Howard v. Carusi/Opinion of the Court

The case made by the bill of complaint is based on the will of Samuel Carusi and upon the deed of trust alleged to have been executed and delivered July 18, 1872. The contention of complainant is that, by the deed, Lewis Carusi conveyed to Samuel Carusi all his real estate in trust to convey the same to such person or persons as the said Lewis Carusi might 'by his last will and testament, or other paper writing under his hand and seal, by two persons witnessed, designate and direct;' and that, although the will was revoked by the trust deed, it was nevertheless effectual as a designation of the persons to whom said real estate was to be conveyed by Samuel Carusi, the trustee; and that the complainant and her sister, Genevieve Carusi, were the persons who were so designated by the will. It is clear, therefore, that complainant's case can derive no aid from the declarations of the testator, Lewis Carusi, alleged to have been made before and after the execution of his will, in relation to the disposition which he intended to make of his property. It must stand or fall upon the designation made in the will. It is clear, also, that the will is to receive precisely the same construction, as an instrument designating the beneficiaries of the trust deed, as it would have received as a last will duly proven and recorded. The question is, therefore, what estate did the testator intend to give the complainant by his will of March 18, 1872? This will gives-First, an estate in fee-simple to Samuel Carusi; it contains, second, the expression of a hope and trust that he will not unnecessarily diminish the estate; and, third, it gives to the nieces of the testator so much of his estate as Samuel Carusi shall not at his death have disposed of by sale of devise. We have, then, devised to Samuel Carusi an estate in fee-simple, with an absolute power of disposition either by sale or devise, clearly and unmistakably implied. Therefore, according to the adjudged cases, the limitation over to the niece of the testator is void. The rule is well established that, although generally an estate may be devised to one in fee-simple or fee-tail, with a limitation over by way of executory devise, yet when the will shows a clear purpose of the testator to give an absolute power of disposition to the first taker, the limitation over is void.

Thus, in the case of Atty. Gen. v. Hall, Fitz G. 314, there was a devise of real and personal estate to the testator's son and to the heirs of his body, and that if he should die leaving no heirs of his body, then so much of the real and personal estate as he should be possessed of at his death was devised over to the complainants in trust. The son in his life-time suffered a common recovery of the real estate, and made a will as to the personal estate, and died without issue, and a bill was filed against his executor to account. It was held by Lord Chancellor KING, aided by the master of the rolls and the chief baron of the exchequer, that the devisee was tenant in tail of the real estate, and had barred the plaintiffs by the common recovery, and that the executrix was not to account for the personal estate to the persons claiming under the limitation, for that was void as repugnant to the absolute ownership and power of disposal given by the will.

In the case of Ross v. Ross, 1 Jacob & W. 154, a limitation over was declared void because it was limited upon the contingency that the first taker did not dispose of the property by will or otherwise. See, also, Cuthbert v. Purrier, Jacob, 415; Bourn v. Gibbs, 1 Russ. & M. 615; Holmes v. Godson, 8 DeGex, M. & G. 152.

The American cases are to the same effect. Thus, in Jackson v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19, Charles Bull died seized of the premises in question. By his last will, after devising a certain lot of land to his son Moses, he declared: 'In case my son Moses should die without lawful issue, the said property he died possessed of I will to my son Young, his lawful issue,' etc. It was held that the limitation over was void, as being repugnant to the absolute control over the estate which the testator intended to give.

In Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, the devise was to the testator's son Peleg, his heirs and assigns, with the following provision: 'And further, it is my will that if my son Peleg shall die and leave no lawful heirs, what estate he shall leave to be equally divided between my son John Ide and my grandson Nathaniel Ide, to them and their heirs forever.' Held, that his limitation over to John and Nathaniel Ide were void because inconsistent with the absolute, unqualified interest in the first devisee.

To the same effect is the case of Bowen v. Dean, 110 Mass. 438, where a man devised all his estate, real and personal, to his wife, 'to hold to her and her assigns,' but should she 'die intestate and seized of any portion of said estate at the time of her death,' then over. The wife took possession of the land and died, having made a will, by which she devised and bequeathed all her estate, real and personal. It was held that the will of the husband gave the wife, by necessary implication, an absolute power of disposal, either by deed or will, and this power having been fully executed by her will, nothing remained upon which the devise over in the will of her husband could operate.

