Johnson v. McAdoo (45 App. D.C. 440)/Brief of Appellants

_________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ IN THE

In the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia

_________

JANUARY TERM, 1916.

No. 2918.

H. N. JOHNSON, ET AL, Appellants,

v.

WM. G. McADOO, SEC'Y. U.S. TREASURY, Appellee.

_________

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

_________

By CORNELIUS J. JONES, Attorney and Joint Appellant. _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ Hayworth Pub. House, Wash D. C.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

In the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia

_________

JANUARY TERM, 1916.

No. 2918.

H. N. JOHNSON, ET AL, Appellants,

v.

WM. G. McADOO, SEC'Y. U.S. TREASURY, Appellee.

_________

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

_________

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

This case is based on the contentions of the plaintiffs, wherein they claim that during the years of 1858 to 1863, they labored in the cotton fields of the Southern States of the United States, and that this labor was [p2] extorted from them by force of persons under a system of involuntary servitude; that under the operation of this system, these plaintiffs performed the labor in question and received no compensation from any source whatever, for the labor so performed; that this labor resulted in the production of many bales of cotton, which became subject to a direct tax in 1862, by a pretended Act of Congress, commonly known as the civil war revenue tax on raw cotton. This Civil war revenue tax, sought to and did cover all raw cotton within the jurisdiction of the United States; and as the cotton raised, and otherwise prepared for market purposes, during the years of 1858 to 1863, and during which years, and thereafter even up to 1868, the year when the war tax was repealed, the cotton raised during the operation of the system of involuntary servitude, was asportated from one section of the United States to others with the view on part of the dominators of these plaintiffs, of escaping the war tax; and hence this cotton was taxed wherever it was found; and therefore a record was made of these collections of the amount collected and the state wherein such collections were had, which collections are shown to have been made in every state of the United States, for the years covering the period of 1862 to 1868; and the collections amounting to $68,072,388.99 ($1.8 billion in 2022 dollars).

The contention on part of these plaintiffs is, that it is the purpose of all political communities, where civilized conduct obtains, that wherever one man obtains the service and labor of another, for lawful and beneficial purposes to be enjoyed by the party obtaining such benefits, being the fruits of the toil of the laboring party in absence of performance thereof as penalty for crime, the laboring party must be indemnified for such labor by way of compensation therefor from the party so benefitted; and upon the strength of this position this suit [p3] was brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, for and on behalf of all persons who labored under the system of involuntary servitude, praying that the $68,072,388.99 collected from the cotton produced by these plaintiffs, be declared subjected to an equitable lien thereon in favor of these plaintiffs for their labor so performed; the plaintiffs charged and alleged that the $68,072,388.99 was not a legitimate asset of the United States government; and the specific money being fruits of the cotton which was likewise the fruit of specific labor of plaintiffs, for which they received no pay, and the performance of which labor was under duress coercion, and involuntary servitude all which condition precluded any activity of part of plaintiffs for recovery of compensation for such labor while the specific cotton so produced was available to such claim; and that this incapacity of plaintiffs continued over them until the specific cotton was disposed of, and the proceeds from the cotton have long since passed beyond the reach of whatever claim these plaintiffs have, except that taxation collected, being $68,072,388.99, which amount is but a small fraction of the total valuation of the cotton produced by these plaintiffs; but as this given amount is all which is available of the specific fruit from the specific subject of the toil of these plaintiffs; and being subject to no ownership of the Government under the federal constitution and still being subject to legitimate disposition by judicial order, and this labor being performed without regard to contract as to price or terms, but by force and coercion, it necessarily becomes the subject of equity, wherein all wrongs shall be corrected, and exact justice meted out to parties, whenever the inherent authority thereof is invoked.

