Konigsberg v. State Bar of California (366 U.S. 36)/Opinion of the Court

This case, involving California's second rejection of petitioner's application for admission to the state bar, is a sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810, in which this Court reversed the State's initial refusal of his application.

Under California law the State Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California Committee of Bar Examiners. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 6064. To qualify for certification an applicant must, among other things, be of 'good moral character,' id., § 6060(c), and no person may be certified 'who advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means * *  * .' Id., § 6064.1. The Committee is empowered and required to ascertain the qualifications of all candidates. Id., § 6046. Under rules prescribed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar, an applicant before the Committee has 'the burden of proving that he is possessed of good moral character, of removing any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness, and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public.' Id., Div. 3, c. 4, Rule X, § 101. Any applicant denied certification may have the Committee's action reviewed by the State Supreme Court. Id., § 6066.

In 1953 petitioner, having successfully passed the California bar examinations, applied for certification for bar membership. The Committee, after interrogating Konigsberg and receiving considerable evidence as to his qualifications, declined to certify him on the ground that he had failed to meet the burden of proving his eligibility under the two statutory requirements relating to good moral character and nonadvocacy of violent overthrow. That determination centered largely around Konigsberg's repeated refusals to answer Committee questions as to his present or past membership in the Communist Party. The California Supreme Court denied review without opinion. See 52 Cal.2d 769, 770, 344 P.2d 777, 778.

On certiorari this Court, after reviewing the record, held the state determination to have been without rational support in the evidence and therefore offensive to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra. At the same time the Court declined to decide whether Konigsberg's refusals to answer could constitutionally afford 'an independent ground for exclusion from the Bar,' considering that such an issue was not before it. Id., 353 U.S. 259-262, 77 S.Ct. 726-727. The case was remanded to the State Supreme Court 'for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.' Id., 353 U.S. 274, 77 S.Ct. 734.

On remand petitioner moved the California Supreme Court for immediate admission to the bar. The court vacated its previous order denying review and referred the matter to the Bar Committee for further consideration. At the ensuing Committee hearings Konigsberg introduced further evidence as to his good moral character (none of which was rebutted), reiterated unequivocally his disbelief in violent overthrow, and stated that he had never knowingly been a member of any organization which advocated such action. He persisted, however, in his refusals to answer any questions relating to his membership in the Communist Party. The Committee again declined to certify him, this time on the ground that his refusals to answer had obstructed a full investigation into his qualifications. The California Supreme Court, by a divided vote, refused review, and also denied Konigsberg's motion for direct admission to practice. 52 Cal.2d 769, 344 P.2d 777. We again brought the case here. 362 U.S. 910, 80 S.Ct. 661, 4 L.Ed.2d 618.

Petitioner's contentions in this Court in support of reversal of the California Supreme Court's order are reducible to three propositions: (1) the State's action was inconsistent with this Court's decision in the earlier Konigsberg case; (2) assuming the Committee's inquiries into Konigsberg's possible Communist Party membership were permissible, it was unconstitutionally arbitrary for the State to deny him admission because of his refusals to answer; and (3) in any event, Konigsberg was constitutionally justified in refusing to answer these questions.

Consideration of petitioner's contentions as to the effect of this Court's decision in the former Konigsberg case requires that there be kept clearly in mind what is entailed in California's rule, comparable to that in many States, that an applicant for admission to the bar bears the burden of proof of 'good moral character' -a requirement whose validity is not, nor could well be, drawn in question here.

Under such a rule an applicant must initially furnish enough evidence of good character to make a prima facie case. The examining Committee then has the opportunity to rebut that showing with evidence of bad character. Such evidence may result from the Committee's own independent investigation, from an applicant's responses to questions on his application form, or from Committee interrogation of the applicant himself. This interrogation may well be of decisive importance for, as all familiar with bar admission proceedings know, exclusion of unworthy candidates frequently depends upon the thoroughness of the Committee's questioning, revealing as it may infirmities in an otherwise satisfactory showing on his part. This is especially so where a bar committee, as is not infrequently the case, has no means of conducting an independent investigation of its own into an applicant's qualifications. If at the conclusion of the proceedings the evidence of good character and that of bad character are found in even balance, the State may refuse admission to the applicant, just as in an ordinary suit a plaintiff may fail in his case because he has not met his burden of proof.

