Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE

IRAQ STRATEGY REVIEW

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JANUARY 2007

Summary Briefing Slides

Guiding Principles

 * Success in Iraq remains critical to our national security and to success in the War on Terror.
 * Failure in Iraq would have disastrous consequences for the United States, the region, and our allies.
 * There is no silver bullet solution in Iraq. Every option involves trade-offs across various risks.

Relationship to the War on Terror

 * Iraq remains a central front in the Global War on Terror.
 * Al-Qaida in Iraq has declared and shown its intentions to establish a caliphate in Iraq and then to expand the caliphate widely.
 * Sowing sectarian violence in Iraq has been and remains the central strategy of al-Qaida in Iraq to reach the goal of creating a caliphate.
 * The Freedom Agenda is advanced by the survival and strengthening of Iraq’s democratic institutions.
 * Winning in Iraq will not end the War on Terror, but it will make success in the War on Terror much easier.
 * Failing in Iraq would make succeeding in the War on Terror vastly more difficult.

The Regional Picture

 * Our allies in the region are concerned about negative Iranian influence in Iraq.
 * Support for the Iraqi Government, however, can help stabilize the region.
 * Iran has been cultivating influence in Iraq through all means at its disposal.
 * Iran’s threat involves both lethal action and the burrowing of Iranian actors into Iraqi institutions.
 * Syrian actions, while posing less of a strategic threat to Iraq than Iranian actions, exacerbate the tactical challenge faced by the Iraqi government.

Present Situation

 * We have achieved many of our initial objectives in Iraq.
 * Saddam Hussein’s regime is no longer an organized threat to Iraq, its neighbors, or the United States.
 * Iraq is governed by a freely elected government under a permanent constitution.
 * Democratic institutions have been established and are enabling Iraqis to shape their own state.
 * Per capita incomes have increased ($743 to $1593 according to the World Bank, although inflation also has risen) and Iraq has performed under its IMF agreement.
 * But the situation in Iraq has grown increasingly complex over the past 12 months.
 * Al-Qaida terrorism and a vicious insurgency are now combined with sectarian violence.
 * The national government is eager to take lead responsibility, but it is hampered by a lack of governmental capability and widening sectarian divisions.
 * Power centers are devolving, with events outside the international zone becoming more relevant to national trends.
 * The political process has shown signs of maturation, but meaningful reconciliation has yet to be achieved.
 * Iraqi leaders have not yet achieved a single vision for a unified Iraq.
 * Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have grown in effectiveness, but the levels of violence with which they must cope continue to increase.
 * Professionalism and effectiveness are improving but are not yet consistent across the force.
 * Some members of the ISF, notably the police, are contributing to sectarian violence.
 * Despite more than 300,000 trained and equipped members of the ISF, substantially fewer numbers are present for duty on a given day.
 * Combat losses, desertion, attrition, and leave account for the majority of those absent.
 * The situation in Baghdad has not improved despite tactical adjustments.
 * The situation in Baghdad determines nationwide trends; its stabilization has been seen as key to a unified Iraq.
 * The Government of Iraq has not yet delivered promised essential services.
 * Limitations on operations have hindered the execution of security plans.
 * Force levels overall in Baghdad have been inadequate to stabilize a city of its size.
 * Iraqi support for the Coalition has declined substantially, in part due to failure of security over the past year.
 * In the absence of security, communities are turning to “self-help.”
 * In his public and private statements, Prime Minister Maliki articulates a positive vision where all Iraqis are protected by the rule of law.
 * Execution and delivery on pledges remain vital.

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Source
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf