Indianapolis Brewing Company v. Liquor Control Commission of Michigan/Opinion of the Court

Indianapolis Brewing Company, Inc., an Indiana corporation, manufactures beer in that State. Under appropriate licenses it has for some years sold and shipped to dealers in Michigan its product in interstate commerce. In July, 1937, the Michigan Liquor Control Act was amended so as to prohibit Michigan dealers in beer from selling any beer manufactured in a state which by its laws discriminates against Michigan beer. By Section 40 of the amended Act, the Michigan Commission is directed to declare what states discriminate as that term is defined by the Act. It named ten states. Among these is In diana, which by its Liquor Control Act of 1935, as amended in 1937, prohibits licensed Indiana wholesalers from importing any beer which is not their absolute property; and requires that in order to secure the privilege of importing beer from other states each must obtain a 'port of entry' permit, of which no fewer than ten and no more than one hundred are to be granted, pay a license fee of $1500 and give a bond of $10,000, in addition to the license fee and bond required of those who sell only Indiana beer.

The Indianapolis Company, suing on behalf of itself and others similarly situated, brought, in the federal court for eastern Michigan, this suit to enjoin the enforcement of that provision of the Michigan law on the ground that it violates the Federal Constitution. The members of the Michigan Liquor Control Commission and other officers of the State were made defendants. As a temporary, as well as a permanent, injunction was sought, a three-judge court was conveened to hear the application for a temporary injunction. Defendants moved to dismiss the bill. It was conceded that if the law was unconstitutional the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief. No question except that of the constitutionality of the law was presented. The court held the law valid; denied the temporary injunction; and dismissed the bill. 21 F.Supp. 969.

The plaintiff contends that although the Twenty-First Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 21, declares: 'The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited', the Michigan law should be held void as violating the commerce clause and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Amend. 14. It characterizes the law as 'retaliatory'; argues, among other things, that the Amendment may not be interpreted as permitting retaliation; and insists that such interpretation would defeat its purpose, as thereby Michigan would be allowed to punish Indiana for doing what, under the rule applied in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63, 57 S.Ct. 77, 78, 81 L.Ed. 38, is permitted. Whether the Michigan law should not more properly be described as a protective measure, we have no occasion to consider. For whatever its character, the law is valid. Since the Twentyfirst Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 21, as held in the Young Case, the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause; and, as held by that case and Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 58 S.Ct. 952, 82 L.Ed. 1424, discrimination between domestic and imported intoxicating liquors, or between imported intoxicating liquors, is not prohibited by the equal protection clause. The further claim that the law violates the due process clause is also unfounded. The substantive power of the State to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor is undoubted. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205.

Affirmed.