Gwin v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The appeal in this case is taken from the decree of May 28, 1900, sustaining the demurrer to, and dismissing the petition of, the appellants, which was filed March 29, 1900.

Our jurisdiction of this appeal depends upon certain statutes, which it becomes necessary to consider. By the original act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. at L. 631, chap. 41), to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the state of California, a commission of three persons was constituted (§ 1) to settle such claims, whose duty it was (§ 8) to decide upon their validity and to certify the same, with their reasons, to the district attorney of the United States. By § 9 an appeal was given to the district court, which was empowered to review the decision of the commissioners, and to decide upon the validity of such claim. By § 10 the district court was required, on application of the party against whom judgment was rendered, to grant an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was held in United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 16 L. ed. 186, that the jurisdiction of the board of commissioners extended, not only to the adjudication of questions relating to the genuineness and authenticity of the grant, but also to all questions relating to its location and boundaries; and that it did not terminate until the issue of a patent conformable to the decree.

The law remained in this condition until 1864, when on July 1 an act was passed (13 Stat. at L. 332, chap. 194) 'to expedite the settlement of titles to lands in the state of California,' the 2d section of which provided 'that where proceedings for the correction or confirmation of a survey are pending. . . it shall be lawful for such district court to proceed and complete its examination and determination of the matter, and its decree thereon shall be subject to appeal to the circuit court of the United States for the district, in like manner, and with like effect, as hereafter provided for appeals in other cases to the circuit court.' By § 3 it was enacted 'that where a plat and survey have already been approved or corrected by one of the district courts,. . . and an appeal from the decree of approval or correction has already been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, the said Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal. But where from such decree of approval or correction no appeal has been taken to the Supreme Court, no appeal to that court shall be allowed, but an appeal may be taken within twelve months after this act shall take effect, to the circuit court of the United States for California, and said circuit court shall proceed to fully determine the matter.'

It appears perfectly clear from § 3 that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was taken away, except as to cases where an appeal had already been taken. With this exception appeals must be taken under that act to the circuit court. The law remained in that condition until the passage of the court of appeals act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517), by the 5th section of which appeals can only be taken directly from the district court to this court in cases where the jurisdiction of the district court is in issue, in prize cases, criminal cases, constitutional cases, or cases involving the validity or construction of a treaty. As to all other cases, by § 6 appeal must be taken to the circuit court of appeals. As we said in McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, this act provides for the distribution of the entire appellate jurisdiction of our national judicial system between the Supreme Court and the circuit court of appeals. As this case does not fall within any of the classes excepted by § 5, it is clear that if any appeal will lie at all, it should have been taken to the circuit court of appeals, and that we have no jurisdiction to enforce the execution of this decree by appeal from the district court. If the decree of November 30, 1859, rendered by the district court in pursuance of the mandate of this court, were not a final decree, it became final either August 4, 1871, when the modified survey was approved, and an appeal was taken to the circuit court and the appeal dismissed by Mr. Justice Field, July 31, 1874, or upon May 28, 1900, from which the appeal was taken in this case.

It is clear that, so far as concerns appeals from final decrees, they must be taken under laws then in existence, and to the court provided by such laws. To say that a decree rendered in 1900 may be appealed to a court whose jurisdiction to review it was taken away in 1864 is beyond belief. Even if the court of appeals act do not apply to this case, the jurisdiction of this court was clearly taken away by the act of 1864, and transferred to the circuit court of the United States for California, except as to appeals which had already been taken. If there had been no reservation of pending cases, even such cases would have fallen within the law. Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 401, 25 L. ed. 231, 232. In that case a writ of error had been sued out on December 6, 1875, to reverse a judgment of $2,250 by the supreme court of the District of Columbia. At that time the appeal was properly taken to this court, but on February 25, 1879, Congress passed an act limiting writs of error from this court to judgments exceeding the value of $2,500, and it was held that the writ of error must be dismissed. Said the Chief Justice: 'The act of 1879 is undoubtedly prospective in its operation. It does not vacate or annul what has been done under the old law. It destroys no vested rights. It does not set aside any judgment already rendered by this court under the jurisdiction conferred by the Revised Statutes when in force. But a party to a suit has no vested right to an appeal or a writ of error from one court to another. Such a privilege once granted may be taken away, and if taken away, pending proceedings in the appellate court stop just where the rescinding act finds them, unless special provision is made to the contrary. The Revised Statutes gave parties the right to remove their causes to this court by writ of error and appeal, and gave us the authority to re-examine, reverse, or affirm judgments or decrees thus brought up. The repeal of that law does not vacate or annul an appeal or a writ [of error] already taken or sued out, but it takes away our right to hear and determine the cause, if the matter in dispute is less than the present jurisdictional amount. The appeal or the writ remains in full force, but we dismiss the suit because our jurisdiction is gone.'

Similar cases are by no means infrequent in this court. Thus in Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281, 3 L. ed. 101, it was held that if the law under which a sentence of forfeiture was inflicted expired or were absolutely repealed after an appeal and before sentence by the appellate court, the sentence must be reversed. See also The Rachel v. United States, 6 Cranch, 329, 3 L. ed. 239; United States v. Preston, 3 Pet. 57, 7 L. ed. 601; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 14 L. ed. 210. In ''Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Ritchie'', 5 Wall. 541, 18 L. ed. 540, it was held that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts between citizens of the same state in internal revenue cases, conferred by the act of 1864, was taken away by the act of 1866, and that cases pending at the passage of the act fell with its repeal. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L. ed. 264. These cases fully establish the proposition that a repealing statute which contains no saving clause operates as well upon pending cases as upon those thereafter commenced.

In the case under consideration there was a saving of suits already begun, but there was an express proviso that, where no appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court, no appeal to that court should be allowed. That law remained unchanged until the court of appeals act of 1891, to which all appeals from circuit or district court must now be taken, with a few specified exceptions.

The appeal must be dismissed.