On the 15th day of October, 1915, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissed plaintiffs' original bill and exception was reserved.[p4]

On the 26th day of October, plaintiffs filed their amended bill; the material contention being that the $68,072,388.99 was collected on raw cotton produced in the southern states during the years covering period of 1858 to 1868, by enforcement of an Act of Congress passed in 1862 and repealed in 1868: That though the money collected amounted to $68,072,388.99, covering years 1862 to 1868, this amount represented a very small share of the total valuation of the crops of cotton during the years given; and that money so collected though in possession of W. G. McAdoo, Secretary of United States treasury, still it was not the legitimate property of the United States Government, under the terms of the federal constitution; and being fruit of the cotton produced by these plaintiffs, who were forced to produce the same under coercion force, and under a system of involuntary servitude and for which labor they received no compensation, they ask that an equitable lien in and to the $68,072,388.99, be declared in their favor, to the extent of one equal undivided share to each plaintiff in this suit, according to his interest shown from the proof this case: On the 10th day of December, 1915, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the Amended Bill; plaintiffs prayed and perfected an appeal and hence the case is here on order of dismissal of the original, and amended bill.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.

(1) The Court erred in dismissing the original bill of complaint.

(2) The Court erred in dismissing the Amended Bill of Complaint. [p5]

(3) The Court erred in rendering judgment dismissing the Amended Bill of Complaint, and rendering judgment final against the plaintiffs.

ARGUMENT. The plaintiffs approach the presentation of their case to this Honorable Court, with becoming conciousness of the importance of the relief sought by the terms of their bill; Courts of Equity are clothed with power and authority to relive wrongs, wherein the terms of the law fall short. These plaintiffs ask this Court to employ its inherent power to the solution of the problem presented by the terms of the bill of complaint. This case presents the simple question of having the Court to declare a lien on certain money, which money is the only remaining fruit of labor performed by plaintiffs, for which labor, there was no compensation paid plaintiffs: It is not overlooked, that liens for specific labor, are usually based upon certain specific conditions and contractural specifications, and usually are addressed to courts of law.

It is brought to the notice of the court, that this is a suit in equity, where substantial justice is sought; and this we do through this tribunal having large inherent powers, and vested with authority of extending its protection beyond the narrow confines of statutory prescriptions. We are mindful of the technical argument that the statute of limitation should operate against our claim, and to accomodate the contentions of such, we will briefly state just what our claim is.

It is well known that many years ago, there prevailed in the south a system of involuntary servitude operating against a certain class of persons in this country; and through this system, these plaintiffs, and the ancestors of those who make claim as heirs thereto, labored in the south in the production of cotton. In the year of 1860, there was a presidential election throughout the United States; and Abraham Lincoln was elected president; for the period covering years of 1859 to 1860, the price of cotton went appreciably low, and the farmers of the south who had had this cotton produced by the labor of these persons under the operation of this system of involuntary servitude, to a very large extent, prior to 1859 and up to the open rebellion of the South, stored this cotton, and did not make sale of it: The civil war was brewing through 1859-'60, and in 1861, the civil war broke out, and confusion prevailed all over the country; and this cotton had no practicable value whatever; still during the years intervening between 1859 and 1868, cotton was made in the South under either the direct operation of this system or under the influence prevailing as a result of such system; and these persons were compelled to produce this cotton throughout the years of 1859 to 1863, and for which they received no compensation, for five years prior to emancipation. And, being under this system, they were incapacitated to contract for such labor; hence they worked under duress and coercion; and such labor resulted in the production of many bales of cotton. In 1862, the Congress of the United States enacted a law, placing a tax of 2 1/2 cents per pound on all raw cotton raised in the United States, and enforced this law; and in 1866, the Congress enacted another law, strengthing the former law, in many particulars, and made the tax 3 cents per pound on raw cotton; this law taxing the cotton was repealed by Congress in 1868; but by that time, there had been collected as raw cotton tax money, $68,072,388.99; in 1866 a suit was instituted in the U.S. Circuit court of Western [p7] District of Tennessee contesting the constitutionality of this law taxing the raw cotton in the manner provided by the terms of the several acts of congress as stated; and this case was contested bitterly, both in the court of original jurisdiction and in the United States Supreme court; and finally was determined without any decision of the act authorizing the revenue tax on raw cotton. But without regard to the validity of the Act of Congress, the treasury department during the years of 1862 to 1868, collected from raw cotton in the United States, money to the amount of $68,072,388.99: It is known that this money has ever been held as of doubtful ownership by the federal Government; and up to this day, not any appropriation has been authorized against this money by Congress. Since the time of producing this cotton, the labor which produced it, has become relieved of its incapacity; and the laborers who are made plaintiffs in this bill of complaint are capable to proceed for compensation for such a labor as was performed in the production of the specific cotton which produced the $68,072,388.99; and while the cotton itself has long since passed beyond the control of this court, and the money realized therefrom by virtue of this taxation, is all that is in sight as fruit of the labor of these plaintiffs; and the very nature of the system under which these plaintiffs were forced to perform this labor, they forego any attempt to locate and identify the persons to whose force under this system they were victims, and now these plaintiffs claim; that as the cotton itself has been placed beyond any hope of assault through proceedings by these plaintiffs, they come into court and ask that they be declared a lien in and upon this money to the extent of $68,072,388.99 the extent of one undivided equal interest therein by all claimants who identify themselves as such plaintiffs according to the terms of the bill of complaint: As the federal Government has [p8] no right nor interest in this money, and the money is fruit of labor performed by plaintiffs without compensation having been paid therefor, and the labor by which said cotton producing this revenue was the source of this money, it is our contention, made with all seriousness, that a court of Equity is vested with full power to intervene and declare these plaintiffs a lien on this money.

