Korea & Her Neighbours/Chapter XXXVII

The patient reader has now learned with me something of Korean history during the last three years, as well as of the reorganized methods of Government, and the education, trade, and finance of the country. He has also by proxy travelled in the interior, and has lived among the peasant farmers, seeing their industries, the huckstering which passes for trade, something of their domestic life and habits, and the superstitions by which they are enslaved, and has acquired some knowledge of the official and patrician exactions under which they suffer. He has seen the Koreans at home, with their limpness, laziness, dependence, and poverty, and Koreans under Russian rule raised into a thrifty and prosperous population. He can to some extent judge for himself of the prospects of a country which is incapable of standing alone, and which could support double its present population, and of the value of a territory which is possibly coveted by two Powers. Having acted as his guide so far, I should like to conclude with a few words on some of the subjects which have been glanced at in the course of these volumes.

Korea is not necessarily a poor country. Her resources are undeveloped, not exhausted. Her capacities for successful agriculture are scarcely exploited. Her climate is superb, her rainfall abundant, and her soil productive. Her hills and valleys contain coal, iron, copper, lead, and gold. The fish- eries along her coast-line of 1,740 miles might be a source of untold wealth. She is inhabited by a hardy and hospitable race, and she has no beggar class.

On the other hand, the energies of her people lie dormant. The upper classes, paralyzed by the most absurd of social obligations, spend their lives in inactivity. To the middle class no careers are open ; there are no skilled occupations to which they can turn their energies. The lower classes work no harder than is necessary to keep the wolf from the door, for very sufficient reasons. Even in Seoul, the largest mercantile establishments have hardly risen to the level of shops. Everything in Korea has been on a low, poor, mean level. Class privileges, class and official exactions, a total absence of justice, the in- security of all earnings, a Government which has carried out the worst traditions on which all unreformed Oriental Governments are based, a class of official robbers steeped in intrigue, a monarch enfeebled by the seclusion of the palace and the pettinesses of the Seraglio, a close alliance with one of the most corrupt of empires, the mutual jealousies of interested foreign- ers, and an all-pervading and terrorizing superstition have done their best to reduce Korea to that condition of resourcelessness and dreary squalor in which I formed my first impression of her.

Nevertheless the resources are there, in her seas, her soil, and her hardy population.

A great and universal curse in Korea is the habit in which thousands of able-bodied men indulge of hanging, or “sorning," on relations or friends who are better off than them- selves. There is no shame in the transaction, and there is no public opinion to condemn it. A man who has a certain income, however small, has to support many of his own kindred, his wife's relations, many of his own friends, and the friends of his relatives. This partly explains the rush for Government offices, and their position as marketable commodities. To a man burdened with a horde of hangers-on, the one avenue of escape is official life, which, whether high or low, enables him to provide for them out of the public purse. This accounts for the continual creation of offices, with no other real object than the pensioning of the relatives and friends of the men who rule the country. Above all, this explains the frequency of conspiracies and small revolutions in Korea. Principle is rarely at stake, and no Korean revolutionist intends to risk his life in support of any conviction.

Hundreds of men, strong in health and of average intelligence, are at this moment hanging on for everything, even their tobacco, to high officials in Seoul, eating three meals a day, gossiping and plotting misdeeds, the feeling of honorable independence being unknown. When it is desirable to get rid of them, or it is impossible to keep them longer, offices are created or obtained for them. Hence Government employment is scarcely better than a "free coup" for this class of rubbish. The factious political disturbances which have dis- graced Korea for many years have not been conflicts of principle at all, but fights for the Government position which gives its holder the disposal of offices and money. The suspicious- ness which prevents high officials from working together is also partly due to the desire of every Minister to get more influence with the King than his colleagues, and so secure more appointments for his relations and friends. The author of the Korean Dictionary states that the word for work in Korean is synonymous with "loss," "evil," "misfortune," and the man who leads an idle life proves his right to a place among the gentry. The strongest claim for office which an official puts forward for a protege is that he cannot make a living. Such persons when appointed do little, and often nothing, except draw their salaries and "squeeze " where they can !

I have repeated almost ad nauseam that the cultivator of the soil is the ultimate sponge. The farmers work harder than any other class, and could easily double the production of the land, their methods, though somewhat primitive, being fairly well adapted to the soil and climate. But having no security for their gains, they are content to produce only what will feed and clothe their families, and are afraid to build better houses or to dress respectably. There are innumerable peasant farmers who have gone on reducing their acreage of culture year by year, owing to the exactions and forced loans of magistrates siiid y a /ig- If ans, and who now only raise what will enable them to procure three meals a day. It is not wonderful that classes whose manifest destiny is to be squeezed, should have sunk down to a dead level of indifference, inertia, apathy, and listlessness.