In the first Konigsberg case this Court was concerned solely with the question whether the balance between the favorable and unfavorable evidence as to Konigsberg's qualifications had been struck in accordance with the requirements of due process. It was there held, first, that Konigsberg had made out a prima facie case of good character and of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, and, second, that the other evidence in the record could not, even with the aid of all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, cast such doubts upon petitioner's prima facie case as to justify any finding other than that these two California qualification requirements had been satisfied. In assessing the significance of Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions as to Communist Party membership, the Court dealt only with the fact that this refusal could not provide any reasonable indication of a character not meeting these two standards for admission. The Court did not consider, but reserved for later decision, all questions as to the permissibility of the State treating Konigsberg's refusal to answer as a ground for exclusion, not because it was evidence from which substantive conclusions might be drawn, but because the refusal had thwarted a full investigation into his qualifications. See 353 U.S. at pages 259-262, 77 S.Ct. at pages 726-728. The State now asserts that ground for exclusion, an issue that is not foreclosed by anything in this Court's earlier opinion which decided a quite different question.

It is equally clear that the State's ordering of the rehearing which led to petitioner's exclusion manifested no disrespect of the effect of the mandate in that case, which expressly left the matter open for further state proceedings 'not inconsistent with' the Court's opinion. There is no basis for any suggestion that the State in so proceeding has adopted unusual or discriminatory procedures to avoid the normal consequences of this Court's earlier determination. In its earlier proceeding, the California Bar Committee may have found further investigation and questioning of petitioner unnecessary when, in its view, the applicant's prima facie case of qualifications had been sufficiently rebutted by evidence already in the record. While in its former opinion this Court held that the State could not constitutionally so conclude, it did not undertake to preclude the state agency from asking any questions or from conducting any investigation that it might have thought necessary had it known that the basis of its then decision would be overturned. In recalling Konigsberg for further testimony, the Committee did only what this Court has consistently held that federal administrative tribunals may do on remand after a reviewing court has set aside agency orders as unsupported by requisite findings of fact. Federal Communications Comm. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 60 S.Ct. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656; Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U.S. 146, 60 S.Ct. 443, 84 L.Ed. 664.

In the absence of the slightest indication of any purpose on the part of the State to evade the Court's prior decision, principles of finality protecting the parties to this state litigation are, within broad limits of fundamental fairness, solely the concern of California law. Such limits are broad even in a criminal case, see Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L.Ed. 335; Hoag v. State of New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913; cf. Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328, 58 S.Ct. 149, 153, 82 L.Ed. 288. In this instance they certainly have not been transgressed by the State's merely taking further action in this essentially administrative type of proceeding.

We think it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications. An investigation of this character, like a civil suit, requires procedural as well as substantive rules. It is surely not doubtful that a State could validly adopt an administrative rule analogous to Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., which provides that that refusal, after due warning, to answer relevant questions may result in 'the matters regarding which the questions were asked' being considered for the purposes of the proceeding to be answered in a way unfavorable to the refusing party, or even that such refusal may result in 'dismissing the action or proceeding' of the party asking affirmative relief.

The state procedural rule involved here is a less broad one, for all that California has in effect said is that in cases where, on matters material to an applicant's qualifications, there are gaps in the evidence presented by him which the agency charged with certification considers should be filled in the appropriate exercise of its responsibilities, an applicant will not be admitted to practice unless and until he cooperates with the agency's efforts to fill those gaps. The fact that this rule finds its source in the supervisory powers of the California Supreme Court over admissions to the bar, rather than in legislation, is not constitutionally significant. Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 60 S.Ct. 968, 84 L.Ed. 1254. Nor in the absence of a showing of arbitrary or discriminatory application in a particular case, is it a matter of federal concern whether such a rule requires the rejection of all applicants refusing to answer material questions, or only in instances where the examining committee deems that a refusal has materially obstructed its investigation. Compare Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399, 78 S.Ct. 1317, 2 L.Ed.2d 1414, with Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 80 S.Ct. 527, 4 L.Ed.2d 494.

In the context of the entire record of these proceedings, the application of the California rule in this instance cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. In the first Konigsberg case this Court held that neither the somewhat weak but uncontradicted testimony, that petitioner had been a Communits Party member in 1941, nor his refusal to answer questions relating to Party membership, could rationally support any substantive adverse inferences as to petitioner's character qualifications, 353 U.S. at pages 266-274, 77 S.Ct. at pages 729-734. That was not to say, however, that these factors, singly or together, could not be regarded as leaving the investigatory record in sufficient uncertainty as constitutionally to permit application of the procedural rule which the State has now invoked, provided that Konigsberg had been first given due warning of the consequences of his continuing refusal to respond to the Committeee's questions. Cf. 353 U.S. at page 261, 77 S.Ct. at page 727.

It is no answer to say that petitioner has made out a prima facie case of qualifications, for this is precisely the posture of a proceeding in which the Committee's right to examine and cross-examine becomes significant. Assuming, as we do for the moment, that there is no privilege here to refuse to answer, petitioner could no more insist that his prima facie case makes improper further questioning of him than he could insist that such circumstance made improper the introduction of other forms of rebutting evidence.

