Harper's/The Arbitration Treaty in Danger

1890 the Senate of the United States and the House of Representatives adopted the following concurrent resolution: &ldquo;That the President be and is hereby requested to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any government with which the United States has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means.&rdquo; In July, 1893, the British House of Commons declared, after reciting the above resolve of our Congress, &ldquo;that this House, cordially sympathizing with the purpose in view, expresses the hope that her Majesty's government will lend their ready co-operation to the government of the United States, upon the basis of the foregoing resolution.&rdquo; Thus the Congress of the United States initiated the movement in favor of arbitration, diplomatic agencies failing, as a settled policy for the adjustment of any international dispute, and the British House of Commons heartily responded. Accordingly the President of the United States and the British government took the matter in hand, and after long negotiation treaty which now requires only the consent of the Senate of the United States to go into effect. The organs of public opinion, not only in the United States and in England, but throughout the civilized world, with an almost unanimous voice congratulate the two countries concerned and all mankind upon the auspicious achievement, as an event marking a grand onward stride in the progress of civilization. And now reports are coming from Washington that the Senate of the United States hesitates to approve this treaty, and that there is grave danger of its total defeat. This is startling news.

Those who attempt to defeat or even to delay the ratification of a treaty of such transcendent significance assume as responsibility so momentous that they must be supposed to have the most convincing and insuperable reasons for their course. So far such reasons have been expressed only in conversations more or less private which have been made public; but although in a still indefinite shape, they may be taken as foreshadowing what is to come. The objections to the treaty, in whatever way they turn up, are of high interest to the world. What are they?

&ldquo;The treaty goes to far,&rdquo; says one critic. &ldquo;It interferes with the doctrine.&rdquo;  No one who has ever read the treaty will seriously pretend this. The doctrine, even in its broadest modern acceptation, concerns only the policy of this republic with regard to the relations between any part of America and any foreign power. Is there anything in the arbitration treaty to prevent this republic from making, if it choose to do so, an alliance with any independent American state to protect it against foreign encroachment, or even, if it deem extreme measures indispensable, from going to war for such a purpose? Let the objectors answer. While under this treaty the adjustment of pecuniary claims may become subject to the verdict of an umpire to be agreed upon by the two parties, or, if they fail to agree, to be designated by the King of Sweden, controversies touching territorial claims shall go before a tribunal composed of three American jurists to be named by the President, and three English jurists to be named by the Queen, whose award by a majority of not less than five to one shall be final. A two-thirds majority of the American judges would therefore be required for a decision against the United States. An award of a less majority shall be final only if neither party protest against it within three months. If such a protest be made, the award shall be invalid. But in this case there shall be no recourse to hostile measures until the mediation of one or more friendly powers has been invited by one or both of the high contracting parties. But as such mediation does not involve any decision, and as

the action of either party is as free after the mediation as it was before, what is there in this article &mdash; the only one which may possibly affect questions touched upon by the doctrine &mdash; to give umbrage to the extremest and most nervous champion of the doctrine? What else is it that a rule that, however exciting the dispute, we shall take time to consider before we strike &mdash; hoping that, if we do take time to consider, both parties may find it wisest not to strike at all? If there is any fault to be found with this provision, it may be not because it restrains too much, but because it restrains to little.

&ldquo;The treaty does not go far enough,&rdquo; says another critic. &ldquo;Its provisions are insufficient to secure the adjustment of the most serious disputes.&rdquo; Granted, for argument's sake. But are there not many differences not belonging to the most serious kind, and these the most frequently occurring, for the peaceable settlement of which the treaty does provide sufficiently? And as to disputes of the most serious kind, will not the treaty, as it stands, at least secure their calm and judicial consideration and discussion before hostile measures are resorted to? Will it not in all cases serve to substitute the sober second thought for the hot unreasoning impulse of the moment? Will it not disarm the reckless demagogue who may seek to inflame the popular mind for the purpose of hurling the country headlong into war? Will it not make war virtually impossible unless one party or the other, after elaborate deliberation, in cold blood, resolves to have war &mdash; that is to say, until all imaginable resources of conciliation and peaceable adjustment are exhausted? Will it not thus present to the popular mind war as so remote a possibility that those &ldquo;war scares&rdquo; which are apt to be so disturbing and disastrous will be effectually prevented? Will it not, therefore, all its assumed imperfections notwithstanding, be a strong bulwark of peace and a great blessing to both nations and to the world at large? Besides, should the provisions of this treaty really prove insufficient in practice, it would not be difficult, so long as the spirit of conciliation prevails, to procure the necessary amendments.

&ldquo;But the treaty will benefit England,&rdquo; says a third critic. So it will. But will it not, by saving it from war and rumors of war, also benefit this republic? And would it not be foolish to reject the treaty, and with it the benefit to the United States, because it promises to benefit both parties alike?

It is also reported that there are Senators who intend to reject the treaty because they hate President and the Secretary of State, Mr., and do not wish them to enjoy the honor of coupling their names with one of the great achievements of the age. This is incredible; for even the intensest hatred could hardly blind them to the fact that by defeating the treaty to satisfy a personal grudge they would, instead of stripping the signers of this treaty of their laurels, only expose to the fullest public appreciation the glaring contrast between their own smallness and the stature of statesmen who are exalting the glory of their country by ministering to the progress of civilization and to the peace and well-being of mankind.

It is also reported that there are Republican Senators who seek to delay the ratification of the treaty merely in order that after the inauguration of the new President their party may have the credit of it. This is hardly less incredible; for they cannot but know that this credit is already awarded by public opinion, that only those who further the consummation of the great work will have a share in that credit, but that those who seek to steal it by delaying that consummation will only discredit themselves by their foolish attempt. If there really were such a scheme on foot, Mr. would win high honor for himself by promptly using his authority to stop it.

The Senate should not forget that the enlightened opinion of mankind has already pronounced its judgment upon the treaty, and that this judgment will hardly be changed by any opposition which does not appear to be inspired by the highest public spirit and is not supported by the most conclusive arguments. It is not exaggeration to say that the eyes of the whole world are on the Senate of the United States at this moment. With the treaty, the Senate is also on trial. Certainly, Senators should not stifle their honest convictions. But unless the Senate can irrefutably prove that, contrary to the universal belief, this treaty will make for wrong instead of justice, for international discord and broil instead of peace, it would, by rejecting or even unnecessarily delaying the ratification of this treaty, present to the world a pitiable display of American statesmanship and American civilization.