Le Roy v. Tatham (55 U.S. 156)/Dissent Nelson

Mr. Justice NELSON-dissenting.

The patent in this case, according to the general description given by the patentees, is, for improvements upon, and additions to, the machinery or apparatus of Thomas Burr, for manufacturing pipes and tubes from metallic substances. They declare, that the nature of their invention, and the manner in which the same is to operate, are particularly described and set forth in their specification. In that, they refer to the patent of Burr of the 11th April, 1820, for making lead pipe out of set or solid lead by means of great pressure, the product being wrought pipe, as contradistinguished from cast, or pipe made according to the draw-bench system. The apparatus, as described by Burr, consisted of a strong iron cylinder, bored sufficiently true for a piston to traverse easily within it. This cylinder was closed at one end by the piston, and also closed at the other, except a small aperture for the die which formed the external diameter of the pipe. The core or mandril, which determined the inner diameter, was a long cylindrical rod of steel, on end of which was attached to the face of the piston, extending through the centre of the cylinder, and passing also through the centre of the die at the opposite end, leaving a space around the core and between it and the die for the formation of the pipe. The metal to form the pipe was admitted into the cylinder in a fluid state, and when it become set or solid, the power of a hydraulic press was applied to the head of the piston, which, moving against the body of solid lead in the cylinder, drove it through the die, the long core advancing with the piston and with the body of lead through the die, and thus forming the pipe. The cylinder usually holds from three to four hundred pounds of lead, and continuous pipe is made till the whole charge is driven out.

This plan, though one of deserved merit, and of great originality, failed, when reduced to practice, except for the purpose of making very large pipe, larger than that usually in demand, and consequently passed out of general use. The long core attached to the face of the piston, advancing with it in the solid lead under the great pressure required, was liable to warp and twist out of a straight line, and out of centre in the die, which had the effect to destroy the uniformity of the thickness and centrality of the bore of the pipe.

The old mode, therefore, of making pipe by the draw-bench system, continued down to 1837, when the patentees in this case discovered, by experiment, that lead, when recently set and solid, but still under heat and extreme pressure, in a close vessel, would reunite after a separation of its parts, and 'heal' (in the language of the patentees) 'as it were by the first intention,' as completely as though it had not been divided.

Upon the discovery of this property of lead, which had never before been known, but, on the contrary, had been supposed and believed, by all men of science skilled in metals, to be impossible, the patentees made an alteration in the apparatus of Burr, founded upon this new property discovered in the metal, and succeeded completely in making wrought pipe out of solid lead by means of the hydraulic pressure. The product was so much superior in quality to that made according to the old mode, that it immediately wholly superseded it in the market. The pipe was also made much cheaper.

The patentees, by their discovery, were enabled to dispense with the long core of Burr, and to fix firmly a bridge or cross bars at the end of the cylinder near the die, to which bridge they fastened a short core extending into and through the die. By this arrangement they obtained a firm, immovable core, that always preserved its centrality with the die, and secured the manufacture of pipe of uniformity of thickness of wall and accuracy of bore, of any dimension. The lead after being admitted into the cylinder in a fluid state, was allowed to remain till it became solid, and was then driven by the piston through the apertures in the bridge into the chamber between it and the die, where the parts reunited, after the separation, as completely as before, and, passing out at the die around the fixed short core, formed perfect pipe.

The patentees state, that they do not intend to confine themselves to the arrangement of the apparatus thus particularly specified, and point out several other modes by which the same result may be produced, all of which variations would readily suggest themselves, as they observe, to any practical engineer, without departing from the substantial originality of the invention, the remarkable feature of which, they say, is, that lead, when in a set state, being yet under heat, can be made, by extreme pressure, to reunite perfectly around a core after separation, and thus be formed into strong pipes or tubes. Pipes thus made are found to possess great solidity and unusual strength, and a fine uniformity, such as had never before been attained by any other mode. The essential difference in its character, and which distinguishes it from all other theretofore known, they add, is, that it is wrought under heat, by pressure and constriction, from set or solid metal.

They do not claim, as their invention or improvement, any of the parts of the machinery, independently of the arrangement and combination set forth.

'What we claim as our invention, they say, is, the combination of the following parts above described, to wit: the core and bridge or guide-piece, with the cylinder, the piston, the chamber, and die, when used to form pipes of metal under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, or in any other manner substantially the same.'

