Henderson's Distilled Spirits/Opinion of the Court

'It is certainly proper to assume that an act of sovereignty so highly penal is not to be inferred from language capable of any milder construction.'

This principle of interpretation is applicable to this case.

2. The Circuit Court did not err in holding the spirits were not forfeited under the fourth count in the information. The 14th section, on which the fourth count is based, does not apply to the removal of spirits. That section applies to the removal from the place of manufacture, and to the deposit or concealment of articles named in the previous sections of the statute; among which articles liquors are not included. Subsequent sections, it is, which govern them, and the 45th section, which concludes this portion of the statute, provides a special and different penalty for the removal of spirits in violation of the law. Different penalties are provided by section 54th for the unlawful removal of fermented liquors, showing that Congress excepted them from the operation of section 14th; a view strengthened by the fact that the statute generally took effect on one date, but that the provisions relating to distilled and fermented liquors did not take effect till a later one.

Section 45th is, therefore, the law which applies to the allegation in the fourth count of the information. But the forfeiture prescribed in that section applies to the removal of spirits 'from the place where the same are manufactured otherwise than into a bonded warehouse,' and the removal of these spirits was not otherwise. It was a bonded warehouse of the United States.

The allegation in the fourth count that the spirits were removed 'from the place where distilled, with intent to defraud the United States of the tax,' and which allegation is admitted in the case agreed on to be true-is rendered nugatory by the other, the fact equally admitted, that the removal was made by the distiller himself to a bonded warehouse of the United States. This act was legal, was in pursuance of the statute, was the very course prescribed by the law 'to secure the payment of the tax.' No conspiracy-which is what, in truth, the opposing counsel assume to have existed-is alleged in the information, nor in the facts agreed on. The contrary appears from the case agreed on. If it did not, all the proceedings required of the inspector by the 29th section -numerous and stringent provisions-must be assumed in the absence of any proof, or even allegation, to the contrary to have taken place. And the fact that when Henderson purchased the spirits he paid the full amount of the tax, and received the collector's certificate of such payment, is conclusive that there was no conspiracy.

The government by accepting and retaining the taxes paid to it by the claimant, is estopped to say the property all the time belonged to it, by reason of previous forfeited title by the vendor or the claimant. Henderson had every possible assurance that he had acquired a perfect title to the property he purchased. If it now be declared forfeited, he loses both the tax and the property, by no fault or negligence on his part. In civil actions, and in all cases like this, which involve a mere right to property, estoppel binds the government as it does individuals.

Reply: Section 45th is widely different from section 14th. The gist of section 14th is the intent with which the spirits are removed; forfeiture only taking place where they are removed, deposited, or concealed in any place with intent to defraud the United States. In section 45th the intent with which the removal is made is immaterial, if they are removed elsewhere than to a bonded warehouse. Thus an information can be founded on section 45th, however innocent may have been the intention of the parties; but, when founded on section 14th, the intent to defraud the government becomes essential. The fact that an information for fraudulently removing spirits elsewhere than to a bonded warehouse may be founded either on section 14th or section 45th, does not show any conflict between the two sections, or that the one limits the other. Such cumulative remedies are very often provided in revenue laws.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Distilled spirits, upon which no tax had been paid according to law, were, by the thirty-second section of the act of the thirteenth of July, 1866, subject to a tax of two dollars on each and every proof gallon, to be paid by the distiller, owner, or any person having possession thereof, and the same section provided that the tax shall be a lien on the spirits distilled, and on the distillery used for distilling the same, with the stills, vessels, fixtures, and tools therein, &c. Express provision is also made by the fourteenth section of that act, that all goods or commodities, for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, or any materials, utensils, or vessels proper or intended to be made use of for or in the making of such goods or commodities, in case they shall be removed or shall be deposited or concealed in any place with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or any part thereof, shall be forfeited. Certain alterations are made in each of those provisions by the fourteenth section of the act of the second of March, 1867, but the alterations are not material to the present case, as the same section provides that the new provision shall not exclude any other remedy or proceeding provided by law, which beyond all doubt leaves in full operation the fourteenth section of the prior act.

