Hartranft v. Meyer (149 U.S. 544)/Opinion of the Court

This was an action brought by the firm of Meyer & Dickinson in the court of common pleas of Philadelphia against the collector of customs for that district to recover duties which they allege to have been illegally assessed against certain articles imported by them. The action was certified to and tried in the circuit court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The collector sued out a writ of error, which is now prosecuted in this court by his executrix.

The issues that were tried in the court below arose under the tariff act of March 3, 1883, (22 Stat. 510, 512.) The imported articles consisted of 'chinas' and 'marcelines;' the latter being made wholly of silk, and the former of silk and cotton, silk being the component material of chief value.

The position of the government was that such articles were dutiable under Schedule L of the act, at the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem, while the plaintiffs contended that they came under Schedule N, and were chargeable with duty at the rate of 20 per centum ad valorem.

The court below regarded the case as falling within the doctrine of Hartranft v. Langfeld, 125 U.S. 125, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732, and of Robertson v. Edelhoff, 132 U.S. 614, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, and accordingly referred it to the jury to find, under the evidence, whether the goods in question were trimmings, and what was their chief use.

A large number of witnesses was called on both sides. There was no dispute as to the composition of the goods, but there was conflicting evidence as to the extent of their use as hat trimmings. The testimony on behalf of the government tended to show that such goods were largely, and, according to some of the witnesses, chiefly, used for purposes other than for hat and bonnet trimmings. The plaintiffs' witnesses testified that, while they were used to a limited extent for other purposes, their chief use was for trimming and lining hats and bonnets. A verdict was found and judgemtn entered in favor of the plaintiffs.

If this case is not distinguishable in its facts from the cases above referred to, then a like conclusion must be reached as that announced in the case of Cadwalader v. Wanamaker, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 979, (just decided,) and for the same reasons, which we need not here repeat.

An attempt is made to distinguish the facts of the cases in the particular that whereas, in the other cases, the imported goods were ribbons, and thus articles naturally fitted for hat and bonnet trimmings, in this case they are piece goods, bought and sold under the commercial designation of 'chinas' and 'marcelines,' and chiefly used for lining hats and bonnets.

But an examination of the record shows that the judge of the trial court did not overlook the distinction supposed to be involved in the character of the imported articles. He stated to the jury that 'undoubtedly the word 'trimmings,' as used in the clause relating to 'hats, and so forth, material for,' includes ornamental appendages. But does it include nothing more? This you will determine upon a consideration of the whole evidence, and having regard also to the terms of the particular claim of the tariff act with which we are now dealing. The language of that clause as it relates to 'trimmings' is: 'Hats, and so forth, materials for, * *  * trimmings, *  *  * used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods.' The use is not confined to ornamentation, but by the express words of the clause is for 'making' as well as ornamenting. * *  * But, aside from the matter of ornamentation, you are to consider whether the lining of a hat, bonnet, or hood is not part of the construction or 'making' of the article, within the meaning of the clause of the tariff act.'

And again: 'The evidence tends to show that chinas and marcelines are particularly adapted and intended to be used, and in fact are and long have been used, as inside appendages for hats, bonnets, and hoods, to trim and finish them, and that their substantial commercial value consists in that use. Are they or are they not trimmings, according to the natural meaning of that word? This you will determine, taking into consideration all the evidence on the subject, and having regard to the preponderating weight of the evidence. If you should find from the evidence that the articles here in question, chinas and marcelines, were not trimmings, that, of course, would make an end of the plaintiffs' case; but if you should find them to be trimmings, then the only remaining inquiry will be as to what their chief use is.' We are unable to see anything objectionable in these instructions, and the charge must be deemed a sound exposition of the law, if the previous decisions of this court, whose rulings the learned judge had in view, are to stand.

Conceding there is force in the views so ably urged in behalf of the government, for the reasons given in the case of Cadwalader v. Wanamaker we adhere to the conclusions reached in the cited cases, and the judgment of the court below is accordingly affirmed.