The question of the legality of slavery, is not one to be urged by these plaintiffs in this action; nor do these plaintiffs regard that question material to their contention; this is a suit for compensation for specific labor performed; asking that the fruit of that labor which is in sight, be held charged with an equitable lien thereon for the satisfaction of the labor producing the material from which this money was derived. It is immaterial as to who caused it to be in sight at this time; whether under unconstitutional methods of Congress or not; the fact is: the money is in sight, and we assert a claim against it. and we assert that a court of equity is clothed with ample power and authority to relieve against the injury shown to exist against these claimants.

There are new incidents arising each day of our lives in the general intercourse of public affairs, wherein there must be new precedents established to meet and settle meritorious contentions emanating from parties justifiably complaining. The fact that such a claim has never been asserted before, is the poorest kind of argument against the equity of a claim, otherwise meritorious.

The questions to be disposed of, are:
 * (1) Did the claimants labor to raise the cotton so taxed?
 * (2) and did the tax so laid by the Congress, produce this money claimed by these claimants?
 * (3) Did these claimants receive any compensation for their labor at that time or [p9] since?
 * (4) and if not, why did they not receive compensation?

And as to the right of the Government to keep this money, we ask the questions:
 * (1) Did the Congress have the authority under the Constitution of the United States to lay this direct tax on raw cotton?
 * (2) And if it did, why did not the Supreme Court of the United States so decide when the case was before it at the time?
 * (3) And further, if it were a legitimate asset of the Government, why did not Congress make appropriations from this fund during these fifty years the money has been slumbering in the Treasury?

We contend,
 * (1) that the money is not the money of the Government; that the tax was illegal;
 * (2) that the cotton from which this tax was derived, has been placed beyond the lien of these claimants, and at a time, and under circumstances over which these claimants had no legal status and when they were helpless to object or protest against removal of the cotton without account for labor lien. But now that they are able to speak in court and have a voice, it is in ample time to reach some of the fruit of their toil according to the equity of the rights asserted; and hence this suit is brought in a formal manner, and an orderly adjustment of the claim is applied for, in the court which alone has power and inherent jurisdiction of such matters; and we invoke that timeworn but ever available principle of equity, wherein there is no wrong without a remedy somewhere within the inherent power of the courts.

The fact that there has been no case like this ever presecuted in a court, is no reason there should not be relief secured in this case, when we show that substantial gain to others has been obtained as a result of labor extorted from plaintiffs. There was no precedent by the Constitution for creation of the Presidential Commission in 1877 when such a commission was created for [p10] settlement of the Presidential embroglio between Hayes and Tilden; but there was a commission, and the Presidency was settled. And there are numerous instances where there have existed no precedents, yet necessity made a precedent, and in this case, the submission of the claim of the plaintiffs, to the arbitrament of the court, the merits of our contention can only be defeated, should our claim to having performed the labor, be false, or, that there was no such money realized from this specific cotton. The question of pay for labor is no new question, but the claim by these plaintiffs for previous servitude is one whether with or without a precedent, according to the principles which gave birth to courts of conscience, this contest shall be somewhere, and at some time emphatically settled once for all; and we contend, that the time is now, and the place, is at the bar of this court.

