Hannah v. Larche Hannah/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concu s, dissenting.

With great deference to my Brethren I dissent from a reversal of these judgments.

The cause which the majority opinion serves is, on the surface, one which a person dedicated to constitutional principles could not question. At the bottom of this controversy is the right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. That Amendment withholds power from either the States or the United States to deny or abridge the right to vote 'on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.' This right stands beyond the reach of government. Only voting qualifications that conform to the standards proscribed by the Fifteenth Amendment may be prescribed. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072. As stated in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468, 73 S.Ct. 809, 813, 97 L.Ed. 1152, 'The Amendment, the congressional enactment and the cases make explicit the rule against racial discrimination in the conduct of elections.' By democratic values this right is fundamental, for the very existence of government dedicated to the concept 'of the people, by the people, for the people,' to use Lincoln's words, depends on the franchise.

Yet important as these civil rights are, it will not do to sacrifice other civil rights in order to protect them. We live and work under a Constitution. The temptation of many men of goodwill is to cut corners, take short cuts, and reach the desired end regardless of the means. Worthy as I think the ends are which the Civil Rights Commission advances in these cases, I think the particular means used are unconstitutional.

The Commission, created by Congress, is a part of 'the executive branch' of the Government, 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975(a), whose members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. § 1975(a). It is given broad powers of investigation with the view of making a report with 'findings and recommendations' to the Congress. § 1975c. It is empowered, among other things, to

'investigate allegations in writing under oath or affirmation     that certain citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right to vote and have that vote      counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national      origin; which writing, under oath or affirmation, shall set      forth the facts upon which such belief or beliefs are based.'      § 1975c(a)(1).

Complaints have been filed with the Commission charging respondents, who are registrars of voters in Louisiana, with depriving persons of their voting rights by reason of their color. If these charges are true and if the registrars acted willfully (see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495), the registrars are criminally responsible under a federal statute which subjects to fine and imprisonment anyone who willfully deprives a citizen of any right under the Constitution 'by reason of his color, or race.' 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C.A. § 242.

The investigation and hearing by the Commission are therefore necessarily aimed at determining if this criminal law has been violated. The serious and incriminating nature of the charge and the disclosure of facts concerning it are recognized by the Congress, for the Act requires certain protective procedures to be adopted where defamatory, degrading, or incriminating evidence may be adduced.

'If the Commission etermines that evidence or testimony at      any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any      person, it shall (1) receive such evidence or testimony in      executive session; (2) afford such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a      witness; and (3) receive and dispose of requests from such      person to subpena additional witnesses.' 42 U.S.C. §      1975a(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975a(e).

Yet these safeguards, given as a matter of grace, do not in my judgment dispose of the constitutional difficulty. First, it is the Commission's judgment, not the suspect's, that determines whether the hearing shall be secret or public. Thus this procedure has one of the evils protested against in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337, 348-353, 77 S.Ct. 510, 515, 521-524, 1 L.Ed.2d 376 (dissenting opinion). The secrecy of the inquisition only underlines its inherent vices: 'Secret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men everywhere. They are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official power. They are often the beginning of tyranny as well as indispensable instruments for its survival. Modern as well as ancient history bears witness that both innocent and guilty have been seized by officers of the state and whisked away for secret interrogation or worse until the groundwork has been securely laid for their inevitable conviction.' Id., 352 U.S. at pages 352-353, 77 S.Ct. at page 523. As said in dissent in Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 299, 79 S.Ct. 1157, 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1234, 'secretly compelled testimony does not lose its highly dangerous potentialities merely because' it is taken in preliminary proceedings. Second, the procedure seems to me patently unconstitutional whether the hearing is public or secret. Under the Commission's rules the accused is deprived of the right to notice of the charges against him and the opportunity of cross-examination. This statutory provision, fashioned to protect witnesses as such rather than a prospective defendant, permits the Commission to exclude the accused entirely from the hearing and deny him the opportunity even to observe the testimony of his accusers. And even if the Commission were inclined in a particular case to protect the accused from the opprobrium likely to flow from the testimony of individual witnesses against him by holding secret sessions, this would be little comfort after the Commission's findings, based on such untested evidence, were publicized across the Nation.

I assume that no court would be justified in enjoining a Congressional Committee composed of Senators or Congressmen that engaged in this kind of conduct. This is not that kind of a committee. Moreover, even if it were and if private rights were infringed by reason of the Committee's violations of the Constitution, there are circumstances when redress can be had in the courts. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377. Cf. Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N.E. 103, 9 A.L.R. 1334; Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 530, 73 A.2d 433. The judiciary also becomes implicated when the Congress asks the courts to back up what its Committees have done; or when a victim of an investigation asks relief from punishment imposed on him. Then the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights come into full play. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273.