Regular seizure of the one hundred barrels of distilled spirits in question was made on the first day of September, 1868, by the collector of the district, as alleged in the information, and the record shows that the information was duly filed by the district attorney on the seventh of the same month, in the District Court of the United States for the district where the seizure was made. Being a seizure on land, the claimant was entitled to a trial by jury, but he appeared and the parties entered into a stipulation waiving a jury and submitted the case to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, as they had a right to do, even before any legislative provision was enacted for waiving a jury by a written stipulation. Pursuant to that stipulation the parties were heard, and the District Court dismissed the information and rendered judgment for the respondent. Exceptions were duly taken by the district attorney and he sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into the Circuit Court, where the judgment rendered by the District Court was affirmed, and the United States thereupon sued out a writ of error to the Circuit Court and removed the cause into this court for re-examination.

Seizure of the spirits was made, as before explained, by the collector of internal revenue for the district, and it is alleged in the information that the collector still holds the same in his possession and custody as forfeited to the United States, under the provisions in the act to amend the existing laws relating to internal revenue. Six articles, each charging a forfeiture of the spirits in question, are contained in the information, but in the view of the case taken by the court it will only be necessary to examine the fourth in the series, which is as follows:

That the said one hundred barrels of spirits were manufactured at some place within the United States to said attorney unknown, and between the first day of September, 1866, and the date of said seizure, by some person or persons to said attorney also unknown, and were then and there goods and commodities on which a tax was then and there imposed by the provisions of law, and the same were removed from the place where distilled, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, the same being then and there unpaid, contrary to the form of the statutes of the said United States in such case made and provided.

Seasonable claim in due form was made for the spirits by the defendant, and he appeared and filed an answer, denying all the material allegations of the information, and tendered an issue to the country, which was joined by the United States. Apart from that, he also answered each article separately, and in respect to the fourth article he denied that the spirits in question were removed from the place where distilled with intent to defraud the United States of any tax then and there imposed, as alleged in the information.

Evidently the answer was precisely equivalent to the general issue, and made it incumbent upon the United States to prove the charge as alleged, and the effect of the stipulation submitting the case to the court was to substitute the court for the jury as the tribunal to determine the issue of fact presented in the pleadings. Had the stipulation contained nothing further, it is clear that the evidence on the one side and the other must have been introduced to the court substantially as provided in the recent act of Congress upon that subject, but the parties went further and stipulated in writing as to what the facts in the case were, in which stipulation it is agreed that the fourth article in the information is true, and it is insisted by the United States that that stipulation is equivalent to a confession of guilt, and that it entitles the United States to judgment, and the court would certainly be of the same opinion if that admission was unaccompanied by what follows in the stipulation in the same connection.

Standing alone, it is an admission that the charge as contained in the fourth article of the information is true, but it must be read in connection with what follows as a part of the same stipulation, and the question is whether the qualification annexed to the admission that the fourth article of the information is true, changes the aspect of the evidence and entitles the defendant to the judgment rendered in his favor by the subordinate courts.

Appended to the admission that the fourth article in the information is true, is the statement that the defendant, subsequently to the removal of the spirits from the distillery, and before their removal from the bonded warehouse, and before the seizure, 'paid the tax on said spirits, and that he was a bon a fide and innocent purchaser;' and the question is whether that statement, appended as it is to the admission, qualifies the language of the admission in such a way that the admission does not establish the truth of the charge contained in the fourth article of the information.

Due weight must also be given to certain other facts stated in the stipulation in determining the question whether the judgment for the defendant was correct or incorrect. He was not the purchaser from the United States, nor have the United States ever sold the spirits in question, but the agreed statement also shows that he purchased the spirits while they were in a bonded warehouse in New Orleans, after the same had been placed therein by the owner of the distillery at which the same were distilled; that he paid the tax due on the spirits to the collector, and removed the same from the warehouse according to law, without any knowledge on his part, at any time before the seizure, of any fraud, either actual or alleged, on the part of the distiller; that the spirits were manufactured and distilled at a certain distillery in that district, in the months of May and June, prior to the seizure, by the person therein named, by the use and means of certain boilers, stills, and other vessels of which the distiller was superintendent and owner, and the parties agree to the effect that all the acts averred in the fifth and sixth articles of the information as having been done in respect to the spirits in question by some person unknown are true, when the averments are applied to the person named in the agreed statement as the manufacturer and distiller of the said spirits.