The question is too broad, and fraught with too much justice to be waived aside with the flimsy contention, that it is without a precedent; or that it is not a popular favorite in the light of present expedients; but we say, that there is justice and equity in our claim; and under our jurisprudence, and we say this with unswerving confidence in our contention, that such a contest arising from the injury occasioned by the abuse of these war rights, the everwhelming impulse to yield to the dispensation of common justice will cause necessity to swing open the doors of the courts, and carve its way through the maize of absent precedents, direct to the citadel where repose substantial justice and equity.

The very circumstances under which our national life was created serves as a lesson which examplifies the truth, that in America, there is no condition, however [p11] complex, that there is not a way to the house of justice. The nation pledged the world in the morning of our national life, that for the equality of the birth of all men, and the adherence to the declaration, that life liberty and the pursuit of individual happiness, were inalienable rights of all men, and to which sacred principles the American people pledged their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor, and at that time made Almighty God their sacred witness.

These declarations were not made by the Colonial statesmen, merely because of the elegance of the diction thereof; but they were the sacred pledge of the nation, binding upon its posterity for all time to come; and until these pledges are wholly fulfilled or repealed by the authority which made them, the laws of these pledges stand pre-eminently supreme, and carry within their embrace the sovereign power of enforcement, through the agencies prescribed by the people; and in this character of measure, its remedies are properly addressed to the courts created therefor.

The question may present itself, whether these persons, who at a time, when by virtue of the then prevailing system throughout the country were not regarded as capable of contracting or being heard. in any manner whatever in consideration of their rights as persons entitled to legal notice, either in the courts of the country then, or otherwise, even though they were compelled to produce this cotton under this system; can they now even though emancipated from all disabilities come into court and request relief for labor extorted from them under this system.

A settlement of this question must certainly determine the right of these plaintiffs to recover in a court of [p12] equity. To arrive at the equity in this character of case, we must reason out some of the events which transpired and thus come to a conclusion satisfactory to a reasonable mind as to the fairness justice and equity of plaintiffs' contention.

It must be admitted that the labor of these plaintiffs produced the cotton; that some persons were made prosperous and happy thereby; and at the same time did not pay these laborers any compensation for this happiness and prosperity they enjoyed: It must be admitted further that this labor was certain and specific in the deal of enjoyment and comfort to some persons; these facts are willingly admitted by every one. It must not be overlooked, however, that these people were never consigned to the fate of this system with their free will; that the system was one of force on part of the strong against the weak and helpless; and the liberation of the weaker parties left them without any available fruits of their toil in sight; and after many years the only asset to which they can reasonably lay claim, is this money collected under unlawful authority; and with this state of facts the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' bill for want of jurisdiction.

There was no new law enacted by Congress, nor was there any new provisions adopted in the Constitution for the exercise of the power by the President to emancipate the slaves in 1863; but, owing to the demands made by a crying emergency which had arisen in the history of the Government, the inherent power which had slumbered within the limitations of the Constitution, was touched by the needle of necessity, and instantly those hitherto dormant powers sprang into living actuality and breathed forth in all of their predominant majesty. It was the spirit and letters breathed by the colonial statesmen, and [p13] written in the declaration of independence which inspired president Lincoln in approaching a term of presidency which would then be confronted with the solution of the problem of human slavery; and to show how he looked to the basic declaration of the American people, as his authority for executive action in furtherance thereof, we quote from his statement in a speech made in 1858, when he ran for the United States Senate from Illinois: ""We are now far into the fifth year of a policy which was adopted with the avowed object and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation";" this quotation is inserted for the purpose of placing our minds on the fact, that the senatorial candidate of 1858, had in mind that his political pilgrimage was directed toward the Executive office with all their attendant responsibilities; and that the question which was then causing unrest throughout the land, was persistent in its association of itself in all national affairs; and the determination of the question was a labor awaiting the then approaching presidential election and encumbency, whomever the individual aspirant might be. And after the election in 1860, and Mr. Lincoln was on his way to the capitol to be inaugurated, great lawyer as he was, he had investigated every possible law bearing on the subject: And to show that he relied on the Declaration of Independence as the abiding, faithful, and unrepudiated principle to which the American people had pledged themselves as to what must be the fate of that unholy institution, on his way to be inaugurated in 1861 he made a speech at Philadelphia which told his unswerving determination to obey the behest of the writers of the Declaration of Independence, when he said at that time: ""I have never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence. [p14] I have often pondered over the dangers which were incurred, by the men who assembled her, and framed and adopted that Declaration of Independence. I have pondered over the toils which were endured by the officers and soldiers of the Army which achieved that Independence. I have often inquired of myself what great principle of idea it was, that kept this confederacy so long together; it was not the mere matter of separation of the Colonies from the mother-land; but, that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence, which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but, I hope to the world for all future time: It was that which gave promise, that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men."" And further in the course of that same speech, refering to this Declaration of Independence for which he had expressed such devotion, he said: ""But if the country can not be saved without giving up that principle, (the principle of the Declaration of Independence spoken of) I was about to say, I would rather be assassinated on this spot, than to surrender it. I have said nothing but what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the pleasure of Almighty God, die by.""

