Iowa Railroad Land Company v. Blumer/Opinion of the Court

The original grant of May, 1856, was in praesenti. The title passed from the United States and vested in the state of Iowa on October 13, 1856, when the map of definite location was lodged in the General Land Office, and the right of the company then attached. Sioux City & I. F. Town Lot & Land Co. v. Griffey, 143 U.S. 32, 36 L. ed. 64, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 362.

Under the decisions made by this court in Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U.S. 241, 35 L. ed. 999, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158, and Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 191 U.S. 532, 48 L. ed. 291, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166, notwithstanding the patent had not been issued, the railway company, grantor of the plaintiff in error, having succeeded to the right and title of the original company, and complied with all the terms and conditions of the grant, as required in the legislation of Congress and the acts of the Iowa legislature after the acceptance of the grant by the state, was in a position and clothed with the requisite title in order to transmit the same to another who might have recovered possession of the lands, and it could itself have brought an action in ejectment to oust one holding adverse possession thereof, and, being clothed with these rights, was in such position that the statute of limitations would run against it in favor of one who occupied the premises by adverse possession under color of title. This was distinctly decided in the Toltec Ranch Company Case, wherein it was held that the statute of limitations would run against the railroad company, thus situated toward the lands, although the patent had not issued.

It is sought to withdraw this case from the application of the doctrine of Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, and Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook. It is argued that § 4 of the act of May, 1856, provided that if the roads were not completed in ten years the unsold lands should revert to the United States; that on March 10, 1868, the state of Iowa resumed the grant of lands as made to the original grantees; that by act of June 2, 1864, Congress provided in § 8:

'That no lands hereby granted shall be certified to either of said companies until the governor of the state of Iowa shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior that the said company has completed, ready for the rolling stock, within one year from the first day of July next, a section of not less than twenty miles from the present terminus of the completed portion of said railroad, and in each year thereafter an additional section of twenty miles; but the number of sections per mile originally authorized shall be certified to each company, upon proof, as aforesaid, of the completion of the additional sections of the road as aforesaid; and upon the failure of either company to complete either section as aforesaid, to be annually built, the portion of the land remaining uncertified shall become subject to the control and disposition of the legislature of the state of Iowa, to aid in the completion of such road.' [13 Stat. at L. 98, chap. 103.]

And it is argued that the effect of this section was to hold the legl title until the railways were built and completed, as therein specified, and that the Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railroad Company never took the legal title to the lands in controversy until certified under § 8 of the act of 1864, which, it is alleged, was not until January 20, 1903, followed by the governor's patent of February 2, 1903.

But when the grant is in proesenti, and nothing remains to be done for the administration of the grant in the Land Department, and the conditions of the grant have been complied with and the grant fully earned, as in this case, notwithstanding the want of final certification and the issue of the patent, the railroad company had such title as would enable it to maintain ejectment against one wrongfully on the lands, and title by prescription would run against it in favor of one in adverse possession under color of title. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, and Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, supra.

Applying and giving weight to the decisions thus recently rendered in this court, we think the debatable proposition in the case concerns not the title of the railway company, or its right to have maintained an action to recover the premises, but involves the right of Carraher, and the defendant in error as his successor, to claim the title to the premises by adverse possession.

We think the record discloses that for more than ten years required by the Iowa statute to ripen such title, Carraher was in possession of the premises. He had planted a large number of trees; caused the lands to be cultivated; had raised crops; had rented the lands to others, and was understood to be claiming the ownership. The answer of plaintiff in error to this claim of title is that Carraher was not in possession of the premises claiming title in good faith.

The record shows that in 1883, by an entry under the timber culture act, Carraher claimed this 40-acre tract. As we have seen in the statement preceding this opinion, his application was rejected by the register of the General Land Office, whose decision was affirmed by the Commissioner and ultimately by the Secretary of the Interior. Pending his appeal, Carraher made a second application for the lands to the register of the land office, and a receiver's receipt was issued to him. This receiver's receipt was dated May 31, 1888, and is as follows:

Application No. 607.