It is supposed that the patentees claim, as the novelty of their invention, the arrangement and combination of the machinery which they have described, disconnected from the employment of the new property of lead, which they have discovered, and by the practical application and use of which they have succeeded in producing the new manufacture. And the general title or description of their invention, given in the body of their letters-patent, is referred to as evidence of such claim. But every patent, whatever may be the general heading or title by which the invention is designated, refers to the specification annexed for a more particular description; and hence this court has heretofore determined, that the specification constitutes a part of the patent, and that they must be construed together when seeking to ascertain the discovery claimed. Hogg et al. v. Emerson, 6 How. 437.

The same rule of construction was applied by the Court of Exchequer, in England, in the case of Neilson's patent for the hot air blast. Webster's Cases, 373.

Now, on looking into the specification, we see, that the leading feature of the invention consists in the discovery of a new property in the article of lead, and in the employment and adaptation of it, by means of the machinery described, to the production of a new article, wrought pipe, never before successfully made. Without the discovery of this new property in the metal, the machinery or apparatus would be useless, and not the subject of a patent. It is in connection with this property, and the embodiment and adaptation of it to practical use, that the machinery is described, and the arrangement claimed. The discovery of this new element or property led naturally to the apparatus, by which a new and most useful result is produced. The apparatus was but incidental, and subsidiary to the new and leading idea of the invention. And hence, the patentees set forth, as the leading feature of it, the discovery, that lead, in a solid state, but under heat and extreme pressure in a close vessel, will reunite, after separation of its parts, as completely as though it had never been separated. It required very little ingenuity, after the experiments in a close vessel, by which this new property of the metal was first developed, to construct the necessary machinery for the formation of the pipe. The apparatus, essential to develop this property, would at once suggest the material parts, especially in the state of the art at the time. Any skilful mechanic, with Burr's machine before him, would readily construct the requisite machinery.

The patentees, therefore, after describing their discovery of this property of lead, and the apparatus by means of which they apply the metal to the manufacture of pipe, claim the combination of the machinery, only when used to form pipes under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, or in any other manner substantially the same. They do not claim it as new separately, or when used for any other purpose, or in any other way; but claim it, only, when applied for the purpose and in the way pointed out in the specification. The combination, as machinery, may be old; may have been long used; of itself, what no one could claim as his invention, and may not be the subject of a patent. What is claimed is, that it never had been before applied or used, in the way and for the purpose they have used and applied it, namely, in the embodiment and adaptation of a newly-discovered property in lead, by means of which they are enabled to produce a new manufacture wrought pipe-out of a mass of solid lead. Burr had attempted it, but failed. These patentees, after the lapse of seventeen years, having discovered this new property in the metal, succeeded, by the use and employment of it, and since then, none other than wrought lead pipe, made out of solid lead, has been found in the market, having superseded, on account of its superior quality and cheapness, all other modes of manufacture.

Now the construction, which I understand a majority of my brethren are inclined to give to this patent, namely, that the patentees claim, as the originality of their invention, simply, the combination of the machinery employed, with great deference, seems to me contrary to the fair and reasonable import of the language of the specification, and also of the summary of the claim. The tendency of modern decisions is to construe specifications benignly, and to look through mere forms of expression, often inartificially used, to the substance, and to maintain the right of the patentee to the thing really invented, if ascertainable upon a liberal consideration of the language of the specification, when taken together. For this purpose, phrases standing alone are not to be singled out, but the whole are to be taken in connection. 1 Sumn. 482-485.

Baron Parke observed, in delivering the opinion of the court in Neilson's patent, 'That, half a century ago, or even less, within fifteen or twenty years, there seems to have been very much a practice with both judges and juries to destroy the patent-right, even of beneficial patents, by exercising great astuteness in taking objections, either as to the title of the patent, but more particularly as to the specifications, and many valuable patent rights have been destroyed in consequence of the objections so taken. Within the last ten years or more, the courts have not been so strict in taking objections to the specifications, and they have endeavored to hold a fair hand between the patentee and the public, willing to give the patentee the reward of his patent.'

Construing the patent before us in this spirit, I cannot but think, that the thing really discovered, and intended to be described, and claimed by these patentees, cannot well be mistaken. That they did not suppose the novelty of their invention consisted, simply, in the arrangement of the machinery described, is manifest. They state, distinctly, that the leading feature of their discovery consisted of this new property of lead, and some of its alloys,-this, they say, is the remarkable feature of their invention,-and the apparatus described is regarded by them as subordinate, and as important only as enabling them to give practical effect to this newly-discovered property, by means of which they produce the new manufacture. If they have failed to describe and claim this, as belonging to their invention, it is manifest, upon the face of their specification, that they have failed to employ the proper words to describe and claim what they intended; and that the very case is presented, in which, if the court, in the language of Baron Parke, will endeavor to hold a fair hand between the patentee and the public, it will look through the forms of expression used, and discover, if it can, the thing really invented. Apply to the specification this rule of construction, and all difficulty at once disappears. The thing invented, and intended to be claimed, is too apparent to be mistaken.

