Gulf Railway Company v. Moser/Opinion of the Court

Mrs. Moser, administratrix of her husband's estate, brought suit under the federal Employers' Liability Act (chapter 149, 35 Stat. 65; chapter 143, 36 Stat. 291 (45 USCA §§ 51-59; Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665)) to recover damages consequent upon his death while employed by petitioner as a brakeman. The point for consideration is whether the trial court charged the jury concerning estimation of damages according to the rule approved by this court.

The cause went to the jury upon special issues framed as questions. Answers thereto constitute the verdict. Relevant parts of special issue No. 7 follow:

'Regardless of what your answers may be to the questions     submitted in this charge, you will assess damages, and you      will arrive at the amount thereof by assessing the same at      such sum of money as if paid in cash at this time would be      sufficient to fairly compensate the surviving wife and child      for such actual pecuniary loss as you may believe from the      evidence that they had a reasonable expectation of receiving      from said John H. Moser, if any, from and after the death of      the said John H. Moser, if he had not died on the date      alleged. By pecuniary loss is meant such loss as may be     compensated for in money. In answering special issue No. 7,     you will take into consideration the contribution of money      and other pecuniary benefits, if any, which the evidence may      show that said surviving wife and child would have received      from him after the time of his death, if he had continued to      live. * *  * In assessing the damages, if any, you will      confine yourselves solely to the determination of the      pecuniary and monetary interest, if any, that the plaintiff      and her child had in the continued life of deceased. * *  *

'Bearing in mind the foregoing definitions and instructions     on the measure of damages, you will answer special issue No. seven. What amount of money, if paid now, will fairly and     reasonably compensate the surviving widow and child of the      deceased, John H. Moser, for the actual pecuniary loss which      they respectively suffered by reason of his death, if any? This question you will answer by stating the     aggregate amount of such pecuniary loss or damage, and you      will answer in the space below the amount you find from the      evidence.'

Petitioner seasonably objected to the charge as-

'generally too broad and not definite and specific enough and     the jury should be limited in their consideration of the      measure of damages, and the damages to be awarded, and should      be further and more in detail instructed as to matters they      can consider and the way their verdict should be arrived at      more fully shown and in line with defendant's requested      charges on the issue of damages.'

Also to special issue No. 7 because-

'it does not give the jury any rule or formula by which the     jury may determine the amount of money that if paid now will      fairly and reasonably compensate the surviving widow and      child for the actual pecuniary loss.'

And it requested the following special instruction:

'In considering of your verdict on the question of damages,     and under the special issues submitted to you in that      connection, and thereunder in determining 'such sum of money      as if paid in cash at this time would be sufficient to fairly      compensate the surviving wife and child,' for their pecuniary      loss, you are instructed that in determining the present      value of such contributions as plaintiff would probably have      received from the continued life of the deceased you will      make your calculations on the basis of the amount of your      award, bearing interest at the highest net rate of interest      that the testimony shows can be had on money safely invested,      and secured as shown by the testimony in this case.'

This action sufficed to raise the point now presented. Refusal to grant the request was material error.

Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kelly, Admx., 241 U.S. 485, 491, 36 S.C.t. 630, 60 L. Ed. 1117, and Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Gainey, Admr., 241 U.S. 494, 36 S.C.t. 633, 60 L. Ed. 1124, announce the applicable rule.

'In computing the damages recoverable for the deprivation of     future benefits, the principle of limiting the recovery to      compensation requires that adequate allowance be made,      according to circumstances, for the earning power of money;      in short, that when future payments or other pecuniary      benefits are to be anticipated, the verdict should be made up      on the basis of their present value only.'

The interpretation approved by us has become an integral part of the statute. It should be accepted and followed.

The judgment below is reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals, Third Supreme Judicial District, state of Texas, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.