Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

It is contended for the plaintiff that the bill of lading does not purport to limit the liability of the defendant to the amounts stated in it, in the event of loss through the negligence of the defendant. But we are of opinion that the contract is not susceptible of that construction. The defendant receives the property for transportation on the terms and conditions expressed, which the plaintiff accepts 'as just and reasonable.' The first paragraph of the contract is that the plaintiff is to pay the rate of freight expressed, 'on the condition that the carrier assumes a liability on the stock to the extent of the following agreed valuation: If horses or mules, not exceeding two hundred dollars each; * *  * if a chartered car, on the stock and contents in same, twelve hundred dollars for the car-load.' Then follow, in the first paragraph, these words: 'But no carrier shall be liable for the acts of the animals themselves, or to each other, such as biting, kicking, goring, or smothering, nor for loss or damage arising from condition of the animals themselves, which risks, being beyond the control of the company, are hereby assumed by the owner, and the carrier released therefrom.' This statement of the fact that the risks from the acts and condition of the horses are risks beyond the control of the defendant, and are therefore assumed by the plaintiff, shows, if more were needed than the other language of the contract, that the risks and liability assumed by the defendant in the remainder of the same paragraph are those not beyond but within the control of the defendant, and therefore apply to loss through the negligence of the defendant. It must be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading, and without any evidence on the subject, and especially in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that, as the rate of freight expressed is stated to be on the condition that the defendant assumes a liability to the extent of the agreed valuation named, the rate of freight is graduated by the valuation. Especially is this so, as the bill of lading is what its heading states it to be, 'a limited liability live-stock contract,' and is confined to live-stock. Although the horses, being race-horses, may, aside from the bill of lading, have been of greater real value than that specified in it, whatever passed between the parties before the bill of lading was signed, was merged in the valuation it fixed; and it is not asserted that the plaintiff named any value, greater or less, otherwise than as he assented to the value named in the bill of lading, by signing it. The presumption is conclusive that if the liability had been assumed on a valuation as great as that now alleged, a higher rate of freight would have been charged. The rate of freight is indissolubly bound up with the valuation. If the rate of freight named was the only one offered by the defendant, it was because it was a rate measured by the valuation expressed. If the valuation was fixed at that expressed, when the real value was larger, it was because the rate of freight named was measured by the low valuation. The plaintiff cannot claim a higher valuation on the agreed rate of freight.

It is further contended by the plaintiff that the defendant was forbidden, by public policy, to fix a limit for its liability for a loss by negligence, at an amount less than the actual loss by such negligence. As a minor proposition, a distinction is sought to be drawn between a case where a shipper, on requirement, states the value of the property, and a rate of freight is fixed accordingly, and the present case. It is said that, while in the former case the shipper may be confined to the value he so fixed, in the event of a loss by negligence, the same rule does not apply to a case where the valuation inserted in the contract is not a valuation previously named by the shipper. But we see no sound reason for this distinction. The valuation named was the 'agreed valuation,' the one on which the minds of the parties met, however it came to be fixed, and the rate of freight was based on that valuation, and was fixed on condition that such was the valuation, and that the liability should go to that extent and no further. We are, therefore, brought back to the main question. It is the law of this court that a common carrier may, by special contract, limit his common-law liability; but that he cannot stipulate for exemption from the consequences of his own negligence or that of his servants. ''New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank'', 6 How. 344; York Co. v. Central R. R. 3 Wall. 107; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co. 93 U.S. 174; Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U.S. 655.

