Harkness v. Underhill/Opinion of the Court

In the winter or spring of 1832, Isaac Waters and Stephen Stillman agreed to cultivate and improve the east half of the southeast quarter of section four, a portion of which is in controversy in this suit. This arrangement was made in view of the probability that Congress would, at its then session, pass a pre-emption law. It was further stipulated that Waters should make the necessary proof to obtain the pre-emption. As was anticipated, the act of April 5, 1832, was passed, allowing 'to actual settlers, being housekeepers,' a pre-emption to enter a half-quarter section to include his improvement. Waters went on the land, made a slight improvement for the purpose of cultivation, erected a temporary hut, or rather a pen, put some furniture in it, and he, with a part of his family, went into the hut, staid there a couple of days, and then returned to his residence in the village of Peoria, where he resided, and continued to reside. He was a substantial resident of the village, having a house, home, and family there. The half-quarter section adjoined the village property. Waters made an affidavit in September, 1832, that he was an actual settler and housekeeper on the land. He does not say at what time, but he applied to enter under the provisions of the act of April 5, 1832. He also procured the affidavit of one Trail, who swore that Waters was an actual settler and housekeeper on the half-quarter section.

In July, 1833, Waters, in a written agreement with Stillman and Wm. A. Stewart, recited the terms on which he and Stillman agreed to improve the land, to wit: that the entry was to be made for their joint benefit on the proofs furnished by Waters. Stewart, at the date of the agreement, stipulated to pay Stillman's moiety of the purchase-money, and Waters was bound to convey to Stewart and Stillman one-half of the eighty acres; and it appears by a covenant, dated July 2, 1835, executed by Waters to Pettingal and Wolcott, that Waters's portion was the western forty acres, which he bound himself to convey to Pettingal and Wolcott, they being purchasers from Waters. Waters soon thereafter died, leaving a widow and children, and they entered the half-quarter section, in the name of Waters, at the land office at Quincy, August 7, 1835. The entry stood in this condition till May, 1838, when the Commissioner of the General Land Office informed the register and receiver at Quincy that, Stephen Stillman's heirs having applied to them to enter the half-quarter section, containing eighty acres, and having adduced evidence to the Commissioner tending to prove that Waters went on the land into a log-pen, without a roof, and staid there only one night; furthermore, that the affidavits of Waters and Trail being evasive, and not stating that Waters was an actual settler on the 5th of April, 1832, the register and receiver were, therefore, instructed, that if they believed the facts, as respects the frauds practised to obtain the entry in Waters's name, to treat it as void, for fraud, and allow Stillman's heirs to enter the land; and this was accordingly done. The entry in Stillman's name was made under the occupant law of 1834.

We concur with the Commissioner's directions, and the finding of the register and receiver, that the proceeding of Waters was a fraudulent contrivance to secure the valuable privilege of a preference of entry. It was an attempt to speculate on his part, and also on the part of Stillman, his co-partner, by fraud and falsehood. They both knew equally well that Waters was no actual settler on the public lands at any time, and that the affidavits of Waters and Trail were false.

The principal ground on which the bill is founded assumes that the complainant, as assignee of Waters's heirs, is entitled to a decree against the respondent, because his title was derived through Stillman, and that Stillman came into possession under Waters, and therefore Stillman's assignee cannot dispute the title of him under whom he held possession, according to the doctrine maintained by this court in the case of Thredgill vs. Pintard, (12 How., 24.)

In Thredgill's case the transaction was fair, and obviously honest. The consideration between the parties was full and undoubted; their contracts bound them. But in this case, there was no legal contract between Stillman and Waters. They combined to defraud the Government; their agreement was contrary to public policy, because it was intended by contrivance to take the land out of the market at public sale-a cherished policy of the Government. Such an agreement can have no standing in a court of justice.

But there is another defence equally conclusive. The bill seeks the legal title from Underhill; he holds under a patent, dated in 1838; he purchased in 1841, and has been in uninterrupted possession ever since. This suit was brought in 1854. In the meantime, the land sued for has been partly laid off into lots, and become city property; yet, Waters's claim lay dormant after his entry was set aside at the General Land Office for eighteen years, and fourteen years after the patent in Stillman's name was issued, and the land conveyed to Underhill by Wren. Underhill, and those holding under him, have held possession from 1841 to the time when this suit was brought; and, in the meantime, the land had greatly increased in value, and changed in its circumstances. These facts present a case on which a court of equity cannot decree for the complainant, if there was no other defence.

The question is again raised, whether this entry, having been allowed by the register and receiver, could be set aside by the Commissioner. All the officers administering the public lands were bound by the regulations published May 6, 1836. 2 L. L. & O., 92. These regulations prescribed the mode of proceeding to vacate a fraudulent occupant entry, and were pursued in the case before the court.

This question has several times been raised and decided in this court, upholding the Commissioner's powers. Garland vs. Winn, (20 How., 8;) Lytle vs. The State of Arkansas, (22 How.)

For the reasons above stated, it is ordered that the decree of the Circuit Court be affirmed.