Four material ingredients are involved in the charge contained in the fourth article of the information: (1.) That the spirits were manufactured at some place within the United States, between the day therein named and the date of the seizure. (2.) That the spirits were then and there goods and commodities on which a tax was imposed by some provision of law then in force. (3.) That the spirits were removed from the place where distilled with intent to defraud the United States of such tax. (4.) That the tax was unpaid at the time the spirits were so removed, with such fraudulent intent.

Beyond all doubt the admission that the fourth article is true is a conclusive admission that each and every one of the well-pleaded allegations which it contains are also true, which, standing alone, would certainly be a confession on the record that the property is subject to forfeiture, unless it can be shown that the fourth article in the information is insufficient in law to warrant a judgment in favor of the United States.

Viewed in that light, as the admission must be, the next question is whether the statement appended to the admission is sufficient to save the property from condemnation in the possession of the defendant. Properly analyzed the statement appended to the admission contains two averments in avoidance of the consequences which would otherwise follow from the admitted acts of the antecedent owner: (1.) That the defendant paid the tax subsequent to the removal of the spirits from the distillery and before they were removed from the bonded warehouse and before the seizure by the collector. (2.) That he was a bon a fide and innocent purchaser, without notice that the spirits were forfeited as alleged in that article of the information.

Where the forfeiture is made absolute by statute the decree of condemnation when entered relates back to the time of the commission of the wrongful acts, and takes date from the wrongful acts and not from the date of the sentence or decree. Subsequent payment of the duties, therefore, is no defence to an information for a forfeiture founded upon antecedent wrongful acts, as the effect of such wrongful acts, where the forfeiture is made absolute by statute, is to divest the owner of all property in the goods seized and to vest the title to the same in the United States, in case a prosecution ensues, and a decree of condemnation follows, as the decree of condemnation when entered by a court of competent jurisdiction relates back to the date of the wrongful acts as alleged and proved at the trial or in the hearing of the cause. Repeated decisions of this court have established that rule in all cases where the forfeiture is made absolute by the act of Congress, and it necessarily follows that neither the subsequent payment of the duties nor the fact that the defendant is an innocent purchaser, without notice of the wrongful acts of the antecedent owner, constitutes any defence to the charge contained in the fourth article of the information. Many such adjudged cases are to be found in the reported decisions of this court, and it must be admitted that they establish the rule beyond all doubt, that the forfeiture becomes absolute at the commission of the prohibited acts, and that the title from that moment vests in the United States in all cases where the statute in terms denounces the forfeiture of the property as a penalty for a violation of law, without giving any alternative remedy, or prescribing any substitute for the forfeiture, or allowing any exceptions to its enforcement, or employing in the enactment any language showing a different intent; and that in all such cases it is not in the power of the offender or former owner to defeat the forfeiture by any subsequent transfer of the property even to a bon a fide purchaser for value without notice of the wrongful acts done and committed by the former owner. Established as that rule has been by the decisions of this court for more than half a century, it is insisted that it should be applied in the case before the court, and it is difficult to see any reason for rejecting the proposition, as the words of the act under which the fourth article of the information is drawn denounce the forfeiture of the property in terms as absolute and unqualified as any which can be chosen in our language. Goods and commodities falling within that provision, it is enacted, shall be forfeited in case they shall be removed with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or any part thereof, and the language denouncing the forfeiture is explicit and absolute and without any qualification whatever. Compare the language of the act of Congress with the language employed in the fourth article of the information and it will be seen that the charge against the spirits is preferred in the same language as that employed in the act of Congress denouncing the forfeiture, as the fourth article alleges that the spirits in question were then and there goods and commodities on which a tax was then and there imposed by the provisions of law, and that the same were removed from the place where distilled with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, the same being then and there unpaid; and the admission set forth in the agreed statement is that the fourth article of the information is true, which is a direct confession that the prohibited acts charged in that article were done and committed at the time and place and by the person and in the manner therein alleged.

