Hodgson v. Local Union 6799, United Steelworkers of America/Dissent Brennan

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

I dissent. The Court acknowledges that 29 U.S.C. § 482(b), in permitting the Secretary to bring a civil action against the union if his investigation discloses 'a violation' of § 481, might well mean 'any violation whatever revealed by the investigation.' Ante, at 338. Nonetheless, it concludes that 'a violation' is limited to 'any of the violations raised by the union member during his internal union election protest,' ibid., because the broader interpretation would disregard the congressional purpose in imposing the exhaustion requirement. It is in giving controlling significance to the exhaustion requirement rather than to the clear and primary policy judgment enacted by Congress that the Court, in my view falls into error.

Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. 463, 88 S.Ct. 643, 19 L.Ed.2d 705 (1968), and Wirtz v. Local Union No. 125, Laborers' International Union, 389 U.S. 477, 88 S.Ct. 639, 19 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), comprehensively analyzed the policy Congress meant to further in enacting the Secretary's enforcement powers under 29 U.S.C. § 482. We said that 'Title IV's special function in furthering the over-all goals of the LMRDA is to insure 'free and democratic' elections,' 389 U.S., at 470, 88 S.Ct., at 647, an interest 'vital' not alone to union members but also to the general public. 389 U.S., at 475, 483, 88 S.Ct., at 650, 642. While we recognized that Congress desired to further this basic policy with minimal interference with a union's management of its own affairs, we made clear that where governmental intrusion was necessary to realize the vital public policy favoring free and democratic elections, 'it would be anomalous to limit the reach of the Secretary's cause of action by the specifics of the union member's complaint.' 389 U.S., at 483, 88 S.Ct., at 642. We accordingly held that 'it is incorrect to read (the exhaustion provision) * *  * as somehow conditioning (the Secretary's) right to relief once that intervention has been properly invoked.' 389 U.S., at 473, 88 S.Ct., at 649.

That holding fits precisely the situation before us. Intervention was properly invoked when the dissident union member pursued his complaint through the union's internal procedures. When the Secretary's subsequent investigation uncovered another Title IV violation, surely it was 'a violation' that Congress meant should also be corrected. Indeed, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) provides that if the Secretary's investigation leads him to conclude that there is 'probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred' the Secretary should seek in a civil action an order to set the election aside and 'to direct the conduct of an election * *  * in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter.' (Emphasis added.) The new election must, under § 482(c), be conducted 'so far as lawful and practicable in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization.' (Emphasis added.) These provisions make inescapable the conclusion that Congress authorized the Secretary to ground an action for a new election not only in violations processed by the union member but also on other violations uncovered in his investigation. The Court's contrary construction ignores 'the fact that Congress, although committed to minimal intervention, was obviously equally committed to making that intervention, once warranted, effective in carrying out the basic aim of Title IV.' 389 U.S., at 473, 88 S.Ct., at 649.