We likewise regard as untenable petitioner's contentions that the questions as to Communist Party membership were made irrelevant either by the fact that bare, innocent membership is not a ground of disqualification or by petitioner's willingness to answer such ultimate questions as whether he himself believed in violent overthrow or knowingly belonged to an organization advocating violent overthrow. The Committee Chairman's answer to the former contention was entirely correct:

'If you answered the question, for example, that you had been     a member of the Communist Party during some period since 1951      or that you were presently a member of the Communist Party,      the Committee would then be in a position to ask you what      acts you engaged in to carry out the functions and purposes      of that party, what the aims and purposes of the party were, to your knowledge, and questions of that      type. You see by failing to answer the initial question there     certainly is no basis and no opportunity for us to      investigate with respect to the other matters to which the      initial question might very well be considered preliminary.'

And the explanation given to petitioner's counsel by another Committee member as to why Konigsberg's testimony about ultimate facts was not dispositive was also sound:

'Mr. Mosk, you realize that if Mr. Konigsberg had answered     the question that he refused to answer, an entirely new area      of investigation might be opened up, and this Committee might      be able to ascertain from Mr. Konigsberg that perhaps he is      now and for many years past has been an active member of the      Communist Party, and from finding out who his associates were      in that enterprise we might discover that he does advocate      the overthrow of this government by force and violence. I am     not saying that he would do that, but it is a possibility,      and we don't have to take any witness' testimony as      precluding us from trying to discover it he is telling the      truth. That is the point.'

Petitioner's further miscellaneous contentions that the State's exclusion of him was capricious are all also insubstantial.

There remains the question as to whether Konigsberg was adequately warned of the consequences of his refusal to answer. At the outset of the renewed hearings the Chairman of the Committee stated:

'As a result of our two-fold purpose (to investigate and     reach determinations), particularly our function of      investigation, we believe it will be necessary for you, Mr. Konigsberg, to answer our material questions or our     investigation will be obstructed. We would not then as a     result be able to certify you for admission.'

After petitioner had refused to answer questions on Communist Party membership, the Chairman asked:

'Mr. Konigsberg, I think you will recall that I initially     advised you a failure to answer our material questions would      obstruct our investigation and result in our failure to      certify you. With this in mind do you wish to answer any of     the questions which you heretofore up to now have refused to      answer?'

At the conclusion of the proceeding another Committee member stated:

'I would like to make this statement so that there will be no     misunderstanding on the part of any court that may review      this record in the future, that I feel that as a member of      the Committee that the failure of Mr. Konigsberg to answer the question as to whether or not      he is now a member of the Communist Party is an obstruction      of the function of this Committee, not a frustration if that      word has been used. I think it would be an obstruction. There     are phases of his moral character that we haven't been able      to investigate simply because we have been stopped at this      point, and I for one could not certify to the Supreme Court      that he was a proper person to be admitted to practice law in      this State until he answers the question about his Communist      affiliation.'

The record thus leaves no room for doubt on the score of 'warning,' and petitioner does not indeed contend to the contrary.

Finally, petitioner argues that, in any event, he was privileged not to respond to questions dealing with Communist Party membership because they unconstitutionally impinged upon rights of free speech and association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association (N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488), as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes,' not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470; Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137; Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. On the other hand, general argulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved. See, e.g., Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155; Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049; Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L..ed. 513; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233. It is in the latter class of cases that this Court has always placed rules compelling disclosure of prior association as an incident of the informed exercise of a valid governmental function. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480. Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be efected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1184, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273; N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, supra; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-127, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1092-1093, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115; Bates v. City of Little Rock, supra; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 81 S.Ct. 567, 5 L.Ed.2d 633; Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 81 S.Ct. 584, 5 L.Ed.2d 653. With more particular reference to the present context of a state decision as to character qualifications, it is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the constitutional protections of speech and association which would automatically and without consideration of the extent of the deterrence of speech and association and of the importance of the state function, exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as character, purpose, credibility, or intent. On the basis of these considerations we now judge petitioner's contentions in the present case.

Petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of § 6064.1 of the California Business and Professions Code forbidding certification for admission to practice of those advocating the violent overthrow of government. It would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief, firm enough to be carried over into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the State or Federal Government is an unimportant consideration in determining the fitness of applicants for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political institutions. Cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L..ed. 1317. Nor is the state interest in this respect insubstantially related to the right which California claims to inquire about Communist Party membership. This Court has long since recognized the legitimacy of a statutory finding that membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the danger of use for such illegal ends of powers given for limited purposes. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128-129, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1093-1094, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115; cf. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 81 S.Ct. 567, 5 L.Ed.2d 633; Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 81 S.Ct. 584, 5 L.Ed.2d 653.

As regards the questioning of public employees relative to Communist Party membership it has already been held that the interest in not subjecting speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness of the employee for the post he holds, and hence that such questioning does not infringe constitutional protections. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399, 78 S.Ct. 1317, 2 L.Ed.2d 1414; Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317. With respect to this same question of Communist Party membership, we regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.