In Melson v. Copper, 4 Leigh, 408, the case was this: John Cooper died in 1813 seized of the messuage and land in controversy, having, by his last will duly executed, devised, inter alia, as follows: 'I give to my son William Cooper the plantation I live on, to him and his heirs forever. In case he should die without a son and not sell the land, I give the land to my son George,' etc. The plantation on which the testator lived was the land in controversy. George Cooper, the lessee of the plaintiff, was the testator's son George mentioned in the devise, who claimed the land under the lititation over to him therein contained. The testator's son William, to whom the land was devised in the first instance, attained to full age, married, and died, leaving issue one daughter, but without leaving or ever having had a son, and without having sold the land. The question referred to the court was whether, upon this state of facts, George Cooper was entitled to the land. The court held that a general, absolute, unlimited power to sell the land was given to William Cooper by the devise, that he took a fee-simple, and that George Cooper was not entitled to recover. See, also, Gifford v. Choate, 100 Mass. 343; Hale v. Marsh, Id. 468; Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 21 Me. 288.

The rule is thus stated by Chancellor KENT:

'If there be an absolute power of disposition given by the     will to the first taker, as if an estate be devised to A., in      fee, and if he dies possessed of the property without lawful      issue, the remainder over the property which he, dying      without heirs, shall leave, or without selling or devising      the same; in all such cases the remainder over is void,      because of his preceding fee; and it is void by way of      executory devise, because the limitation is inconsistent with      the absolute estate expressly given, or necessarily implied,      by the will.' 4 Kent, Comm. 271.

If the will of Lewis Carusi had remained unrevoked and had been duly proven and recorded, and Samuel Carusi, had died intestate, with all the property devised to him by Lewis Carusi undisposed of, the complainant would be entitled to no relief, for she would have taken nothing by the will. If the will can be held the designate any beneficiary under the trust deed of July 18, 1872, it designated Samuel Carusi, and not the complainant and her sisters. But by the terms of Lewis Carusi's will, the complainant and her sisters were only entitled to so much of the estate of Lewis as Samuel should 'not have disposed of by devise or sale.' The bill of complaint charges that Samuel Carusi, by his last will and testament, had devised to certain persons therein named, among them the complainant, all the property devised to him by the last will of Lewis Carusi. There was therefore no property of the estate of Lewis Carusi to which the supposed devise to complainant and her sisters could apply.

The case of complainant receives no support from the precatory words of the will of Lewis Carusi. These words express 'the hope and trust that Samuel Carusi will not diminish the same (viz., the property devised to him by the will) to a greater extent than may answer for his comfortable support,' and the testator then devises to complainant and her sisters what Samuel shall not have disposed of by devise or sale. The words do not raise any trust in Samuel. He is not made a trustee for any purpose, and no duty in respect to the disposition of the estate is imposed upon him. But even if the will had contained an express request that Samuel should convey to the complainant so much of the estate as he did not dispose of by sale or devise, there would be no trust, for the will, as we have seen, gives Samuel Carusi the absolute power of disposal.

In Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 148, it was said by the master of the rolls (Lord LANGDALE:)

'If the giver accompanies his expression of wish or request     by other words, from which it is to be collected that he did      not intend the wish to be imperative, or if it appears from      the context that the first taker was to have a discretionary      power to withdraw any part of the subject from the wish or      request, *  *  * it has been held that no trust was created.' And see S.C.. ''nom. Knight v. Boughton'', 11 Clark & F. 513.

The rule is thus stated by Mr. Justice STORY in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 1070:

'Whenever the objects of the supposed recommendatory trust     are not certain or definite, whenever the property to which      it is to attach is not certain or definite, whenever a clear      discretion or choice to act or not to act is given, whenever      the prior dispositions of the property import absolute and      uncontrollable ownership, in all such cases courts of equity      will not create a trust from words of this character.'

See, also, Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684; Wright v. Atkyns, Turn. & R. 157; Stead v. Mellor, 5 Ch. Div. 225; Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267; S.C.. L. R. 6 Ch. 597; Hess v. Singler, 114 Mass. 56; Bennocks' Estate, 20 Pa. St. 268; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 1 McCart. 397; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, and notes.

The views we have expressed render it unnecessary to consider other questions argued by counsel. It is quite immaterial whether or not Lewis Carusi had mental capacity to execute the deed of October 17, 1872, or whether he had any title to the property described therein. If that deed had never been executed the fact would not aid the complainant's case.

The result is that the decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, in general term, by which the decree of the special term dismissing the complainant's bill was affirmed, was right, and must itself be affirmed.