The Civil Rights Commission, however, is not a Congressional Committee of Senators or Congressmen; nor is it an arm of Congress. It is an arm of the Executive. There is, in my view, only one way the Chief Executive may move against a person accused of a crime and deny him the right of confrontation and cross-examination and that is by the grand jury.

The grand jury is the accusatory body in federal law as provided by the Fifth Amendment. The essence of the institution of the grand jury was stated by 1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law of England, 252: 'The body of the country are the accusers.' Thomas Erskine stated the matter ac urately and eloquently in Jones v. Shipley 21 How.St.Tr. 847, 977.

'(I)t is unnecessary to remind your lordships, that, in a     civil case, the party who conceives himself aggrieved, states his complaint to the court,-avails himself      at his own pleasure of its process,-compels an answer from      the defendant by its authority,-or taking the charge pro      confesso against him on his default, is entitled to final      judgment and execution for his debt, without any      interposition of a jury. But in criminal cases it is     otherwise; the court has no cognizance of them, without leave      from the people forming a grand inquest. If a man were to     commit a capital offense in the face of all the judges of      England, their united authority could not put him upon his      trial:-they could file no complaint against him, even upon      the records of the supreme criminal court, but could only      commit him for safe custody, which is equally competent to      every common justice of the peace:-the grand jury alone could      arraign him, and in their discretion might likewise finally      discharge him, by throwing out the bill, with the names of      all your lordships as witnesses on the back of it. If it     shall be said, that this exclusive power of the grand jury      does not extend to lesser misdemeanors, which may be      prosecuted by information; I answer, that for that very      reason it becomes doubly necessary to preserve the power of      the other jury which is left.'

This idea, though uttered in 1783, is modern and relevant here. The grand jury brings suspects before neighbors, not strangers. Just recently in Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, we said, 'The very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.'

This Commission has no such guarantee of fairness. Its members are not drawn from the neighborhood. The members cannot be as independent as grand juries because they meet not for one occasion only; they do a continuing job for the executive and, if history is a guide, tend to acquire a vested interest in that role.

The grand jury, adopted as a safeguard against 'hasty, malicious, and oppressive' action by the Federal Government, Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12, 7 S.Ct. 781, 787, 30 L.Ed. 849, stands as an important safeguard to the citizen against open and public accusations of crime. Today the grand jury may act on its own volition, though originally specific charges by private prosecutors were the basis of its action. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59-60, 26 S.Ct. 370, 372-373, 50 L.Ed. 652. It has broad investigational powers to look into what may be offensive against federal criminal law. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 510, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 1237, 87 L.Ed. 1546. An indictment returned by a grand jury may not be challenged because it rests wholly on hearsay. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 407-408, 100 L.Ed. 397. An accused is not entitled to a hearing before a grand jury, nor to present evidence, nor to be represented by counsel; and a grand jury may act secretly-a procedure normally abhorrent to due process. In this country as in England of old, the grand jury is convened as a body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged in indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor. Costello v. United States, supra, 350 U.S. at page 362, 76 S.Ct. at page 408.

Grand juries have their defects. They do not always return a true bill, for while the prejudices of the community may radiate through them, they also have the saving quality of being familiar with the people involved. They are the only accusatory body in the Federal Government that is recognized by the Constitution. I would allow no other engine of government, either executive or legislative, to take their place-at least when the right of confrontation and cross-examinat on are denied the accused as is done in these cases.

The might and power of the Federal Government have no equal. When its guns are leveled at a citizen on charges that he committed a federal crime, it is for me no answer to say that the only purpose is to report his activities to the President and Congress, not to turn him over to the District Attorney for prosecution. Our Constitution was drawn on the theory that there are certain things government may not do to the citizen and that there are other things that may be done only in a specific manner. The relationship of the Federal Government to a man charged with crime is carefully defined. Its power may be marshalled against him, but only in a defined way. When we allow this substitute method, we make an innovation that does not comport with that due process which the Fifth Amendment requires of the Federal Government. When the Federal Government prepares to inquire into charges that a person has violated federal law, the Fifth Amendment tells us how it can proceed.