In spite of reforms, the Korean nation still consists of but two classes, the Robbers and the Robbed, — the official class recruited from the yang-bans y the licensed vampires of the country, and the Ha-hiy literally "low men," a residuum of fully four-fifths of the population, whose raiso7i d^etre is to supply the blood for the vampires to suck.

Out of such unpromising materials the new nation has to be constructed, by education, by protecting the producing classes, by punishing dishonest officials, and by the imposition of a labor test in all Government offices, i.e. by paying only for work actually done.

That reforms are not hopeless, if carried out under firm and capable foreign supervision, is shown by what has been accomplished in the Treasury Department in one year. No Korean office was in a more chaotic and corrupt condition, and the ramifications of its corruption were spread all through the Provinces. Much was hoped when Mr. M'Leavy Brown accepted the thankless position of Financial Adviser, from his known force of character and remarkable financial capacity, but no one would have ventured to predict what has actually occurred.

Although his efforts at financial reform have been thwarted at every turn, not alone by the rapacity of the King's male and female favorites, and the measureless cunning and craft of corrupt officials, who incite the Sovereign to actions concerning money which are subversive of the fairest schemes of financial rectitude, but by chicane, fraud, and corruption in every department ; by the absence of trustworthy subordinates ; by infancious traditional customs ; and the fact that every man in office, and every man hoping for office, is pledged by his personal interest to oppose every effort at reform actively or passively, Korean finance stands thus at the close of 1897.

In a few months the Augean stable of the Treasury Department in Seoul has been cleansed ; the accounts are kept on a uniform system, and with the utmost exactitude ; " value received" precedes payments for work; an army of drones, hanging on to all departments and subsisting on public money, has been disbanded ; a partial estimate has been formed of the revenue which the Provinces ought to produce ; superfluous officials unworthily appointed find that their salaries are not forthcoming; every man entitled to receive payment is paid at the end of every month ; nothing is in arrears ; great public improvements are carried out with a careful supervision which ensures rigid economy ; the accounts of every Department undergo strict scrutiny ; no detail is thought unworthy of attention, and instead of Korea being bankrupt, as both her friends and enemies supposed she would be in July, 1896, she closed the financial year in April, 1897, with every account paid and a million and a half in the Treasury, out of which she has repaid one million of the Japanese loan of three millions. If foreign advisers of similar calibre and capacity were attached to all the departments of State similar results might in time be obtained.

One thing is certain, that the war and the period of the energetic ascendency of Japan have given Korea so rude a shake, and have so thoroughly discredited various customs and institutions previously venerated for their antiquity, that no retrograde movements, such as have been to some extent in progress in 1897, can replace her in the old grooves.

Seoul is Korea for most practical purposes, and the working of the Western leaven, the new impulses and modes of thought introduced by Western education, the inevitable contact with foreigners, and the influence of a free Press are through Seoul slowly affecting the nation. Under the shadow of Chinese suzerainty the Korean yang-han enjoyed practically unlimited opportunities for the extortions and tyrannies which were the atmosphere of patrician life. Japan introduced a new theory on this subject, and practically gave the masses to understand that they possess rights which the classes are bound to respect, and the Press takes the same line.

It is slowly dawning upon the Korean peasant farmer through the medium of Japanese and Western teaching, that to be an ultimate sponge is not his inevitable destiny, that he is entitled to civil rights, equality before the eye of the law, and protection for his earnings.

The more important of the changes during the last three years which are beneficial to Korea may be summarized thus : The connection with China is at an end, and with the victories of Japan the Korean belief in the unconquerable military power of the Middle Kingdom has been exploded, and the alliance between two political systems essentially corrupt has been severed. The distinction between patrician and plebeian has been abolished, on paper at least, along with domestic slavery, and the disabilities which rendered the sons of concubines ineligible for high office. Brutal punishments and tor- ture are done away with, a convenient coinage has replaced cash, an improved educational system has been launched, a disciplined army and police force has been created, the Chinese literary examinations are no longer the test of fitness for official employment, a small measure of judicial reform has been granted, a railroad from Chemulpo to the capital is being rapidly pushed to completion, the pressure of the Trades Guilds is relaxed, a postal system efficiently worked and commanding confidence has been introduced into all the Provinces, the finances of the country are being placed on a sound basis, the change from a land-tax paid in kind to one which is an assessment in money on the value of the land greatly diminishes the opportunities for official “squeezing,” and large and judicious retrenchments have been carried out in most of the metropolitan and provincial departments.