There is here no likelihood that deterrence of association may result from foreseeable private action, see N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. at page 462, 78 S.Ct. at page 1171, for bar committee interrogations such as this are conducted in private. See Rule 58, Section X, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Illinois, S.H.A. ch. 110, § 101.58, Section 10; cf. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, Rule 8; Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 291-292, 79 S.Ct. 1157, 1159-1160, 3 L.Ed.2d 1234. Nor is there the possibility that the State may be afforded the opportunity for imposing undetectable arbitrary consequences upon protected association, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, for a bar applicant's exclusion by reason of Communist Party membership is subject to judicial review, including ultimate review by this Court, should it appear that such exclusion has rested on substantive or procedural factors that do not comport with the Federal Constitution. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216. In these circumstances it is difficult indeed to perceive any solid basis for a claim of unconstitutional intrusion into rights assured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

If this were all there was to petitioner's claim of a privilege to refuse to answer, we would regard the Beilan case as controlling. There is, however, a further aspect of the matter. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, we held unconstitutional a state procedural rule that in order to obtain an exemption a taxpayer must bear the burden of proof, including both the burdens of establishing a prima facie case and of ultimate persuasion, that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of government. We said (357 U.S. at page 526, 78 S.Ct. at page 1342):

'The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular     speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the      unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in      all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate      utterance will be penalized. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof     and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct      necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if      the State must bear these burdens. This is especially to be     feared when the complexity of the proofs and the generality      of the standards applied, cf. Dennis v. United States, supra,     provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must      maintain his position. How can a claimant whose declaration     is rejected possibly sustain the burden of proving the      negative of these complex factual elements? In practical     operation, therefore, this procedural device must necessarily      produce a result which the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the     Constitution makes free.'

It would be a sufficient answer to any suggestion of the applicability of that holding to the present proceeding to observe that Speiser was explicitly limited so as not to reach cases where, as here, there is no showing of an intent to penalize political beliefs. Distinguishing Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, 341 U.S. 56, 71 S.Ct. 565, 95 L.Ed. 745, and American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925, the Court said (357 U.S. at page 527, 78 S.Ct. at page 1343):

'In these cases * *  * there was no attempt directly to      control speech but rather to protect, from an evil shown to      be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of      governmental concern. * *  * Each case concerned a limited      class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue      of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious      danger to the public safety. The principal aim of those     statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny      positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the      position might be misused to the detriment of the public.' But there are also additional factors making the rationale of Speiser inapplicable to the case before us. There is no unequivocal indication that California in this proceeding has placed upon petitioner the burden of proof of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, as distinguished from its other requirement of 'good moral character.' All it has presently required is an applicant's cooperation with the Committee's search for evidence of forbidden advocacy. Petitioner has been denied admission to the California bar for obstructing the Committee in the performance of its necessary functions of examination and cross-examination, a ruling which indeed presupposes that the burden of producing substantial evidence on the issue of advocacy was not upon petitioner but upon the Committee. Requiring a defendant in a civil proceeding to testify or to submit to discovery has never been thought to shift the burden of proof to him. Moreover, when this Court has allowed a State to comment upon a criminal defendant's failure to testify it has been careful to note that this does not result in placing upon him the burden of proving his innocence. Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 58, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1679, 91 L.Ed. 1903.

In contrast to our knowledge with respect to the burden of establishing a prima facie case, we do not now know where, under California law, would rest the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of advocacy of violent overthrow. But it is for the Supreme Court of California first to decide this question. Only if and when that burden is placed by the State upon a bar applicant can there be drawn in question the distinction made in the Speiser case between penalizing statutes and those merely denying access to positions where unfitness may lead to the abuse of state-given powers or privileges. The issue is not now before us.

Thus as matters now stand, there is nothing involved here which is contrary to the reasoning of Speiser, for despite compelled testimony the prospective bar applicant need not 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' (357 U.S. at page 526, 78 S.Ct. at page 1342) for fear of mistaken judgment or fact finding declaring unlawful speech which is in fact protected by the Constitution. This is so as to the ultimate burden of persuasion for, notwithstanding his duty to testify, the loss resulting from a failure of proof may, for all we now know, still fall upon the State. It is likewise so as to the initial burden of production, for there is no indication in the proceeding on rehearing of petitioner's application that the Bar Committee expected petitioner to 'sustain the burden of proving the negative' (357 U.S. at page 526, 78 S.Ct. at page 1342) of those complex factual elements which amount to forbidden advocacy of violent overthrow. To the contrary it is clear that the Committee had assumed the burden of proving the affirmative of those elements, but was prevented from attempting to discharge that burden by petitioner's refusal to answer relevant questions.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concur, dissenting.