Isbrandtsen Company v. Johnson/Opinion of the Court

The question before us arises in an admiralty proceedings by a seaman against his employer to recover wages earned on a merchant vessel of United States registry. The question is whether the employer may set off against the seaman's wages its expenditures for the medical care and hospitalization of another member of the crew necessitated by injuries inflicted on him by the seaman, without justification, during the voyage on which the wages were earned. For the reasons hereafter stated we hold that it may not do so.

In 1948, respondent, Johnson, was employed by petitioner, Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., as a messman on a foreign voyage of a vessel of United States registry, chartered by petitioner. On April 21, while the vessel was on its course in the Pacific, Johnson, without justification, stabbed Brandon, another member of the crew. He injured Brandon so severely that petitioner found it necessary to divert its vessel from its course in order to hospitalize Brandon on the Island of Tonga. Johnson makes no claim for wages earned after April 21. However, when discharged in Philadelphia, May 31, 1948, Johnson claimed $439.27 as earned wages due him above all deductions, without making allowance for any expenditures made by petitioner for the care or hositalization of Brandon. When petitioner refused to pay Johnson anything, he filed a libel and complaint in the United States District Court to recover the balance due on his earned wages, plus interest, transportation to Seattle (his port of signing on) and double wages for each day of unlawful delay in the payment of the sum due. Petitioner set up a counterclaim of $2,500, later reduced to $1,691.55, for expenses and losses caused it by Johnson's attack on Brandon. It contended also that the nature of this defense demonstrated the existence of sufficient statutory cause for its delay in making payment.

The District Court disallowed petitioner's counterclaim and entered judgment for respondent's earned wages and transportation allowance, plus interest and costs. It disallowed respondent's claim for double wages. 91 F.Supp. 872. Petitioner appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed. 190 F.2d 991. We granted certiorari because the decision below presents an important question of maritime law not heretofore determined by this Court. 342 U.S. 940, 72 S.Ct. 562.

Petitioner cites several early lower court decisions which allowed a set-off against a seaman's suit for wages. These were largely rendered before the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872 or rendered later without discussion of that or subsequent legislation. We ar convinced, however, that the legislation passed by Congress f or the protection of seamen, beginning in 1872, has now covered this field. Petitioner's set-off is not prescribed, recognized or permitted by such legislation. So far as that legislation goes, such a set-off is not available as a defense against a seaman's claim for earned wages. R.S. § 4547, 30 Stat. 756, 46 U.S.C. § 604, 46 U.S.C.A. § 604. On the other hand, the absence of such authorization for the employer to set off such a counterclaim does not preclude it from seeking to collect the claim otherwise.

For the purposes of this case, we may assume that petitioner owed Brandon the legal duty to provide him with the medical care and hospitalization which it provided and also owed him the duty to divert its vessel from its course to secure his hospitalization at Tonga. Atuilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730, 732-736, 63 S.Ct. 930, 933, 934-936, 87 L.Ed. 1107. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 375, 53 S.Ct. 173, 175, 77 L.Ed. 368; Alpha S.S.C.orp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642, 50 S.Ct. 443, 74 L.Ed. 1086; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 50 S.Ct. 440, 74 L.Ed. 1082. Also, we may assume, without deciding, that respondent owed petitioner an obligation to reimburse petitioner for the expense which he thus thrust upon it by his unjustified attack upon a fellow seaman.

Whenever congressional legislation in aid of seamen has been considered here since 1872, this Court has emphasized that such legislation is largely remedial and calls for liberal interpretation in favor of the seamen. The history and scope of the legislation is reviewed in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 727-735, and notes, 63 S.Ct. 930, 932-936, 87 L.Ed. 1107. 'Our historic national policy, both legislative and judicial, points the other way (from burdening seamen). Congress has generally sought to sageguard seamen's rights.' Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246, 63 S.Ct. 246, 251, 87 L.Ed. 239. '(T)he maritime law by inveterate tradition has made the ordinary seaman a member of a favored class. He is a 'ward of the admiralty,' often ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection against himself as well as others. * *  * Discrimination may thus be rational in respect of remedies for wages.' Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162, 55 S.Ct. 46, 49, 79 L.Ed. 254; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 375, 377, 53 S.Ct. 173, 175-176, 77 L.Ed. 368; Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 246-248, 29 S.Ct. 58, 61-62, 53 L.Ed. 164; Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 23 S.Ct. 821, 47 L.Ed. 1002; Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 155-157, 20 S.Ct. 62, 64-65, 144 L.Ed. 109. 'The ancient characterization of seamen as 'wards of admiralty' is even more accurate now than it was formerly.' Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287, 17 S.Ct. 326, 331, 41 L.Ed. 715; Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed.Cas.No.6,047, 2 Mason 541, 556.