Nevertheless, the Government Gazette of the 12th of August, 1897, contains the following Royal Edicts : —

We have been looking into the condition of the country. We have re- alized the imminent danger which threatens the maintenance of the na- tion. But the people of both high and low classes do not seem to mind the coming calamity and act indifferently. Under the circumstances the country cannot prosper. We are depending upon Our Ministers for their advice and help, but they do not respond to our trust. How are we goiiig to bring the nation out of its chaotic condition ? We desire them to pause and to think that they cannot enjoy their homes unless the integrity of the nation is preserved. We confess that We have not performed our part properly, but Our Ministers and other officials ought to have advised Us to refrain from wrongdoing as their ancestors had done to Our fore- fathers. We will endeavor to do what is right and proper for our country hereafter, and We trust Our subjects will renew their loyalty and patriot- ism in helping Us to carry out Our aim. Our hope is that every citizen in the land will consider the country's interest first before thinking of his private affairs. Let Us all join Our hearts to preserve the integrity of Our country.

II

The welfare of Our people is our constant thought. We realize that since last year's disturbance Our people have been suffering greatly on account of lack of peace and order. The dead suffers as much as the living, but the Government has not done anything to ameliorate the ex- isting condition. This thought makes Us worry to such an extent that the afHuence by which We are surrounded is rather uncomfortable. If this fact is known to Our provincial officials they will do their best to amelio- rate the condition of the people. Compulsory collection of unjust taxes and thousands of lawless officials and Government agents rob the helpless masses upon one pretence or another. Why do they treat Our people so cruelly ? We hereby order the provincial officials to look into the various items of illegal taxes now being collected, and abolish them all without reservation. Whoever does not heed this edict will be punished according to the law.$1$

Though the Koreans of to-day are the product of centuries of disadvantages, yet after nearly a year spent in the country, during which I made its people my chief study, I am by no means hopeless of their future, in spite of the distinctly retrograde movements of 1897. Two things, however, are essential.

I. As Korea is incapable of reforming herself from within, that she must be reformed from without.

II. That the power of the Sovereign must be placed under stringent and permanent constitutional checks.

Hitherto I have written exclusively on Korean internal affairs, her actual condition, and the prospects of the social and commercial advancement of the people. I conclude with a few remarks on the political possibilities of the Korean future, and the relations of Korea with certain other powers.

The geographical position of Korea, with a frontier con- terminous with those of China and Russia, and divided from Japan by only a narrow sea, has done much to determine her political relationships. The ascendency of China grew nat- urally out of territorial connection, and its duration for many centuries was at once the cause and effect of a community in philosophy, customs, and to a great extent in language and re- ligion. But Chinese control is at an end, and China can scarcely be regarded as a factor in the Korean situation.

Japan having skilfully asserted her claim to an equality of rights in Korea, after several diplomatic triumphs and marked success in obtaining fiscal and commercial ascendency, even- tually, by the overthrow of her rival in the late war, secured political ascendency likewise ; and the long strife between the two empires, of which Korea had been the unhappy stage, came to an end.

The nominal reason for the war, to which the Japanese Gov- ernment has been careful to adhere, was the absolute necessity for the reform of the internal administration of a State too near the shores of Japan to be suffered to sink annually deeper into an abyss of misgovernment and ruin. It is needless to specu- late upon the ultimate object which Japan had in view in undertaking this unusual task. It is enough to say that she entered upon it with great energy ; and that, while the sug- gestions she enforced introduced a new regune, struck at the heart of privilege and prerogative, revolutionized social order, and reduced the Sovereign to the position of a "salaried automaton," the remarkable ability with which her demands were formulated gave them the appearance of simple and natural administrative reforms.

I believe that Japan was thoroughly honest in her efforts ; and though she lacked experience, and was ofttimes rough and tactless, and aroused hostile feeling needlessly, that she had no intention to subjugate, but rather to play the role of the pro- tector of Korea and the guarantor of her independence.

For more than a year, in spite of certain mistakes, she made fair headway, accomplished some useful and important reforms, and initiated others ; and it is only just to her to repeat that those which are now being carried out are on the lines which she laid down. Then came Viscount Miura's savage coup, which discredited Japan and her diplomacy in the eyes of the civilized world. This was followed by the withdrawal of her garrisons, and of her numerous advisers, controllers, and drill instructors, and the substitution of an apparently laissez-faire policy for an active dictatorship. I write "apparently," be- cause it cannot for a moment be supposed that this sagacious and ambitious Empire recognized the unfortunate circum- stances in Korea as a finality, and retired in despair !