The Civil Rights Commission, it is true, returns no indictment. Yet in a real sense the hearings on charges that a registrar has committed a federal offense are a trial. Moreover, these hearings before the Commission may be televised or broadcast on the radio.3 In our day we have seen Congressional Committees probing into alleged criminal conduct of witnesses appearing on the television screen. This is in reality a trial in which the whole Nation sits as a jury. Their verdict does not send men to prison. But it often condemns men or produces evidence to convict and even saturates the Nation with prejudice against an accused so that a fair trial may be impossible. As stated in 37 A.B.A.J. 392 (1951), 'If several million television viewers see and hear a politician, a businessman or a movie actor subjected to searching interrogation, without ever having an opportunity to cross-examine his accusers or offer evidence in his own support, that man will stand convicted, or at least seriously compromised, in the public mind, whatever the later formal findings may be.' The use of this procedure puts in jeopardy our traditional concept of the way men should be tried and replaces it with 'a new concept of guilt based on inquisitorial devices.' Note, 26 Temp.L.Q. 70, 73.

Yet whether the hearing is televised or not it will have all the evils of a legislative trial. 'The legislative trial,' wrote Alan Barth in Government by Investigation (1955) p. 81, 'is a device for condemning men without the formalities of due process.' And he went on to say:

'The legislative trial serves three distinct though related     purposes: (1) it can be used to punish conduct which is not      criminal; (2) it can be used to punish supposedly criminal      conduct in the absence of evidence requisite to conviction in      a court of law; and (3) it can be used to drive or trap      persons suspected of 'disloyalty' into committing some      collateral crime such as perjury or contempt of Congress,      which can then be subjected to punishment through a judicial      proceeding. 'It is hard to get them for their criminal     activities in connection with espionage, but a way has been      found,' Senator McCarthy once remarked. 'We are getting them     for perjury and putting some of the worst of them away. For     that reason I hope every witness who comes here is put under oath      and his testimony is gone over with a fine-tooth comb, and if      we  annot convict some of them for their disloyal activities,      perhaps we can convict some of them for perjury.' That they      may have been guilty of no violation of law in the first      place seems of no concern to the Senator.' Id., at 83. And     see Telford Taylor, Grand Inquest (1955).

Barth wrote of hearings in the so-called loyalty cases. But the reasons apply to any hearing where a person's job or liberty or reputation is at stake. Barth wrote of hearings held by Congressional Committees. Yet the evil is compounded where the 'legislative trial' has become a 'Commission trial.' And while I assume that a court would not enjoin the typical Congressional Committee, it is duty bound to keep commissions within limits, when its jurisdiction is properly invoked.

The right to know the claims asserted against one and to contest them-to be heard-to conduct a cross-examination-these are all implicit in our concept of 'a full and fair hearing' before any administrative agency, as the Court in Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129, emphasized. We spoke there in the context of civil litigation where property was at stake. Here the need for all the protective devices of a fair hearing is greater. For one's job and perhaps his liberty are hinged on these hearings.

We spoke in the tradition of the Morgan case only recently in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377.

'Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our     jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action     seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of      the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to      prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the      individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While     this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is      even more important where the evidence consists of the      testimony of individuals whose momory might be faulty or who,      in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice,      vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have     formalized these protections in the requirements of      confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides     that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right      'to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' This Court      has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has     spoken out not only in criminal cases, *  *  * but also in all      types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions      were under scrutiny.' (Italics added.)

We spoke there in a context where men were being deprived of their jobs as a result of investigations into their loyalty. Certainly no less is required if hearings are to be held on charges that a person has violated a federal law.

Respondents ask no more than the right to known the charges, to be confronted with the accuser, and to cross-examine him. Absent these rights, they ask for an injunction. In the Greene case we said these rights were available 'where governmental action seriously injures an individual.' 360 U.S., at page 496, 79 S.Ct. at page 1413. Injury is plain and obvious here-injury of a nature far more serious than merely losing one's job, as was the situation in the Greene case. If the hearings are to be without the safeguards which due process requires of all trials-civil and criminal-there is only one way I know by which the Federal Government may proceed and that is by grand jury. If these trials before the Commission are to be held on charges that these respondents are criminals, the least we can do is to allow them to know what they are being tried for, and to confront their accusers and to cross-examine them.4 This protection would be extended to them in any preliminary hearing, even in one before a United States Commissioner. Confrontation and cross-examination are so basic to our concept of due process (Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 31, 351-352, 75 S.Ct. 790, 800-801, 99 L.Ed. 1129 (concurring opinion)) that no proceeding by an administrative agency is a fair one that denies these rights.

References are made to federal statutes governing numerous administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the inference is that what is done in this case can be done there. This comes as a surprise to one who for some years was engaged in those administrative investigations. No effort was ever made, so far as I am aware, to compel a person, charged with violating a federal law, to run the gantlet of a hearing over his objection. No objection based either on the ground now advanced nor on the Fifth Amendment was, so far as I know, ever overruled. Investigations were made; and they were searching. Such evidence of law violations as was obtained was turned over to the Department of Justice. But never before, I believe, has a federal executive agency attempted, over the objections of an accused, to force him through a hearing to determine whether he has violated a federal law. If it did, the action was lawless and courts should have granted relief.