The patentees have certainly been unfortunate in the language of the specification, if, upon a fair and liberal interpretation, they have claimed only the simple apparatus employed; when they have not only set forth the discovery of this property in the metal, as the great feature in their invention, but, as is manifest, without it the apparatus would have been useless. Strike out this new property from their description and from their claim, and nothing valuable is left. All the rest would be worthless. This lies at the foundation upon which the great merit of the invention rests, and without a knowledge of which the new manufacture could not have been produced; and, for aught we know, the world would have been deprived of it down to this day.

If the patentees had claimed the combination of the core and bridge or guide-piece, with the cylinder, the chambers, and the die, and stopped there, I admit the construction, now adopted by a majority of my brethren, could not be denied; although, even then, it would be obvious, from an examination of the specification as a whole, that the draughtsman had mistaken the thing really invented, and substituted in its place matters simply incidental, and of comparative insignificance. But the language of the claim does not stop here. The combination of these parts is claimed only when used to form pipes of lead, under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth,-that is, when used for the embodiment and adaptation of this new property in the metal for making wrought pipe out of a solid mass of lead. This guarded limitation of the use excludes the idea of a claim to the combination for any other, and ties it down to the instance, when the use incorporates within it the new idea or element which gives to it its value, and by means of which the new manufacture is produced. How, then, can it be consistently held, that here is a simple claim to the machinery, and nothing more, when a reasonable interpretation of the words not only necessarily excludes any such claim, but in express terms sets forth a different one,-one not only different in the conception of the invention, but different in the practical working of the apparatus, to accomplish the purpose intended? I conclude, therefore, that the claim, in this case, is not simply for the apparatus employed by the patentees, but for the embodiment or employment of the newly-discovered property in the metal, and the practical adaption of it, by these means, to the production of a new result, namely, the manufacture of wrought pipe out of solid lead.

Then, is this the proper subject-matter of a patent?

This question was first largely discussed by counsel and court in the celebrated case of Boulton v. Bull, (2 Hen. 31, 463,) involving the validity of Watts's patent, which was for 'a new invented method for lessening the consumption of fuel and steam in fire-engines.' This was effected by inclosing the steam vessel or cylinder with wood, or other material, which preserved the heat in the steam vessel; and by condensing the steam in separate vessels. It was admitted, on the argument, that there was no new mechanical construction invented by Watt, and the validity of the patent was placed on the ground that it was for well-known principles, practically applied, producing a new and useful result. On the other hand, it was conceded, that the application of the principles in the manner described was new, and produced the result claimed; but it was denied, that this constituted the subject-matter of a patent. Heath and Buller, Justices, agreed with the counsel for the defendant. But Lord Chief Justice Eyre laid down the true doctrine, and which, I think, will be seen to be the admitted doctrine of the courts of England at this day. 'Undoubtedly,' he observed, 'there can be no patent for a mere principle; but for a principle, so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act, and to produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, I think there may be a patent. Now, this,' he continues, 'is, in my judgment, the thing for which the patent stated in the case was granted; and this is what the specification describes, though it miscalls it a principle. It is not that the patentee conceived an abstract notion, that the consumption of steam in fire-engines may be lessened; but he has discovered a practical manner of doing it; and for that practical manner of doing it he has taken this patent. Surely,' he observes, 'this is a very different thing from taking a patent for a principle. The apparatus, as we have said, was not new. There is no new mechanical construction, said the counsel for the patentee, invented by Watt, capable of being the subject of a distinct specification; but his discovery was of a principle, the method of applying which is clearly set forth.' Chief Justice Eyre admitted that the means used were not new, and that if the patent had been taken out for the mechanism used, it must fail.

He observed, 'When the effect produced is some new substance or composition of things, it should seem that the privilege of the sole working or making ought to be for such new substances or composition, without regard to the mechanism or process by which it has been produced, which, though perhaps also new, will be only useful as producing the new substance.' Again, 'When the effect produced is no new substance, or composition of things, the patent can only be for the mechanism, if new mechanism is used; or for the process, if it be a new method of operating, with or without old mechanism, by which the effect is produced.' And again, he observes, 'If we wanted an illustration of the possible merit of a new method of operating with old machinery, we might look to the identical case before the court.' p. 496, 493, 495.