The landing of Japanese armies in Korea, and the subsequent declaration of war with China, while they gave the world the shock of a surprise, were, as I endeavored to point out briefly in chapter xiii., neither the result of a sudden im- pulse, nor of the shakiness of a Ministry which had to choose between its own downfall and a foreign war. The latter view could only occur to the most superficial student of Far Eastern history and politics.

Japan for several centuries has regarded herself as possessing vested rights to commercial ascendency in Korea. The harvest of the Korean seas has been reaped by her fishermen, and for 300 years her colonies have sustained a more or less prosperous existence at Fusan. Her resentment of the pretensions of China in Korea, though debarred for a considerable time from active exercise, first by the policy of seclusion pursued by the Tokugawa House, and next by the necessity of consolidating her own internal polity after the restoration, has never slum- bered.

To deprive China of a suzerainty which, it must be ad- mitted, was not exercised for the advantage of Korea ; to con- solidate her own commercial supremacy ; to ensure for herself free access and special privileges ; to establish a virtual pro- tectorate under which no foreign dictation would be tolerated ; to reform Korea on Japanese lines, and to substitute her own liberal and enlightened civilization for the antique Oriental conservatism of the Peninsula, are aims which have been kept steadily in view for forty years, replacing in part the designs which had existed for several previous centuries.

In order to judge correctly of the action or inaction of Japan during 1896 and 1897, it must be borne in mind not only that her diplomacy is secret and reticent, but that it is steady ; that it has not hitherto been affected by any great political cataclysms at home; that it has less of opportunism than that of almost any other nation, and that the Japanese have as much tenacity and fixity of purpose as any other race. Also, Japanese policy in Korea is still shaped by the same remarkable statesmen, who from the day that Japan emerged upon the international arena have been recognized by the people as their natural leaders, and who have guided the country through the manifold complications which beset the path of her enlightened progress with a celerity and freedom from disaster which have compelled the admiration of the world.

The assassination of the Korean Queen under the auspices of Viscount Miura, and the universal horror excited by the act, rendered it politic for Japan to keep out of sight till the storm which threatened to wreck her prestige in Korea had blown over. This temporary retirement was arranged with consummate skill. There were no violent dislocations. The garrisons which were to be withdrawn quietly slipped away, and were replaced by guards only sufficient for the protection of the Japanese Legation, the Japanese telegraph, and other property. The greater number of the Japanese in Korean Government employment fell naturally out of it as their con- tracts expired, and quietly retired from the country. Minis- ters of experience, proved ability, and courtesy of demeanor, have succeeded to the post once occupied by Mr. Otori and Viscount Miura. There has been scarcely any recent inter- ference with Korean affairs, and the Japanese colonists who were much given to bullying and blustering are on greatly im- proved behavior, the most objectionable among them having been recalled by orders from home. Diplomatically, Japan has carefully avoided friction with the Korean Government and the representatives of the other Powers. But to infer from this that she has abandoned her claims, or has swerved from her determination to make her patronage essential to the well-being of Korea would be a grave mistake.

It has been said that whatever Japan lost in Korea Russia gained. It is true that the King in his terror and apprehen- sion threw himself upon the protection of the Russian Minis- ter, and remained for more than a year under the shelter of the Russian flag, and that at his request a Russian Military Commission arrived to reorganize and drill the Korean army, that Russia presented 3,000 Berdan rifles to Korea, that a Russian financier spent the autumn of 1896 in Seoul investi- gating the financial resources and prospects of the country, and that the King, warned by disastrous experiences of be- trayal, prefers to trust his personal safety to his proximity to the Russian military quarters.

But "Russian Ascendency," in the sense of " ControV in which Japanese ascendency is to be understood, has never existed. The Russian Minister used the undoubtedly influ- ential position which circumstances gave him with unexampled moderation, and only brought his influence to bear on the King in cases of grave misrule. The influence of Russia, however, grew quietly and naturally, with little of external manifestation, up to March, 1897, when the publication of a treaty, concluded ten months before between Russia and Japan,$^$ caused something of a revulsion of feeling in favor of the latter country, and Russia has been slowly losing ground. Her policy is too pacific to allow of a quarrel with Japan, and a quarrel would be the inevitable result of any present attempt at dictatorship in Korea. So far, she has pursued a strictly opportunist policy, taking no steps except those which have been forced upon her; and even if the Korean pear were ready to drop into her mouth, I greatly doubt if she would shake the tree.