Concede all that and it is clear that the United States are entitled to judgment, if it be true that the forfeiture relates back to the date of the wrongful acts charged in the information. Escape from that conclusion, it would seem, is impossible, if it be admitted that the fourth article of the information sets forth a good cause of forfeiture, and it is clear that the affirmative of that proposition must be admitted, unless it be affirmed that the 14th section of the act of Congress, on which it is drawn, does not provide for such a forfeiture, under the circumstances therein described. Such a proposition, whether so intended or not, is precisely equivalent to a demurrer to the fourth article of the information or to a motion in arrest of judgment after verdict; and if so, then it follows, as shown by all the authorities upon the subject, that everything well pleaded in the fourth article of the information must be taken as true, which is the exact admission contained in the agreed statement. Nothing can be more certain in legal investigation than that the decree must have been for the United States if the claimant had demurred to the fourth article of the information, unless it can be held that the act of Congress denouncing the forfeiture is unconstitutional, as the article in question embodies the exact language of that provision, and it is equally certain that a motion in arrest of judgment would also have been unavailing for the same reason, and also because the validity of the act of Congress is beyond all doubt.

Congress possesses the power to levy taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and it is as clear that Congress may enact penalties and forfeitures for the violation of such laws as it is that Congress may levy the taxes or duties or pass laws for their collection, safe-keeping, and disbursement.

Section fourteen, it is admitted, is broad enough in its terms to embrace the removal of spirits, on which there is a tax, from the place where distilled, with intent to defraud the United States of the tax, but it is suggested that another section of the same act requires that spirits, when removed from the place where distilled, shall be deposited in a bonded warehouse, and that the penalty imposed for a violation of that requirement is different from the penalty imposed by the fourteenth section of the act, and it must be admitted that the suggestion is correct, but it is impossible to see in what respect the suggestion tends to support the views of the defendant in the present case.

Suggestion is also made that it is not an illegal act to remove spirits from the place where distilled to a bonded warehouse, and that also is true, but the corollary attempted to be drawn from the two suggestions is a non-sequitur, and cannot be sustained, which is that the charge that the spirits were removed from the place where distilled, with intent to defraud the United States, cannot be true if it appears that the spirits were removed from the distillery to a bonded warehouse, as the removal of spirits from the place where distilled to a bonded warehouse is authorized by law. Undoubtedly such a removal of spirits from the place where distilled to a bonded warehouse, if made to secure the payment of the tax to the government, is a lawful act, but it is equally clear, if the removal is made even to a bonded warehouse to defraud the United States of the tax, that the act of removal is illegal, and that the spirits removed are forfeited.

Both of these suggestions, however, are founded upon the assumed theory that the record shows that the only removal of the spirits alleged or proved was a removal from the place where distilled to a bonded warehouse, but that assumption is wholly unsupported either by the charge contained in the fourth article of the information or by the admission that the fourth article is true, as exhibited in the agreed statement. On the contrary, the fourth article of the information alleges that the spirits were removed from the place where distilled, with intent to defraud the United States of the tax, without any specification as to the place to which the same were removed, or where they were deposited; nor is that omission any objection to the form of the charge, as that article of the information follows substantially the language of the fourteenth section of the act of Congress on which it is drawn.

Tested by the charge, as made in that article, and the admission applicable to it, as exhibited in the agreed statement, as the question must be, and it is clear that the spirits may have been removed elsewhere than to a bonded warehouse before they were placed in that depository by the owner and distiller. Such certainly would be the legal conclusion if the defendant had demurred to the information, and the court is of the opinion that the same conclusion must follow from the admission that the fourth article of the information is true, as the admission is expressed in the agreed statement.

Henderson, the claimant, purchased the spirits while they were in the bonded warehouse and after they had bee deposited therein by the owner of the distillery where the spirits were manufactured, and having made the purchase without notice that any fraud had been practiced by the distiller, and having paid the tax before the spirits were removed from the bonded warehouse, it is insisted by his counsel, in every possible form of argument, that his title is perfect and that the spirits are not liable to forfeiture, but the decisive answer to all that is the one already given, that the forfeiture relates back to the unlawful or wrongful acts of the antecedent owner, and that he cannot by any subsequent transfer of the property defeat the title of the United States, as settled by a series of decisions which, if traced to their source, have their origin in the early history of the common law.

