International Railway Company v. Davidson/Opinion of the Court

The International Railway Company owns and operates two public toll bridges across the Niagara river between the United States and Canada. One is at Niagara Falls, the other at Lewiston, a short distance below. Over each bridge the company operates regularly its passenger cars; and over each there is a heavy passenger travel also in other vehicles and on foot. For more than 20 years prior to June, 1920, the government had, at its own expense, maintained at the American end of these bridges customs inspectors, continuously day and night, including Sundays and holidays. Then the collector of customs of the port of Buffalo notified the company that on Sundays and holidays thereafter no vehicle (except trolley cars) would be permitted to enter the United States; that no passenger would be allowed to enter except after surrender to the customs guard of all personal baggage, even the smallest handbag; and that all vehicles (except trolley cars) and all baggage surrendered would be held by the collector, at the owner's risk, for examination on the next following working day. The company was further advised that continued service of customs inspectors on Sundays and holidays could be secured, if it would make application for a special license under the Act of February 13, 1911, c. 46, § 5, 36 Stat. 899 (Comp. St. § 5571), as amended by the Act of February 7, 1920, c. 61, 41 Stat. 402. Day and night customs service on ordinary week days was to be continued at the expense of the government as thereto fore. The collector acted throughout under instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The act of 1911, entitled 'An act to provide for the lading or unlading of vessels at night,' etc., declares that immediate lading or unlading of any vessel or other conveyance can be had upon the obtaining by 'master, owner, agent or consignee' of a special license therefor. To obtain the license it is necessary that the applicant shall agree to pay to the collector of customs an amount equal to the extra compensation of the customs officers employed therefor at night or on Sundays or holidays, and shall give a bond conditioned to indemnify the United States against all losses which arise from granting the license. The compensation payable for overtime, including services on Sundays and holidays, was fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury at double the day rate; and the amount of the bond for a six months' license is fixed by the statute at $50,000. The amendment of 1920 provides, among other things, that the work for which extra compensation is payable by the licensee shall include that of examining 'passengers' baggage.' The company does not unlade any cargo at night or on Sundays or holidays, and does not contemplate doing so. It is interested only in preserving the passenger traffic passing over its bridges. This traffic on working days is not nearly as heavy as on Sundays and holidays. Discontinuance of the customs service on those days would, in large measure, destroy that traffic.

The company brought this suit in the federal District Court for Western New York against the collector to enjoin the threatened action, insisting that the provisions of these statutes are not applicable to a toll bridge and that the collector is without power to exact, as a condition of continuing the service, that the company take a license with the attendant burdens. The District Court dismissed the bill for want of equity (271 Fed. 313); and its decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (273 Fed. 153). The case was brought here by appeal; and a petition for a writ of certiorari was also filed, consideration of which was postponed until the hearing on the merits. Whether the action taken and threatened exceeds the powers conferred by law is the main question presented.

The act of 1911 contained no reference whatsoever to passengers or to their baggage or personal effects. It dealt exclusively with the grant of special permits for the immediate lading or unlading of vessels and other conveyances. It consists of five sections and a repealing clause. The first four prescribe the conditions under which such license shall issue and the proceedings to be taken thereunder. The fifth section gives the Secretary of the Treasury power to fix extra compensation to be paid customs officials serving at night, on Sundays, or on holidays in connection with lading or unlading under such special permit; and it provides that an amount equal to the extra compensation shall be paid to the collector by the licensee. The amendatory act of February 7, 1920, made no change whatsoever in the first four sections of the act of 1911 (Comp. St. §§ 5559-5562). It dealt solely with the extra compensation, merely substituting the new section 5, shown in the margin. This substituted section defines what shall be deemed overtime, how the rate of extra pay shall be fixed, and what the work is, for which extra compensation shall be paid. In this work it includes that 'in connection with the unlading, receiving or examination of passengers' baggage.' The contention of the government is that the mere insertion of these words in section 5 has the effect of establishing a system of special licenses applicable to toll bridges, which are not vessels or other conveyances, and on which there is neither cargo, lading, or unlading, but passengers who pass on foot or in trolleys or automobiles.

The contention is at variance with the language of the act and with its history. Obviously the words 'vessel or other conveyance' are not appropriate to describe the plant of a toll bridge. Other provisions, also, of the act of 1911, like the requirement 'of entry of vessels and due report of other conveyances' before issue of the special license (section 4 [Comp. St. § 5562]), show that it was not the purpose of Congress to make it applicable to the conduct of a toll bridge or the operation thereon of a line of passenger trolley cars. The clause in the amendment of 1920 by which the extra compensation payable under section 5 is extended to cover overtime 'in connection with the unlading, receiving or examination of passengers' baggage,' is given full effect, if applied to the baggage of passengers on those vessels for the immediate lading and unlading of whose cargoes special license may issue under the first four sections of the act of 1911. That these were the only overtime services in connection with passengers for which the amendment made provision is confirmed by its history. The injustice of denying to customs officials compensation for such overtime services was obvious. But the Secretary of the Treasury had been advised, after the passage of the act of 1911, as well as before, that he was without power to make-or to require the vessel owner to make-any payment therefor, since passengers' baggage is not 'cargo.' 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 123. To remedy this and other defects in the provision for extra pay, the amendment was introduced at the instance of the Treasury Department, with the approval of the United States Shipping Board and of the American Steamship Association.