At all events, Russia let the opportunity of obtaining ascendency in Korea go by. It is very likely that she never de- sired it. It may be quite incompatible with other aims, at which we can only guess. At the same time, the influence of Japan is quietly and steadily increasing. Certainly the great object of the triple intervention in the treaty negotiations in Shimonoseki was to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on the mainland of the Asiatic Continent ; but it does not seem altogether impossible that, by playing a waiting game and profiting by previous mistakes, she, without assuming a formal protectorate, may be able to add, for all practical purposes of commerce and emigration, a mainland province to her Em- pire. Forecasts are dangerous things,$2$ but it is safe to say that if Russia, not content with such quiet, military develop- ments as may be in prospect, were to manifest any aggressive designs on Korea, Japan is powerful enough to put a brake on the wheel ! Korea, however, is incapable of standing alone, and unless so difficult a matter as a joint protectorate could be arranged, she must be under the tutelage of either Japan or Russia.

If Russia were to acquire an actual supremacy, the usual result would follow. Preferential duties and other imposts would practically make an end of British trade in Korea with all its large potentialities. The effacement of British political influence has been effected chiefly by a policy of laissez-faire^ which has produced on the Korean mind the double impres- sion of indifference and feebleness, to which the dubious and hazy diplomatic relationship naturally contributes. If England has no contingent interest in the political future of a country rich in undeveloped resources and valuable harbors, and whose possession by a hostile Power might be a serious peril to her interests in the Far East, her policy during the last few years has been a sure method of evidencing her unconcern.

Though we may have abandoned any political interest in Korea, the future of British trade in the country remains an important question. Such influence as England possesses, being exercised through a non-official channel, and therefore necessarily indirect, is owing to the abilities, force, and diplomatic tact of Mr. M'Leavy Brown, the Chief Commissioner of Customs, formerly of H.B.M.'s Chinese Consular Service.

So long as he is in control at the capital, and such upright and able men as Mr. Hunt, Mr. Oiesen, and Mr. Osborne are Commissioners at the treaty ports (Appendix D), so long will England be commercially important in Korean estimation.

The Customs revenue, always increasing, and collected at a cost of 10 per cent, only, is the backbone of Korean finance ; and everywhere the ability and integrity of the administration give the Commissioners an influence which is necessarily in favor of England, and which produces an impression even on corrupt Korean officialism. That this service should remain in our hands is of the utmost practical importance. In the days of Japanese ascendency there was a great desire to upset the present arrangement, but it was frustrated by the tact and firmness of the Chief Commissioner. The next danger is that it should pass into Russian hands, which would be a severe blow to our prestige and interests. Some of the leading Russian papers are agitating this question, and the Novoie Vrei7iia of 9th September, 1897, in writing of the opening of the ports of Mok-po and Chi-nam-po to foreign trade, says : —

"These encroachments are chiefly due to the cleverness of the British officials who are at the head of the Financial and Customs Departments of the Korean administration." It adds, “If Russia tolerates any further increase in this policy. . . Great Britain will convert the country into one of her best markets." The Novoie Vremia goes on to urge “the Russian Government to exercise, before it is too late, a more searching surveillance than at present, to take steps to reduce the number of British officials in the Korean Government (the Customs), and to compel Japan to withdraw what are practically the military garrisons which she has established in Korea."

Such, in brief outline, is the position of political affairs in Korea at the close of 1897. Her long and close political connection with China is severed ; she has received from Japan a gift of independence which she knows not how to use; England, for reasons which may be guessed at, has withdrawn from any active participation in her affairs; the other European Powers have no interests to safeguard in that quarter ; and her integrity and independence are at the mercy of the most patient and the most ambitious of Empires, whose interests in the Far East are conflicting, if not hostile.

It is with great regret that I take leave of Korea, with Russia and Japan facing each other across her destinies. The distaste I felt for the country at first passed into an interest which is almost affection, and on no previous journey have I made dearer and kinder friends, or those from whom I parted more regretfully. I saw the last of Seoul in snow in the blue and violet atmosphere of one of the loveliest of her winter mornings, and the following day left Chemulpo in a north wind of merciless severity in the little Government steamer Hyenik for Shanghai, where the quaint Korean flag excited much interest and questioning as she steamed slowly up the river.

$^$See Appendix E.

$1$The good intentions of the Korean Sovereign, as well as the weakness which renders them ineffective, are typically illustrated in these two pathetic documents.

$2$As "it is the unexpected which happens," it would not be surprising if certain moves, ostensibly with the object of placing the independence of Korea on a firm basis, were made even before these volumes are published.