Statutes which invade the common law or the general maritime law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident. No rule of construction precludes giving a natural meaning to legislation like this that obviously is of a remedial, beneficial and amendatory character. It should be interpreted so as to effect its purpose. Marine legislation, at least since the Shipping Commissioners Act of June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 262, should be construed to make effective its design to change the general maritime law so as to improve the lot of seamen. 'The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such an adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly intended to be given to the measure.' Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640, 50 S.Ct. 440, 442, 74 L.Ed. 1082; Texas & P.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437, 440, 27 S.Ct. 350, 354, 355, 51 L.Ed. 553. The direction of the current of maritime legislation long has been evident on its face.

'In this country these notions were reflected early, and have     since been expanded, in legislation designed to secure the      comfort and health of seamen aboard ship, hospitalization at      home and care abroad. * *  * The legislation *  *  * gives no      ground for making inferences adverse to the seaman or      restrictive of his rights. * *  * Rather it furnishes the      strongest basis for regarding them broadly, when an issue      concerning their scope arises, and particularly when it      relates to the general character of relief the legislation      was intended to secure.' Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318      U.S. 724, 728-729, 63 S.Ct. 930, 932, 87 L.Ed. 1107.

In the specific area of a seaman's right to collect his earned wages promptly upon discharge, § 61 of the Shipping Commissioners Act provided that 'no wages due or accruing to any seaman or apprentice shall be subject to attachment or arrestment from any court, * *  * .' 17 Stat. 276, R.S. § 4536, 38 Stat. 1169, 46 U.S.C. § 601, 46 U.S.C.A. § 601. The full force of this became evident when this Court, in 1908, interpreted 'attachment' and 'arrestment' to mean that the Act prohibits the seizure of a seaman's earned wages even by levying execution against them to collect valid judgments. Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 29 S.Ct. 58, 53 L.Ed. 164; see 1 Norris, The Law of Seamen (1951), 347-350.

Congressional legislation now touches nearly every phase of a seaman's life. It concerns itself with his personal safety, comfort and health in many ways not necessary to review here. It deals specifically with his shipping articles and the payment to him of his wages. It insures generally a partial payment to him of his wages at each port where his vessel loads or delivers cargo. It insures the payment to him of the balance of those wages upon completion of his voyage or shortly after his discharge. It deals explicitly with the final payment of wages. It describes 'forfeitures' which lawfully may be deducted from a seaman's wages 'for the benefit of the master or owner by whom the wages are payable.' These provisions for the return of wages to the employer are remedial, rather than penal, in their nature. See Crawford, The Construction of Statutes (1940), 106.

In keeping with the spirit of such legislation and the need for clear rules governing the computation of the balance due each seaman upon his discharge, it is reasonable to hold that only such deductions and set-offs for derelictions in the performance of his duties shall be allowed against his wages as are recognized in the statutes. Other claims against him may be valid but their collection must be sought through other means. The appropriateness of this solution is emphasized in the case of unliquidated counterclaims. Petitioner's unliquidated claim was first estimated at $2,500. It now has been fixed at $1,691.55. The factors making up such a claim are largely within the control and knowledge of the employer alone and it easily could wipe out every cent of a seaman's earned wages.

There is little substance to the suggestion that the expenses at issue can be brought within the statutorily recognized 'forfeitures.' Assuming that Johnson's attack amounted to a breach of general discipline it hardly amounted to 'willful disobedience to any lawful command at sea * *  * .' R.S. 4596, Foruth. Assuming that it caused expense to petitioner, it hardly amounted to 'willfully damaging the vessel * *  * or *  *  * any of the stores or cargo *  *  * .' R.S. § 4596, Seventh.

From this, we conclude that Congress has preempted the area relating to deductions and set-offs based upon derelictions of duty as against a seaman's claim to his wages. Congress has gone so far in expressly listing such deductions and set-offs that it is a fair inference that those not listed may not be made. It thus remains for the courts to determine only what are the deductions or set-offs for derelictions of duty that are listed by Congress, rather than to determine which of the deductions or set-offs once known to the general maritime law Congress has failed to exclude. Congress, in effect, has excluded all of them except those which it has listed affirmatively.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice JACKSON dissents.