Kennerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana/Opinion of the Court

This case arises on petition for certiorari from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana. The petition for certiorari and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. For reasons appearing below, we vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Petitioners are members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe and reside on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana. The tribe is duly organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. In July and August of 1964, petitioners purchased some food on credit from a grocery store located within the town limits of Browning, a town incorporated under the laws of Montana but located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation.

A suit was commenced in the Montana state courts against petitioners on the debt arising from these transactions. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the state courts lacked jurisdiction because the defendants were members of the Blackfeet Tribe and the transactions took place on the Indian reservation. The lower state court overruled the motion and petitioners, pursuant to Montana rules of procedure, petitioned the Supreme Court of Montana for a 'writ of supervisory control' to review this lower court ruling. The State Supreme Court took jurisdiction and affirmed.

Prior to the passage of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1964 ed., Supp. V), discussed infra, state assumption of civil jurisdiction-in situations where Congress had not explicitly extended jurisdiction -was governed by § 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590. Section 7 of that statute provided:

'The consent of the United States is hereby given to any     other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal      offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both,      as provided for in this Act (referring to §§ 2 and 4, see n.      1, supra), to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such      manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative      legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption      thereof.'

Pursuant to this statute, the Montana Legislature enacted Chapter 81, Laws of 1963 ( §§ 083-801, 83-806, Montana Rev.Codes Ann. (1966)), extending criminal, but not civil, jurisdiction over Indians of the Flathead Indian Reservation. But Montana never took 'affirmative legislative action'-concerning either civil or criminal jurisdiction-with respect to the Blackfeet Reservation.

However, on November 20, 1967, the Blackfeet Tribal Council adopted Chapter 2, Civil Action, § 1, as part of the Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order Code, which provides, in relevant part:

'The Tribal Court and the State shall have concurrent and not     exclusive jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is      a member of the Tribe which is brought before the Courts. * *      * '

The Montana Supreme Court relied on this pre-1968 Tribal Council action as an alternative basis for the assertion of state civil jurisdiction over the instant litigation. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), a non-Indian brought suit against a Navajo Indian for a debt arising out of a transaction which took place on the Navajo Reservation. The Arizona State Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction and we reversed. In the instant case, the Montana Supreme Court attempted to reconcile its result with Williams on the theory that the transfer of jurisdiction by unilateral tribal action is consistent with the exercise of tribal powers of self-government. 154 Mont. 488, 466 P.2d 85.

The Court in Williams, in the process of discussing the general question of state action impinging on the affairs of reservation Indians, noted that '(e) ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' 358 U.S., at 220, 79 S.Ct., at 271. With regard to the particular question of the extension of state jurisdiction over civil causes of action by or against Indians arising in Indian country, there was, at the time of the Tribal Council resolution, a 'governing Act of Congress,' i.e., the Act of 1953. Section 7 of that statute conditioned the assumption of state jurisdiction on 'affirmative legislative action' by the State; the Act made no provision whatsoever for tribal consent, either as a necessary or sufficient condition to the assumption of state jurisdiction. Nor was the requirement of affirmative legislative action an idle choice of words; the legislative history of the 1953 statute shows that the requirement was intended to assure that state jurisdiction would not be extended until the jurisdictions to be responsible for the portion of Indian country concerned manifested by political action their willingness and ability to discharge their new responsibilities. See H.R.Rep.No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 6, 7 (1953); Williams, supra, at 220-221, 79 S.Ct., at 270-271. Our conclusion as to the intended governing force of § 7 of the 1953 Act is reinforced by the comprehensive and detailed congressional scrutiny manifested in those instances where Congress has undertaken to extend the civil or criminal jurisdictions of certain States to Indian country. See n. 1, supra.

In Williams, the Court went on to note the absence of affirmative congressional action, or affirmative legislative action by the people of Arizona within the meaning of the 1953 Act. 358 U.S., at 222-223, 79 S.Ct., at 271-272. Here it is conceded that Montana took no affirmative legislative action with respect to the Blackfeet Reservation. The unilateral action of the Tribal Council was insufficient to vest Montana with jurisdiction over Indian country under the 1953 Act.

The remaining question is whether the pre-1968 manifestation of tribal consent by tribal council action can operate to vest Montana with jurisdiction under the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title IV of the 1968 statute repealed § 7 of the 1953 Act and substituted a new regulatory scheme for the extension of state civil and criminal jurisdiction to litigation involving Indians arising in Indian country. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1964 ed., Supp. V). Section 402(a) of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), dealing with civil jurisdiction, provides:

'The consent of the United States is hereby given to any     State not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action      between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise      in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to      assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the      particular Indian country or part thereof which would be      affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction      over any or all such civil causes of action arising within      such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined      by such State to the same extent that such State has      jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those      civil laws of such State that are of general application to      private persons or private property shall have the same force      and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they      have elsewhere within that State.'

Section 406 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1964 ed., Supp. V), then provides:

'State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with     respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or      with respect to both, shall be applicable in Indian country      only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian country      accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult      Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose. The Secretary of the Interior shall call such special     election under such rules and regulations as he may      prescribe, when requested to do so by the tribal council or      other governing body, or by 20 per centum of such enrolled      adults.'

We think the meaning of these provisions is clear: the tribal consent that is prerequisite to the assumption of state jurisdiction under the provisions of Title IV of the Act must be manifested by majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the affected area of Indian country. Legislative action by the Tribal Council does not comport with the explicit requirements of the Act.

Finally, with regard to the 1968 enactment, this case presents no question concerning the power of the Indian tribes to place time, geographical, or other conditions on the 'tribal consent' to state exercise of jurisdiction. Rather, we are presented solely with a question of the procedures by which 'tribal consent' must be manifested under the new Act. Thus the suggestion made in dissent that, under today's disposition, '(t)he reservation Indians must now choose between exclusive tribal court jurisdiction on the one hand and permanent, irrevocable state jurisdiction on the other,' is incorrect.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Judgment of Supreme Court of Montana vacated and case remanded.

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE joins, dissenting.