This doctrine, in expounding the law of patents, was announced in 1795, and the subsequent adoption of it by the English courts, shows, that Chief Justice Eyre was considerably in advance of his associates upon this branch of the law. He had got rid, at an early day, of the prejudice against patents so feelingly referred to by Baron Parke in Neilson v. Harford, and comprehended the great advantages to his country if properly encouraged. He observed, in another part of his opinion, that 'The advantages to the public from improvements of this kind are beyond all calculation important to a commercial country; and the mgenuity of artists, who turn their thoughts towards such improvements, is, in itself, deserving of encouragement.'

This doctrine was recognized by the Court of King's Bench in the King v. Wheeler, 2 B. & Ald. 340, 350.

It is there observed, that the word 'manufactures,' in the patent act, may be extended to a mere process to be carried on by known implements or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better or more useful kind.

Now, if this process to be carried on by known implements acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance of a better kind, is patentable, a fortiori will it be patentable, if it ultimately produces not some other known substance, but an entirely new and useful substance.

In Forsyth's patent, which consists of the application and use of detonating powder as priming for the discharge of firearms, it was held that whatever might be the construction of the lock or contrivance by which the powder was to be discharged, the use of the detonating mixture as priming, which article of itself was not new, was an infringement. Webster's Pat. Cas. 94, 97, (n); Curtis on Pat. 230.

This case is founded upon a doctrine which has been recognized in several subsequent cases in England, namely, that where a person discovers a principle or property of nature, or where he conceives of a new application of a well-known principle or property of nature, and also, of some mode of carrying it out into practice, so as to produce or attain a new and useful effect or result, he is entitled to protection against all other modes of carrying the same principle or property into practice for obtaining the same effect or result.

The novelty of the conception consists in the discovery and application in the one case, and of the application in the other, by which a new product in the arts or manufactures is the effect; and the question, in case of an infringement, is, as to the substantial identity of the principle or property, and of the application of the same, and consequently the means or machinery made use of, material only so far as they affect the identity of the application.

In the case of Jupe's patent for 'an improved expanding table,' Baron Alderson observed, speaking of this doctrine, 'You cannot take out a patent for a principle; you may take out a patent for a principle coupled with the mode of carrying the principle into effect. But then, you must start with having invented some mode of carrying the principle into effect; if you have done that, then you are entitled to protect yourself from all other modes of carrying the same principle into effect, that being treated by the jury as piracy of your original invention.' Webster's Pat. Cases, 147. The same doctrine was maintained also in the case of Neilson's patent for the hot air blast, in the K. B. and Exchequer in England. Webster's Pat. Cases, 342, 371; Curtis, § 74, 148, 232; Webster's Pat. Cases, 310.

This patent came also before the Court of Sessions in Scotland; and in submitting the case to the jury, the Lord Justice remarked, 'That the main merit, the most important part of the invention, may consist in the conception of the original idea-in in the discovery of the principle in science, or of the law of nature, stated in the patent; and little or no pains may have been taken in working out the best mode of the application of the principle to the purpose set forth in the patent. But still, if the principle is stated to be applicable to any special purpose, so as to produce any result previously unknown, in the way and for the objects described, the patent is good. It is no longer an abstract principle. It becomes to be a principle turned to account, to a practical object, and applied to a special result. It becomes, then, not an abstract principle, which means a principle considered apart from any special purpose or practical operation, but the discovery and statement of a principle for a special purpose, that is, a practical invention, a mode of carrying a principle into effect. That such is the law,' he observes, 'if a well-known principle is applied for the first time to produce a practical result for a special purpose, has never been disputed, and it would be very strange and unjust to refuse the same legal effect, when the inventor has the additional merit of discovering the principle, as well as its application to a practical object.'

Then he observes, again, 'Is it an objection to the patent that in its application of a new principle to a certain specified result, it includes every variety of mode of applying the principle according to the general statement of the object and benefit to be attained? This,' he observes, 'is a question of law, and I must tell you distinctly, that this generality of claim, that is, for all modes of applying the principle to the purpose specified, according to, or within a general statement of the object to be attained, and of the use to be made of the agent to be so applied, is no objection to the patent. The application or use of the agent for the purpose specified, may be carried out in a great variety of ways, and only shows the beauty and simplicity, and comprehensiveness of the invention.'

This case was carried up to the House of Lords on exceptions to the charge, and among others, to this part of it, which was the sixth exception, and is as follows: 'In so far as he (the Judge) did not direct the jury, that on the construction of the patent and specification, the patentee cannot claim or maintain that his patent is one which applies to all the varieties in the apparatus which may be employed in heating air while under blast; but was limited to the particular described in the specification.' And although the judgment of the court was reversed in the House of Lords on the eleventh exception, it was expressly affirmed as respects this one. Lord Campbell at first doubted, but after the decision of the courts in England on this patent, he admitted the instruction was right. Webster, Pat. Cases, 683, 684, 698, 717.

