King v. United States (344 U.S. 254)/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Chief Justice VINSON concurs, dissenting.

The Court has taken an unprecedented and, in my view, an unwarranted step in enlarging the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It upholds the power of the Commission to raise intrastate freight rates, not because they favor intrastate over interstate commerce, not because they fail to yield their fair share of the carriers' revenue, but because the carriers' interstate passenger operations are losing money.

The power of Congress to regulate intrastate rates stems from its authority to promote and protect interstate commerce. See Shreveport Rate Case (Houston East & West Texas R. Co. v. U.S.), 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341. By § 13(4) of the Act the Commission is empowered to regulate intrastate rates which are found to be discriminatory. The key to this regulatory authority is discrimination against interstate commerce, which presupposes that somehow or other the particular intrastate rates interfere with or prejudice interstate commerce. This principle is explicit in § 13(4) and in the decisions of the Court, both before and after the enactment of § 13(4).

In this case there is no rational relation between intrastate fright rates and interstate passenger operations. The present level of freight rates in Florida neither hampers nor obstructs the free flow of interstate passenger transportation. They do not affect its quantity or flow. There is, therefore, no basis for a finding of discrimination against interstate commerce.

The Commission, of course, is authorized to regulate intrastate rates so that intrastate operations will provide a fair share of the carriers' revenue. See Wisconsin R. Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371. But that authority rests on the Commission's power to remove discrimination. If, for example, intrastate freight operations fail to produce an adequate return as determined by reference to the cost of the intrastate operations and the investment in the intrastate business, interstate commerce is discriminated against. But there is no such failure in this case. Intrastate freight operations in Florida are amply profitable and carry their fair share of the load. The Commission nevertheless has saddled the intrastate freight business with the deficits from the interstate passenger business. If there is any discrimination here, it is against the local Florida shipper.

The Commission surmises but does not find that the intrastate passenger rates contribute to the passenger deficits of the carriers. But there is no showing that either the intrastate passenger rates or the intrastate freight rates do in fact contribute to these deficits. Moreover, even if we assume that intrastate passenger rates do contribute to the passenger deficits, we do not know the amount. The absence of these material findings, see North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 65 S.Ct. 1260, 89 L.Ed. 1760, indicates to me the short cut which the Commission is taking to enlarge its jurisdiction to unprecedented limits.