In York Co. v. Central R. R. 3 Wall. 107, a contract was upheld exempting a carrier from liability for loss by fire, the fire not having occurred through any want of due care on his part. The court said that a common carrier may 'prescribe regulations to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the risks he may have to encounter.' In Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, the following propositions were laid down by this court: (1) A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law. (2) It is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants. (3) These rules apply both to carriers of goods and to carriers of passengers for hire, and with special force to the latter. The basis of the decision was that the exemption was to have applied to it the test of its justness and reasonable character. It was said that the contracts of the carrier 'must rest upon their fairness and reasonableness,' and that it was just and reasonable that carriers should not be responsible for losses happening by sheer accident, or chargeable for valuable articles liable to be damaged, unless apprised of their character or value. That case was one of a drover traveling on a stock train on a railroad to look after his cattle, and having a free pass for that purpose, who had signed an agreement taking all risk of injury to his cattle and of personal injury to himself, and who was injured by the negligence of the railroad company or its servants. In Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, this court held that an agreement made by an express company, a common carrier in the habit of carrying small packages, that it should not be held liable for any loss or damage to a package delivered to it, unless claim should be made therefor within 90 days from its delivery to the company, was an agreement which the company could rightfully make. The court said: 'It is now the settled law that the responsibility of a common carrier may be limited by an express agreement made with his employer at the time of his accepting goods for transportation, provided the limitation be such as the law can recognize as reasonable, and not inconsistent with sound public policy.' It was held that the stipulation as to the time of making a claim was reasonable and intrinsically just, and could not be regarded as a stipulation for exemption from responsibility for negligence, because it did not relieve that carrier from any obligation to exercise diligence, fidelity, and care.

On the other hand, in Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co. 93 U.S. 174, it was held that a stipulation by an express company that it should not be liable for loss by fire could not be reasonably construed as exempting it from liability from loss by fire occurring through the negligence of a railroad company which it had employed as a carrier. To the views announced in these cases we adhere; but there is not in them any adjudication on the particular question now before us. It may, however, be disposed of on principles which are well established, and which do not conflict with any of the rulings of this court. As a general rule, and in the absence of fraud or imposition, a common carrier is answerable for the loss of a package of goods, though he is ignorant of its contents, and though its contents are ever so valuable, if he does not make a special acceptance. This is reasonable, because he can always guard himself by a special acceptance, or by insisting on being informed of the nature and value of the articles before receiving them. If the shipper is guilty of fraud or imposition, by misrepresenting the nature or value of the articles, he destroys his claim to indemnity, because he has attempted to deprive the carrier of the right to be compensated in proportion to the value of the articles and the consequent risk assumed, and what he has done has tended to lessen the vigilance the carrier would otherwise have bestowed. 2 Kent, Comm. 603, and cases cited; Relf v. Rapp, 3 Watts & S. 21; Dunlap v. Steam-boat Co. 98 Mass. 371; Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24. This qualification of the liability of the carrier is reasonable, and is as important as the rule which it qualifies. There is no justice in allowing the shipper to be paid a large value for an article which he has induced the carrier to take at a low rate of freight on the assertion and agreement that its value is a less sum than that claimed after a loss. It is just to hold the shipper to his agreement, fairly made, as to value, even where the loss or injury has occurred through the negligence of the carrier. The effect of the agreement is to cheapen the freight and secure the carriage, if there is no loss; and the effect of disregarding the agreement, after a loss, is to expose the carrier to a greater risk than the parties intended he should assume. The agreement as to value, in this case, stands as if the carrier had asked the value of the horses, and had been told by the plaintiff the sum inserted in the contract.

The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond in that value for negligence. The compensation for carriage is based on that value. The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater. The articles have no greater value for the purposes of the contract of transportation between the parties to that contract. The carrier must respond for negligence up to that value. It is just and reasonable that such a contract, fairly entered into, and where there is no deceit practiced on the shipper, should be upheld. There is no violation of public policy. On the contrary, it would be unjust and unreasonable, and would be repugnant to the soundest principles of fair dealing and of the freedom of contracting, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a shipper should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss, and to repudiate it in case of loss. This principle is not a new one. In Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298, the sum of £100 was hidden in some hay in an old nail-bag and sent by a coach and lost. The plaintiff knew of a notice by the proprietor that he would not be answerable for money unless he knew what it was, but did not apprise the proprietor that there was money in the bag. The defense was upheld, Lord MANSFIELD saying: 'A common carrier, in respect of the premium he is to receive, runs the risk of the goods and must make good the loss, though it happen without any fault in him, the reward making him answerable for their safe delivery. His warranty and insurance is in respect of the reward he is to receive, and the reward ought to be proportionable to the risk. If he makes a greater warranty and insurance he will take greater care, use more caution, and be at the expense of more guards or other methods of security, and therefore he ought, in reason and justice, to have a greater reward.' To the same effect is Batson v. Donovan, 4 Barn. & Ald. 21.

