owner of the vessel.

The writ of sequestration was issued as a mesne or conservatory process, to preserve intact pendente lite, a lien and privilege granted by law, and to secure the presence of the vessel within the territorial jurisdiction of the State court, until after the final judgments, to be then subjected to execution and sale to satisfy said judgments; and inasmuch as the writ was only resorted to as a means of enabling the State court more effectually to exercise its lawful jurisdiction and to secure in advance the execution of valid personal judgments on transitory property pledged by law to their payment, it follows that the writ was as lawful as the suit itself, to which indeed it was a mere appendage or incident, and as the writ of ''fi. fa.'' issued on the personal judgments and of which the writ of sequestration was the mere precursor.

The only thing which the Federal Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 seem to have taken away from the State courts is the 'cognizance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' when the same are sought to be brought solely in rem against the offending vessel itself as a party defendant to the suit, according to the peculiar forms of the proceedings in rem of the admiralty courts, the judgments and sales of which are building on the whole world, erga omnes.

The writ of sequestration has no analogy whatever with the admiralty process, as understood and defined by writers on admiralty law.

It cannot be pretended that vessels are not liable to seizure under executions issued upon judgments rendered by State courts. How, then, can it be contended that a writ of attachment or any other mesne or conservatory process, which only anticipates and subserves the writ of ''fi. fa., cannot be lawfully resorted to, when sanctioned by the State law, to prevent the departure of the vessel pendente lite'', in order to subject it afterwards under execution to the payment of the creditor's personal judgment, for which she is legally pledged?

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.