Hopkins v. Lee/Opinion of the Court

The first question which this Court has to consider is, whether the proceedings in Chancery were properly admitted in evidence in the Court below.

It is not denied, as a general rule, that a fact which has been directly tried, and decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be contested again between the same parties, in the same or any other Court. Hence a verdict and judgment of a Court of record, or a decree in Chancery, although not binding on strangers, puts an end to all further controversy concerning the points thus decided between the parties to such suit. In this, there is and ought to be, no difference between a verdict and judgment

On Lee's answer coming in, denying several of the allegations of the bill, the cause is referred to a master commissioner, who, after a long investigation, in the presence of both parties, and the examination of many witnesses, makes a report by which Hopkins is made a debtor of Lee in the sum of $427 77. On inspection of this report, it will be seen that the chief, if not the only controversy between the parties was, whether Hill and Dale had been relieved from its incumbrance to Colston, by funds furnished by Lee to Hopkins for that purpose, and that unless that fact had been found affirmatively, a report could not have been made in Lee's favour. The Court, after referring to this report, and stating that it had not been excepted to, proceeds to decree the payment of this balance by the complainant to the defendant. From this summary review of the proceedings in Chancery, the conclusion seems inevitable, that the chief, if not sole matter in litigation in that suit, was whether Hill and Dale had been freed of the incumbrance to Colston, by Lee or by Hopkins, and that the report and subsequent decree proceeded on the ground, and established the fact, that Lee had discharged it, which was also the only point put in issue by the first plea of the defendant in the action of covenant. No rule of evidence, therefore, is violated in saying that this decree was properly admitted by the Circuit Court. But if the decree were admissible, it is supposed that the report of the master ought not to have been submitted to the jury. The Court entertains a different opinion. No reason has been assigned why a decision by a proper and sworn officer of a Court of Chancery, in the presence and hearing of both parties, according to the acknowledged practice and usage of the Court, on the very matters in controversy, not excepted to by either party, and confirmed by the Court, should not be as satisfactory evidence of any fact found by it, as the verdict of a jury, on which a judgment is afterwards rendered. The advantage which a verdict may be supposed to possess over a report, from its being the decision of twelve, instead of the opinion of a single man, is perhaps more than counterbalanced by the time which is allowed to a master for deliberation, and a more thorough investigation of the matters in controversy. But a better and more satisfactory answer is, that it is the usual, known, and approved practice of the Court to whose jurisdiction the parties had submitted themselves. But if this document be witheld from a jury, how are they or the Court to arrive at the grounds of the decree, or a knowledge of the points or matters which have been decided in the cause? Without it, the decree may be intelligible; but the grounds on which it proceeds, or the facts which it means to decide, may be liable to much uncertainty and conjecture. The report, therefore, as well as the decree, was proper evidence, not only of the fact that such report and decree had been made, but of the matter which they professed directly to decide. We are not now called upon to say, whether, in those respects, they were conclusive, as they do not appear to have been offered with that view; but without meaning t odeny to them such effect, we only say, which is all that the present case requires, that they were competent and proper, in the absence of other testimony, to establish the fact of the removal of the incumbrance by the defendant Lee, from the estate of Hill and Dale.

In the assessment of damages, the counsel for the plaintiff in error, prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that they should take the price of the land, as agreed upon by the parties in the articles of agreement upon which the suit was brought, for their government. But the Court refused to give this instruction, and directed the jury to take the price of the lands, at the time they ought to have been conveyed, as the measure of damages. To this instruction the plaintiff in error excepted. The rule is settled in this Court, that in an action by the vendee for a breach of contract on the part of the vendor, for not delivering the article, the measure of damages is its price at the time of the breach. The price being settled by the contract, which is generally the case, makes no difference, nor ought it to make any; otherwise the vendor, if the article have risen in value, would always have it in his power to discharge himself from his contract, and put the enhanced value in his own pocket. Nor can it make any difference in principle, whether the contract be for the sale of real or personal property, if the lands, as is the case here, have not been improved or built on. In both cases, the vendee is entitled to have the thing agreed for, at the contract price, and to sell it himself at its increased value. If it be withheld, the vendor ought to make good to him the difference. This is not an action for eviction, nor is the Court now prescribing the proper rule of damages in such a case.b

Judgment affirmed.