The subject-matter of a contract may be valued, or the damages in case of a breach may be liquidated, in advance. In the present case, the plaintiff accepted the valuation as 'just and reasonable.' The bill of lading did not contain a valuation of all animals at a fixed sum for each, but a graduated valuation according to the nature of the animal. It does not appear that an unreasonable price would have been charged for a higher valuation. The decisions in this country are at variance. The rule which we regard as the proper one in the case at bar is supported in Newburger v. Howard, 6 Phila 174; Squire v. ''New York Cent. R. Co.'' 98 Mass. 239; Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatchf. 64; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166; Oppenheimer v. U.S. Exp. Co. 69 Ill. 62; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168, and 62 N. Y. 35, and 70 N. Y. 410; Earnest v. Express Co. 1 Woods, 573; Elkins v. Empire Transportation Co. 81 * Pa. St. 315; ''South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Henlein'', 52 Ala. 606; Same v. Same, 56 Ala. 368; Muser v. Holland, 17 Blatchf. 412; Harvey v. Terre Haute R. Co. 74 Mo. 538; and Graves v. ''Lake Shore Ry. Co.'' 137 Mass. 33. The contrary rule is sustained in Southern Exp. Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822; The City of Norwich, 4 Ben. 271; U.S. Exp. Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144; Black v. ''Goodrich Transp. Co.'' 55 Wis. 319; S.C.. 13 N. W. Rep. 244; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017; Kansas City R. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645; S.C.. 2 Pac. Rep. 821; and Moulton v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. 31 Minn. 85; S.C.. 16 N. W. Rep. 497. We have given consideration to the views taken in these latter cases, but are unable to concur in their conclusions. Applying to the case in hand the proper test to be applied to every limitation of the common-law liability of a carrier-its just and reasonable character-we have reached the result indicated. In Great Britain, a statute directs this test to be applied by the courts. The same rule is the proper one to be applied in this country, in the absence of any statute.

As relating to the question of the exemption of a carrier from liability beyond a declared value, reference may be made to section 4281 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, (a re-enactment of section 69 of the act of February 28, 1871, c. 100, 16 St. 458,) which provides that if any shipper of certain enumerated articles, which are generally articles of large value in small bulk, 'shall lade the same, as freight or baggage, on any vessel, without, at the time of such lading, giving to the master, clerk, agent, or owner of such vessel receiving the same a written notice of the true character and value thereof, and having the same entered on the bill of lading therefor, the master and owner of such vessel shall not be liable as carriers thereof in any form or manner, nor shall any such master or owner be liable for any such goods beyond the value and according to the character thereof so notified and entered.' The principle of this statute is in harmony with the decision at which we have arrived.

The plaintiff did not, in the course of the trial, or by any request to instruct the jury, or by any exception to the charge, raise the point that he did not fully understand the terms of the bill of lading, or that he was induced to sign it by any fraud or under any misapprehension. On the contrary, he offered and read in evidence the bill of lading as evidence of the contract on which he sued. The distinct ground of our decision in the case at bar is that, where a contract of the kind, signed by the shipper, is fairly made, agreeing on a valuation of the property carried, with the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting himself against extravagant and fanciful valuations. Squire v. ''New York Cent. R. Co.'' 98 Mass. 239, 245, and cases there cited.

There was no error in excluding the evidence offered, or in the charge to the jury, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.