Receiver's Receipt No. 607.

Receiver's Office, Des Moines, Iowa,

May 31st, 1888.

Received of John Carraher the sum of Nine Dollars _____ cents, being the amount of fee and compensation of register and receiver for the entry of northeast _____ of N. E. quarter of section 1, in township 89 of range 46, under the 1st section of the act of Congress approved June 14th, 1878, entitled 'An Act to Amend an Act Entitled an Act to Encourage the Growth of Timber on the Western Prairies.'

$9.00. M. V. McHenry, Receiver.

Indorsed: State of Iowa, Woodbury county, filed for record     this 9th day of Dec., 1891, at 2 o'clock P. M., and recorded      in book 40, Lands, page 162, C. A. DeMun, Recorder. P.     Shontz, Deputy.

It was inclosed to Carraher in a letter, of which the     following is a copy:

Sioux City. Iowa, June 2, 1888.

Mr. John Carraher,

My Dear Sir:--

I have the pleasure of handing you herewith with your timber     culture entry receiver's receipt No. 607 for N. E. 1/4 of N.      E. 1/4, 1, 89, 46.

Respectfully,

Geo. W. Wakefield.

P. S. You can take possession and proceed to comply with the     timber culture laws.

After this receiver's receipt and letter, Carraher went into possession in the manner we have already stated and held it until 1901, when, shortly before his death, he conveyed the premises to the defendant in error. The contention is that this possession could not have been in good faith, with any expectation of obtaining title from the government at the conclusion of the eight years required by law in which to earn it; that Carraher knew that his first application under the timber culture act had beenre jected, and afterwards that decision was affirmed on appeal in 1891, and that he could not have continued in the occupation of the premises in good faith under claim of title.

The record shows that when the Secretary of the Interior (July 11, 1891) affirmed the decision against Carraher's first timber culture entry, the Commissioner, in advising the register and receiver at Des Moines by letter of July 13, 1891, of that decision, added: 'It appears that on May 31, 1888, more than three years after the rejection of his application, and while his case was pending before the Secretary of the Interior on appeal, your office allowed Carraher to make timber culture entry 607 of the land. The action was without authority and the entry has this day been canceled.' It does not appear that Carraher was notified that this entry 607 had been canceled, nor was he ever called upon to appear in reference to the same, and the letter of the Commissioner discloses that the register of the land office at Des Moines should not have allowed the entry to be made, and that it was summarily canceled without notice or hearing. Carraher had been advised by the letter from his counsel, who had become a judge of a court in Iowa, that he might take possession and proceed to comply with the timber culture law. As far as the record shows, he heard nothing further from his entry, knew nothing of its summary cancelation, and no attempt was made to disturb his possession of the premises.

The supreme court of Iowa held that there was nothing in these facts to show that Carraher was not acting in good faith, and with the belief that he would acquire title under the last entry under the timber culture act, and we are not prepared to disturb this holding.

After 1891, as we have seen, the railway company was in position to have ousted him from the premises and asserted its superior title and right. It did not attempt to do this, and, so far as the record discloses, made no objection to Carraher planting and cultivating the trees required by the act of Congress to perfect his title under the second application. His possession was certainly open, notorious, continuous, and adverse, and, unless he was acting in bad faith, was such as would ripen into full title as against the railway company, it failing to assert its rights within the period of the statute of limitation. While, until the time had run required by the timber culture act, Carraher would have been in no position to claim title as against the government, he was occupying a hostile attitude toward the railway company, and, while recognizing title in the United States, he expected to acquire title from it, had excluded all others from the use and occupation of the land, and held under no other title. The supreme court of Iowa has held that, under such circumstances, the statute of limitations of Iowa would run in his favor as against the railroad company, and we find no reason to disturb that conclusion. And for more than ten years that company was in such position under its grant that it might have maintained an action in ejectment and asserted its title to the premises as against Carraher.

We find no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa and it will be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Brewer concurs in the judgment.