By these expressions it is clearly seen that the president did not heed any pretended laws bearing on the subject of slavery between the Declaration of Independence, and the time which he was about to respond to the call of duty in enforcing the American will as to this Declaration, that all men were created equal; and it was made plain, that that law was the supreme law on the subject of slavery, and ere the time came for his executive action; he declared, that if further suspension of the law declaring all men equal was required to even avoid his assassination, he would rather be assassinated. The president did not look to the many [p15] state measures on that subject, nor to any of the acts of Congress, but being charged with the duty of enforcing all the laws of the land within his prerogative, and violating the laws of no state nor of the nation, he chose to inform the world, that under the laws already enacted by the people in their sovereign authority through their accredited representatives, both in the Colonial Congress and in the Original Constitutional Convention, he saw that these laws directed that all men should be treated as being created equal, and entitled to enjoyment of life liberty, and persuit of happiness. It was not the exercise of any powers known to the prescribed laws which brought about this result, but the inherent equitable functions, with which every executive of our country has been clothed since the first inauguration of George Washington, within four generations after the adoption of the Constitution, this power had been awakened from its cradle of infantile slumber; and which awakening by the actions of the president in basing his acts in emancipating the slaves, was reaffirmed by the Country It has been urged by the defendant herein, as shown by his motion to dismiss the original bill of complaint and brought forward in motion to dismiss the amended bill, that the plaintiffs' bill showed from its terms that the right to recover by these plaintiffs, was barred by statute of limitation of actions: To properly respond to this proposition, it necessarily carries this discussion farther back in the history of this question than hoped for, yet the accomodation must be extended, so as to make clear the falacy thereof.

(1) Before the statute could apply in this case as suggested by the motion of the defendant, the bill must have shown to the defendant by its terms alone, that the laber sued for, was labor performed under some known legally permitted scheme of industry; that the plaintiffs [p16] were performing this labor under some agreement; or under some implied agreement or contract which has not against public policy or public morals; that there remained with the plaintiffs a right to be heard through the laws of the land, for redress of any wrong done them, or a denial of any right to which they were entitled under the same laws; and that with all these agencies at the command of these plaintiffs, they permitted the persons for whom they labored, to take away from the places of production, all the cotton they raised with this labor, and that this product was taken away and disposed of with the expressed or implied acquiesence of plaintiffs without protest in any manner whatever; and now after these many years, plaintiffs bring this suit for the enforcement of a right which they had, from the time they undertook to perform this labor. If this state of facts were alleged on face of the bill, we would not be heard for a moment in this court; but whether the bill shows such state of facts, we must leave this court to look to the face of the bill, and there let the answer come; the whole state of facts which would have to obtain as set out before herein, as the only grounds wherein the statute of limitation of actions would apply are every one, positively denied in the bill.

