Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic/Dissent Black

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Two procedures for the deportation of aliens are relevant in this case. The first is set forth in § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and is the procedure required in most instances when the Government seeks to deport an alien. Under § 242(b) a number of procedural safeguards are specified to insure that an alien is given the full benefit of a complete and fair hearing before the harsh consequence of deportation can be imposed on him. The second procedure involved in this case is set forth in § 252(b). It is applicable only under very special circumstances involving alien seamen who enter this country under conditional landing permits. Section 252(b) provides for a short, summary procedure. Unlike § 242(b), the first provision mentioned, this second provision does not require that the hearing officer be someone unconnected with the investigation and prosecution of the case. It does not require specific trial safeguards such as the rights to notice, counsel, and crossexamination of witnesses. Indeed, § 252(b) apparently does not require that the alien be given any hearing at all but would seem to authorize an immigration officer to order immediate arrest and summary deportation on the basis of any information coming to him in any way at any time. The question before the Court is therefore not the apparently insignificant question suggested by the Court's opinion-namely, whether this alien's case was properly determined by an official with one title, 'District Director,' rather than another title, 'special inquiry officer.' Instead, the question is the crucially significant one whether an alien seaman about to be forced to leave the country is entitled under the circumstances of this case to the benefit of safeguards that were carefully provided by Congress to insure greater fairness and reliability in deportation proceedings.

The regulations relied on by the Court in Part II of its opinion do not provide an independent basis for its holding. Among the relevant regulations, 8 CFR § 242.8(a) applies '(i)n any proceeding conducted under this part,' namely 'Part 242 Proceedings to Determine Deportability of Aliens in the United States: Apprehension, Custody, Hearing, and Appeal.' The regulation is thus designed to spell out further the details of proceedings required to be conducted under § 242 of the statute, and this regulation explicitly authorizes the special inquiry officer 'to order temporary withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act (the political persecution provision).' In contrast, the regulations relied upon by the Court as authorizing a District Director to decide this issue, in particular former 8 CFR § 253.1(e), apply by their own terms only to the procedure for 'parole' of an alien under § 212(d) (5), a remedy distinct from the withholding of deportation under § 243(h), and by the Government's own admission these regulations are applicable only to 'requests for asylum made by crewmen against whom proceedings under Section 252(b) have been instituted.' Brief for Petitioner 37. Thus, the regulations serve only to spell out the procedures to be followed under both § 242(b) and § 252(b) and do not even purport to specify when one of the sections rather than the other is in fact applicable. The fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Service has applied the regulations differently does not change this meaning. As the Court concedes, the regulation is 'not free from ambiguity,' ante, at 72, and of course the ambiguity in the regulation is precisely the same as the ambiguity in the statutory provision from which the wording of the regulation was drawn. It seems clear that the way in which the Service has applied the regulation has been determined by its interpretation of the statute, an interpretation that is in no way binding on us. Both the statute and the regulation are ambiguous, and there is no doubt in my mind that this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the alien who is seeking a full and fair hearing. With all due respect, I think the Court's involved argument based upon the regulations, which goes beyond anything suggested by the Government itself in this case, provides no basis whatsoever for avoiding the fundamental question of statutory interpretation as to which of the two procedures, § 242(b) or § 252(b), was required to be followed in this case.

The Government contends that respondent, the alien seaman involved here, could be properly deported under the special summary procedures of § 252(b) because his conditional landing permit was revoked and because § 252(b) authorizes summary deportation after this permit is revoked. Respondent, however, argued in the Court of Appeals that he should have been given the benefit of the careful hearing procedures spelled out by Congress in § 242(b) because the ship on which he came had departed before the decision of theD istrict Director was made, and therefore the only justification for the fast but ordinarily less desirable procedure of § 252(b) no longer existed. The Court of Appeals held that § 252(b) proceedings were authorized only prior to the departure of the ship. I agree with the Court of Appeals. As that court noted in its opinion:

'The section (252(b)) exception (to the general procedure     requirements of § 242(b)) is very narrowly drawn. It does not     apply to the deportation of crewmen who have 'jumped ship'      and entered the United States illegally, with no permit at      all. As noted above, it does not apply to crewmen issued     landing permits authorizing them to depart on vessels other      than those on which they arrived. It does not apply to     crewmen who have overstayed the twenty-nine day leave period      without revocation of their landing permits. It does not     apply to crewmen who were to leave on the vessel on which      they arrived if their vessels have departed before their      landing permits are revoked. In all of these situations     crewmen may be deported only in accordance with (§ 242(b))      procedures.' 393 F.2d 539 544.

As the legislative history of the Act, quoted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, shows, the special truncated procedure of § 252(b) was intended to be used only when the need for speed was truly pressing-when the ship was about to leave port. But the seaman in this case was subjected to this truncated, summary procedure even though his ship had already gone and the need for haste in completing these important legal proceedings no longer existed. There is no reason to suspect that Congress wanted a seaman to be deprived under these circumstances of the vital procedural safeguards so carefully specified in § 242(b) of the Act.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.