I shall not pursue a reference to one authorities on this subject any further. The settled doctrine to be deduced from them, I think, is, that a person having discovered the application for the first time of a well-known law of nature, or well-known property of matter, by means of which a new result in the arts or in manufactures is produced, and has pointed out a mode by which it is produced, is entitled to a patent; and, if he has not tied himself down in the specification to the particular mode described, he is entitled to be protected against all modes by which the same result is produced, by an application of the same law of nature or property of matter. And a fortiori, if he has discovered the law of nature or property of matter, and applied it, is he entitled to the patent, and aforesaid protection.

And why should not this be the law? The original conception the novel idea in the one case, is the new application of the principle or property of matter, and the new product in the arts or manufactures-in the other, in the discovery of the principle or property, and application, with like result. The mode or means are but incidental, and flowing naturally from the original conception; and hence of inconsiderable merit. But, it is said, this is patenting a principle, or element of nature. The authorities to which I have referred, answer the objection. It was answered by Chief Justice Eyre, in the case of Watts's patent, in 1795, fifty-seven years ago; and more recently in still more explicit and authoritative terms. And what if the principle is incorporated in the invention, and the inventor protected in the enjoyment for the fourteen years. He is protected only in the enjoyment of the application for the special purpose and object to which it has been newly applied by his genius and skill. For every other purpose and end, the principle is free for all mankind to use. And, where it has been discovered, as well as applied to this one purpose, and open to the world as to every other, the ground of complaint is certainly not very obvious. Undoubtedly, within the range of the purpose and object for which the principle has been for the first time applied, piracies are interfered with during the fourteen years. But any body may take it up and give to it any other application to the enlargement of the arts and of manufactures, without restriction. He is only debarred from the use of the new application for the limited time, which the genius of others has already invented and put into successful practice. The protection does not go beyond the thing which, for the first time, has been discovered and brought into practical use; and is no broader than that extended to every other discoverer or inventor of a new art or manufacture.

I own, I am incapable of comprehending the detriment to the improvements in the country that may flow from this sort of protection to inventors.

To hold, in the case of inventions of this character, that the novelty must consist of the mode or means of the new application producing the new result, would be holding against the facts of the case, as no one can but see, that the original conception reaches far beyond these. It would be mistaking the skill of the mechanic for the genius of the inventor.

Upon this doctrine, some of the most brilliant and useful inventions of the day by men justly regarded as public benefactors, and whose names reflect honor upon their country-the successful application of steam power to the propulsion of vessels and railroad cars-the application of the electric current for the instant communication of intelligence from one extremity of the country to the other-and the more recent, but equally brilliant conception, the propulsion of vessels by the application of the expansibility of heated air, the air supplied from the atmosphere that surrounds them. It would be found, on consulting the system of laws established for their encouragement and protection, that the world had altogether mistaken the merit of their discovery; that, instead of the originality and brilliancy of the conception that had been unwittingly attributed to them, the whole of it consisted of some simple mechanical contrivances which a mechanician of ordinary skill could readily have devised. Even Franklin, if he had turned the lightning to account, in order to protect himself from piracies, must have patented the kite, and the thread, and the key, as his great original conception, which gave him a name throughout Europe, as well as at home, for bringing down this element from the heavens, and subjecting it to the service of man. And if these simple contrivances, taken together, and disconnected from the control and use of the element by which the new application, and new and useful result may have been produced, happen to be old and well known, his patent would be void; or, if some follower in the tract of genius, with just intellect enough to make a different mechanical device or contrivance, for the same control and application of the element, and produce the same result, he would, under this view of the patent law, entitle himself to the full enjoyment of the fruits of Franklin's discovery.

If I rightly comprehend the ground upon which a majority of my brethren have placed the decision, they do not intend to controvert so much the doctrine which I have endeavored to maintain, and which, I think, rests upon settled authority, as the application of it to the particular case. They suppose that the patentees have claimed only the combination of the different parts of the machinery described in their specification, and therefore, are tied down to the maintenance of that as the novelty of their invention. I have endeavored to show, that this is a mistaken interpretation; and that they claim the combination, only, when used to embody and give a practical application to the newly-discovered property in the lead, by means of which a new manufacture is produced, namely, wrought pipe out of a solid mass of lead; which it is conceded, was never before successfully accomplished.

For these reasons, I am constrained to differ with the judgment they have arrived at, and am in favor of affirming that of the court below