The scheme of industry by which these plaintiffs produced this cotton, was one which precluded these plaintiffs from the exercise of any pretense of a right under the thing called "law" as prevailed at that time covering the period mentioned in the bill as being the time within which this labor was performed. The system by which these plaintiffs were forced to perform this labor, was outlawry pure and simple; and the American people expressed their judgment on that system very emphatically. The system of servitude herein set out, is complained of to the extent that it resulted in forcing these [p17] plaintiffs to make cotton as stipulated, and that this labor was without any compensation being paid the laborers; then this policy must have been against public policy, public morals, and in defiance of the fundamental law of the land; then if these facts be true, it is not within the scope of defense for this defendant to plead the protection of a law, to uphold the principles of a system which was operated in defiance of the fundamental law; it must be admitted by all, that it was the terms of the Declaration of Independence which served as the authority for president Lincoln to emancipate the slaves; and this is shown from this expression made when he was about to perform the duty of enforcing the terms thereof he said: ""that sentiment of the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but I hope to the world, for all future time.""

Notice the words "GAVE" liberty. From this expression, we must admit that liberty was given to all the people at the time of adoption of the Declaration of Independence; this must be so, because it is not within the breast of any man to assume for a moment, that the president would enforce a policy inconsistant with the accepted law; and the Declaration of Independence being the supreme law directing individual liberty to all men in 1776, it remained law, and was law all the years afterwards, even though the system of involuntary servitude continued its operation throughout the country; then, if we were forced to perform this labor contrary to law, is it not highly inconsistent for the defendent to come into this court and claim that we are guilty of laches for not exercising a right, under a system which prohibited the very same right, in defiance of the supreme law of the land.

(2) The defendant asserts on pages 5 and 8 of Record, that this suit is substantially a suit against the [p18] government. If this court gives the plaintiffs the benefit of the very words of their bill, and not the assumptions indulged in by the language of the defendant, it will see: that plaintiffs-specifically alleged that this money was not the property, nor in any way an asset of the government, because it was accumulated in the treasury contrary to the constitution of the United States, and was not the property of the Government; the mere fact that some money is deposited in the federal treasury under a mistaken idea that it is legally there, does not make that money the property of the Government; but as it is in the treasury, the secretary of the treasury is legal custodian of whatever he finds in the office when he takes possession of the office; but while he is legal custodian, he is chargable with due preservation of the money merely as bailee, and not the official custodian, as he would be of money which legally belongs to the Government. It is true that the Congress would have to authorize disposition of the money under any order this court might make, just as it would have to do to carry' out any decree against funds in possession of the treasury department; but in order to make the Government a party, this money would have to be the property of the Government; and we have alleged positively that it is not the money of the Government; while this court may take judicial notice of the revenue tax law, it also must take judicial notice that this tax was contested as to the constitutionality thereof, and that the supreme court after having this matter discussed, and briefed before it for hardly 20 years, still that court failed to affirm the constitutionality of that tax by any decision; and to-day the right of the federal Government to this money is highly questioned and universally admitted by the bar of the country, as being unconstitutional and void; and this being true, it is absurd to say that the mere fact that money is in the United States treasury, [p19] it belongs to the government; and this fact of being in the treasury of the United States, is the only fact which inspires the able attorney for defendant to allege in his motion to dismiss, that the property is "manifestly" the property of the Government.

The court observes that this whole contest hinges on the constitutionality of the act of Congress in 1862, and the amended acts thereto, which authorized the collection of this war revenue tax on raw cotton, and which was enforced until 1868 when the law was repealed.

The country contends that the law is unconstitutional; and these plaintiffs contend the same thing; and the law being void, then the money which has been accumulated as result of enforcement of this void law, is assailed by these plaintiffs because the cotton from which this money came was raised and produced and manufactured for market purposes by these plaintiffs, and they did this labor under duress and force, by an illegal system, and all the fruit which they see of this unpaid-for labor, is this money which is fruit of that labor; and hence, without regard to whom the owners may be, they know this is some of the fruit of their labor for which they received no pay; and seeing this portion of the fruit of their labor, they ask that it be held subject to an equitable lien in favor of such of the plaintiffs as make proof of their claim and identification as such.


 * Respectfully submitted,


 * CORNELIUS J. JONES,


 * Attorney and Joint Appellant.