What we do today is to allow under the head of due process a fragmentation of proceedings against accused people that seems to me to be foreign to our system. No indictment is returned, no commitment to jail is made, no formal criminal charges are made. Hence the procedure is condoned as violating no constitutional guarantee. Yet what is done is another short cut used more and more these days to 'try' men in ways not envisaged by the Constitution. The result is as damaging as summoning before committees men who it is known will invoke the Fifth Amendment and pillorying them for asserting their constitutional rights. This case-like the others-is a device to expose people as suspects or criminals. The concept of due process which permits the invention and use of prosecutorial devices not included in the Constitution makes due process reflect the subjective or even whimsical notions of a majority of this Court as from time to time constituted. Due process under the prevailing doctrine is what the judges say it is; and it differs from judge to judge, from court to court. This notion of due process makes it a tool of the activists who respond to their own visceral reactions in deciding what is fair, decent, or reasonable. This elastic concept of due process is described in the concurring opinion as follows:

'Whether the scheme satisfies those strivings for justice     which due process guarantees, must be judged in the light of reason drawn from the considerations of fairness      that reflect our traditions of legal and political thought,      duly related to the public interest Congress sought to meet      by this legisla ion as against the hazards or hardship to the      individual that the Commission procedure would entail.'

When we turn to the cases, personal preference, not reason, seems, however, to be controlling.

Illustrative are the First Amendment protection given to the activities of a classroom teacher by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 261-263, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1214, 1217-1218, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (concurring opinion), but denied to the leader of an organization holding discussion groups at a summer camp in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 S.Ct. 1040, 3 L.Ed.2d 1090; the decisions that due process was violated by the use of evidence obtained by the forceful use of a stomach pump in Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, but not when evidence was used which was obtained by taking the blood of an unconscious prisoner. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448.

It is said in defense of this chameleonlike due process that it is not 'an exercise of whim or will,' that it is 'founded on something much deeper and more justifiable than personal preference. As far as it lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal judgment. It must rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed.' Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, supra, 354 U.S. at page 267, 77 S.Ct. at page 1220 (concurring opinion). Yet one who tries to rationalize the cases on cold logic or reason fails. The answer turns on the personal predilections of the judge; and the louder the denial the more evident it is that emotion rather than reason dictates the answer. This is a serious price to pay for adopting a free-wheeling concept of due process, rather than confining it to the procedures and devices enumerated in the Constitution itself. As said in Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 89, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1695, 91 L.Ed. 1903 (dissenting opinion):

'In my judgment the people of no nation can lose their     liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and      its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced      and respected so as to afford continuous protection against      old, as well as new, devices and practices which might thwart      those purposes. I fear to see the consequences of the Court's     practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and      fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as      its point of departure in interpreting and enforcing that      Bill of Rights.'

That was written concerning the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it has equal vitality when applied to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment with which we are now concerned.

I think due process is described in the Constitution and limited and circumscribed by it. The Constitution is explicit as respects permissible accusatory process that the Executive can employ against the citizen. Men of goodwill, not evil ones only, invent, under feelings of urgency, new and different procedures that have an awful effect on the citizen. The new accusatory procedure survives if a transient majority of the Court are persuaded that the device is fair or decent. My view of the Constitution confines judges-as well as the lawmakers and the Executive-to the procedures expressed in the Constitution. We look to the Constitution-not to the personal predilections of the judges-to see what is permissible. Since summoning an accused by the Government to explain or justify his conduct, that is charged as a crime, may be done only in one way, I would require a constitutional amendment before it can be done in a different way.

The alternate path which we take today leads to trial of separate essential parts of criminal prosecutions by commissions, by executive agencies, by legislative committees. Farming out pieces of trials to investigative agencies is fragmentizing the kind of trial the Constitution authorizes. It prejudices the ultimate trial itself; and it puts in the hands of officials the awesome power which the Framers entrusted only to judges, grand jurors and petit jurors drawn from the community where the accused lives. It leads to government by inquisition.

The Civil Rights Commission can hold all the hearings it desires; it can adduce testimony from as many people as it likes; it can search the records and archives for such information it needs to make an informed report to Congress. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614. But when it summons a person, accused under affidavit of having violated the federal election law, to see if the charge is true, it acts in lieu either of a grand jury or of a committing magistrate. The sifting of criminal charges against people is for the grand jury or for judges or magistrates and for them alone under our Constitution. In my view no other accusatory body can be used that withholds the rights of confrontation and cross-examination from those accused of federal crimes.

I would affirm these judgments.