Leighton v. United States (289 U.S. 506)/Opinion of the Court

In 1921 all assets of Leighton & Co., Inc., of California, were sold and the proceeds distributed pro rata among stockholders, including petitioners. Nothing remained to satisfy outstanding corporate obligations.

September, 1925, within the time permitted by statute, or written waivers, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue notified the corporation of tax deficiencies for 1918, 1919, and 1920; and no January 16, 1926, he assessed these against it. There was no contest. Efforts to enforce payment by distraint were unsuccessful. The present equity suit seeks to compel petitioners severally to account for corporate property in order that it may be applied toward payment of taxes due by the company. No assessment was made against any petitioner.

The District Court ruled that the distributed assets constituted a trust fund and adjudged that each petitioner should account for the amount he received, with interest, from January 16, 1926. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 61 F.(2d) 530. The matter comes here by certiorari. 289 U.S. 716, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. --.

Pertinent provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 55, 59, 61, are in the margin.

Prior to the Revenue Act of 1926, the United States in an equity proceeding might recover from distributees of corporate assets, without assessment against them, the value of what they received in order to discharge taxes assessed against the corporation. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 592, 51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289; United States v. Updike, 281 U.S. 489, 50 S.Ct. 367, 74 L.Ed. 984. And this right remained unless taken away by the specific words or clear intendment of the 1926 enactment. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 261, 31 S.Ct. 155, 55 L.Ed. 204; United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. (C.C.A.) 249 F. 678, 681.

Petitioners rely upon section 280 of that act, and maintain that, while the words of this standing alone would not suffice to destroy the right, nevertheless, when read in connection with sections 274(a) and 278, there is enough clearly to show the purpose of Congress to require an assessment against them before suit for restitution. And, further, that the sole remedy available in the present circumstances is the one prescribed by section 280.

The meaning of the statute is not free from uncertainty. The insistence presented in behalf of the petitioners is at least plausible, but this has been before the courts several times, and none has approved it. One the other hand, the right of the United States to proceed against transferees by suit since the act of 1926 has been definitely recognized. United States v. Updike (D.C.) 25 F.(2d) 746, affirmed (C.C.A.) 32 F.(2d) 1; Phillips v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 42 F.(2d 177, affirmed 283 U.S. 589, 593, 51 S.Ct. 608, 610, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (Note); United States v. Greenfield Tap & Die Corp. (D.C.) 27 F.(2d) 933; United States v. Garfunkel (D.C.) 52 F.(2d) 727.

Considering the established rule of strict construction, the views expressed in the cases cited, also the possible conflict with other statutory provisions pointed out in those opinions, we cannot accept petitioners' interpretation of the statute. The present suit was properly brought, we think, and the courts below reached the correct conclusion. There was no abuse of discretion in respect of interest.

Affirmed.