Inman v. South Carolina Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

The defendant, a corporation of South Carolina, received the cotton in question for safe carriage from the point of connection with the Columbia & Greenville Railroad Company to Charleston, S.C.., and delivery to the steam-ship company at that port. The loss occurred by fire, in Charleston, before the obligation was discharged, and this is an action as on the case, based on defendant's breach of duty, as a common carrier, in failing to safely carry and deliver. To secure care, diligence, and fidelity in the discharge of his important public functions, the common law charged the common carrier as an insurer, but the rigor of the rule has been relaxed so as to allow reasonable limitations upon responsibility at all events, to be imposed by contract. We have, however, uniformly held that this concession to changed conditions of business cannot be extended so far as to permit the carrier to exempt himself, by a contract with the owner of the goods, from liability for his own negligence; and as in case of loss the presumption is against the carrier, and no attempt was made here to rebut that presumption, the defendant's liability, because in fault, must be assumed upon the evidence before us.

The cause went to judgment, however, in favor of the defendant upon its second defense, which was sustained by the rulings of the circuit court brought under review upon this writ of error. That defense set up the clause in the bills of lading, providing that 'the company incurring such liability shall have the benefit of any insurance which may have been effected upon or on account of said cotton;' and it was averred that the plaintiffs had fully insured the cotton against the risk of fire, but that defendant had not had the benefit of such insurance, nor had the plaintiffs given or offered to give to it such benefit. If this bill of lading had contained a provision that the railroad company would not be liable unless the owners should insure for its benefit, such provision could not be sustained, for that would be to allow the carrier to decline the discharge of its duties and obligations as such, unless furnished with indemnity against the consequences of failure in such discharge. Refusal by the owners to enter into a contract so worded would furnish no defense to an action to compel the company to carry, and submission to such a requisition would be presumed to be the result of duress of circumstances, and not binding. But the clause in question bears no such construction, and obviously cannot be relied on as in itself absolving the company from liability, for by its terms the benefit of insurance was only to be had when a legal liability had been incurred, and in favor of 'the company incurring such liability.' Since the right to the benefit of insurance at all depended upon the maintenance of plaintiffs' cause of action, the fact of not receiving such benefit could not be put forward in denial of the truth or validity of their complaint. If, on the other hand, the contention of the defendant may be regarded as in the nature of a counter-claim by way of recoupment or set-off, then the question arises as to the extent of the stipulation, assuming it to be otherwise valid, and what would amount to a breach of it. By its terms the plaintiffs were not compelled to insure for the benefit of the railroad company; but if they had insurance at the time of the loss, which they could make available to the carrier, or which, before bringing suit against the company, they had collected, without condition, then, if they had wrongfully refused to allow the carrier the benefit of the insurance, such a counter-claim might be sustained, but otherwise not. The policies here were all taken out some weeks before the shipments were made, although, of course, they did not attach until then, and recovery upon neither of them could have been had, except upon condition of resort over against the carrier, any act of the owners to defeat which operated to cancel the liability of the insurers. They could not, therefore, be made available for the benefit of the carrier. Nor have the insurance companies paid the owners. It is true that, after the loss had been incurred, the companies signed certain memoranda, by which the face of the insurance was reinstated, proofs of loss waived, and provision made for postponing the question of indemnity until the owners, if the carrier refused to pay, had used effort to collect, without prejudice to the owners' claims against the insurance companies. But this falls far short of the equivalent of payment, and, indeed, under the terms of these policies, payment itself would have been subject to such conditions as the companies chose to impose. Although, in the order of ultimate liability, that of the carrier is in legal effect primary, and that of the insurer secondary, yet the insured can, in the absence of provisions otherwise controlling the subject, insist upon proceeding, under his contract, first, against the party secondarily liable, and when he does so is bound in conscience to give to the latter the benefit of the remedy against the party principal; but these insurers could, under their contracts, require the owners to pursue the carrier in the first instance, and decline to indemnify them until the question and the measure of the latter's liability were determined. This they did, and to their action in that regard the defendant is not so situated as to be entitled to object. In our judgment, the second defense, in any aspect in which it may be considered upon this record, cannot be maintained, and it follows that the action of the circuit court was erroneous. The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the circuit court to award a new trial.