Rules of decision of such long standing and so necessary to protect the public revenue cannot be changed, nor can it be admitted that the charge contained in the fourth article of the information may not be sustained, even if it appears that the only removal of the spirits made by the distiller was to the bonded warehouse, as assumed in argument by the defendant.

Unquestionably a removal of distilled spirits from the place where distilled to such a depository, if made to secure the payment of the tax, is a lawful act, but it is equally clear that if it is made with intent to defraud the United States of the tax it is an unlawful act, and subjects the spirits to forfeiture.

Grant that the removal was rightful, as assumed by the circuit judge, and the conclusion which he adopted would follow, but it cannot be assumed in this case that the removal was rightful, as the charge in the fourth article of the information is that it was made with intent to defraud the United States of the tax, and the admission in the agreed statement is that the fourth article of the information is true, which shows as fully as it can be shown that the United States are entitled to a decree of condemnation, unless it can be established that the fraudulent intent there charged could not under any circumstances be carried into effect by such a removal as that alleged in the fourth article of the information and admitted in the agreed statement.

Suppose it be true, as assumed in argument, that the only attempt made to execute the unlawful intent charged was the removal of the spirits from the place where distilled to the bonded warehouse, still it would by no means necessarily follow, as is supposed, that the removal was a legal act, as the removal, though to a bonded warehouse, may nevertheless have been made for the express purpose to defraud the United States of the tax, and if so, then the removal was indubitably an illegal act, and the spirits are properly subject to forfeiture as charged in the information.

Cases have arisen, as the records of this court show, where the removal to the bonded warehouse was made as a part of a preconcerted arrangement with other parties to avoid the payment of the tax, and it would not be difficult to suppose other cases where the removal of the spirits from the place where distilled to the bonded warehouse would be a necessary part of a well-devised scheme to defraud the United States by delivering the spirits to purchasers without the payment of the duties.

Inspectors of spirits are required to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and all distilled spirits, before being removed from the distillery, are required to be inspected and gauged by a general inspector, whose duty it is to mark the vessels or packages in the manner required by law, and penalties are prescribed and imposed in case the spirits are removed from the place where distilled without a compliance with those requirements.

Persons distilling spirits, and the owners of stills used for the purpose of distilling spirits, are required to keep books and to make certain entries therein, and to render certain accounts to assessors, and if they do not comply with those requirements they also are subject to certain penalties for the neglect.

Bonded warehouses are established for the storage of spirits to be placed therein to secure the payment of the duties imposed by law, and the provision is that if any person shall ship, transport, or remove any spirits under any other than the proper mark or brand, known to the trade as designating the kind and quality of the contents of the casks or packages containing the same, or cause the same to be done, he shall forfeit the same, and shall, on conviction thereof, be subject to and pay a fine of five hundred dollars.

Cautious merchants, in consequence of those regulations, and many others equally stringent, are often disinclined to purchase spirits at the place where distilled lest they should be subject to forfeiture, if equally favorable terms are offered by other parties who have made deposits in the bonded warehouses. Distillers, therefore, intending to evade the payment of the duties may find it a most effectual way to accomplish their unlawful designs, in case they can, by bribery or otherwise, secure the co-operation of the inspector, storekeeper, or collector, to remove the spirits to a bonded warehouse, as spirits placed in that depository are less subject to suspicion and sell more readily than before they were removed from the place where distilled.

Spirits placed in such a depository sell more readily than before they were removed, because they are regarded as less likely to be subject to forfeiture than while they remained in the distillery, but it is clear that the theory that an intent to defraud the United States cannot be predicated of a removal of spirits from the place where distilled to a bonded warehouse is an erroneous theory, as it is manifest that the dishonest distiller, if he can obtain the assistance of the inspector, storekeeper, or collector, as a partner or agent, will find such a removal an essential step in almost every scheme which he may devise to accomplish his wicked designs.

Viewed in any light, therefore, the court is of the opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous.

Questions are also presented in the record under the fifth and sixth articles of the information, but the court having come to the conclusion that the United States are entitled to judgment upon the fourth article of the information, do not deem it necessary to express any opinion as to the other questions.

JUDGMENT REVERSED and the cause remanded with instructions to render.

JUDGMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES.

Mr. Justice FIELD, with whom concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice MILLER, dissenting.