Congress created two distinct systems for the examination of articles coming from foreign countries. One dealt with articles imported as merchandise; the other with passengers' baggage and personal effects. That distinction, established by the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, has been preserved in all later legislation. One Pearl Chain v. United States, 123 Fed. 371, 374, 59 C. C. A. 499. For merchandise there are elaborate provisions concerning entry, manifests, unloading, invoices, consular certificates, and bills of lading. Revised Statutes, §§ 2581, 2867, 2962 (Comp. St. §§ 5341, 5555, 5646) and 2872, as amended by Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 25, 23 Stat. 53, 59 (Comp. St. § 5563). There are special provisions affecting importations from Canada and Mexico. Revised Statutes, §§ 3097, 3098, 3099 (Comp. St. §§ 5809-5811). Compliance with these requirements necessarily involves delays. Concerning passengers' baggage and effects the provisions are much simpler. They are designed to secure expeditious entry. Revised Statutes, §§ 2799, 2800, 2801, and 2802 (Comp. St. §§ 5496-5499), deal with articles from foreign ports. There are additional provisions concerning articles coming from contiguous countries. Revised Statutes, §§ 3100, 3101, 3102 (Comp. St. §§ 5812-5814). That Congress intended by the act of 1920 to abandon this distinction between merchandise and passengers' baggage, which had been carefully preserved in the act of 1911, is not to be assumed.

It is also insisted that the Secretary of the Treasury has authority, independently of the power specially conferred by the act of 1911 as amended, to issue the instruction complained of. The contention is that his instruction to the collector was not to compel the bridge company to pay the cost of the inspection service but merely to withdraw the service unless the company would agree to pay the cost; that since customs officials cannot be maintained at every point where merchandise may conceivably enter from contiguous countries, discretion must rest in the Secretary to determine whether the character and extent of the movement at a particular place justifies maintaining them there; and that the instruction given was a regulation under section 161 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 235), which had the force of law. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 480, 30 Sup. Ct. 249, 54 L. Ed. 569, 17 Ann. Cas. 1112. To this contention it is perhaps a sufficient answer to say that the instruction given was obviously not a determination by the Secretary that the travel over these bridges on Sundays and holidays was not such as to justify the government in maintaining the inspection service. The travel was heavier on those days than on any other; and the service had been maintained continuously for more than 20 years. But there are other conclusive answers. Section 161 does not confer upon the Secretary any legislative power. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 1 Sup. Ct. 423, 27 L. Ed. 267; United States v. George, 228 U.S. 14, 33 Sup. Ct. 412, 57 L. Ed. 712. A regulation to be valid must bereasonable and must be consistent with law. The instruction given lacks both of these essentials. To collect the cost of customs service from vessel owners or other is virtually laying a tax upon them. This cannot be done except by specific authorization of Congress. Moreover, unless so authorized, no official or employee may receive from the government pay for extra services. Revised Statutes, § 1764 (Comp. St. § 3233); United States v. Garlinger, 169 U.S. 316, 18 Sup. Ct. 364, 42 L. Ed. 762. Nor may he receive in connection with his services pay from any private source. Act of March 3, 1917, c. 163, § 1, 39 Stat. 1106 (Comp. St. § 3231a). Customs officials especially are forbidden to receive such payment. Revised Statutes, § 1790 (Comp. St. § 3265). Furthermore, to impose upon the company the obligation of furnishing an indemnity bond covering losses which may accrue to the government from the action, not of the bridge company or of its employees, but of any passenger who crosses the bridge, was clearly unreasonable. It was this lack of power in the Secretary to impose upon others any part of the cost of the customs service unless specially authorized by Congress which led to the enactment also of the earlier legislation concerning special licenses for lading and unlading of cargoes. The instructions here attacked profess to rest, not upon Revised Statutes, § 161, but upon the act of 1911 as amended by that of 1920. T. D. 38290; T. D. 38429. The claim of such authority by virtue of the power to establish regulations for the Department was apparently first made in this suit.

It is further contended that the petitioner has no standing to question the regulation which applies not to it, but to the owners of private conveyances and of personal baggage brought over the bridge. While these also might be entitled to seek redress, it is clear that the instructions given threaten vital interests of the bridge company to which a court of equity should afford protection. The jurisdiction of this court on appeal was also questioned. In support of the jurisdiction it is urged that the bill invoked rights under the Constitution as well as under the revenue laws; and treaty rights are also pressed upon us. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 407, 24 Sup. Ct. 376, 48 L. Ed. 496; Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 237 U.S. 618, 621, 35 Sup. Ct. 708, 59 L. Ed. 1148. Whether the appeal lies we need not decide. A writ of certiorari was also applied for and the question presented is of sufficient importance to require determination by this court. Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co., 204 U.S. 204, 213, 27 Sup. Ct. 254, 51 L. Ed. 444.

Decree reversed.