Griffin v. California/Opinion of the Court

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree after a jury trial in a California court. He did not testify at the trial on the issue of guilt, though he did testify at the separate trial on the issue of penalty. The trial court instructed the jury on the issue of guilt, stating that a defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. But it told the jury:

'As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant     can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of      facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if,      though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such      evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration      as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as      indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably      drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the      more probable.'

It added, however, that no such inference could be drawn as to evidence respecting which he had no knowledge. It stated that failure of a defendant to deny or explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof.

Petitioner had been seen with the deceased the evening of her death, the evidence placing him with her in the alley where her body was found. The prosecutor made much of the failure of petitioner to testify:

'The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this     beat up appearance at the time he left her apartment and went      down the alley with her.

'What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a     woman that beat up is she was beat up at the time he left? 'He would know that. He would know how she got down the     alley. He would know how the blood got on the bottom of the     concrete steps. He would know how long he was with her in     that box. He would know how her wig got off. He would know     whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether     he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber when he saw      Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt and      wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman.

'These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny     or explain.

'And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this     defendant would know.

'Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant won't.'

The death penalty was imposed and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 60 Cal.2d 182, 32 Cal.Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432. The case is here on a writ of certiorari which we granted, 377 U.S. 989, 84 S.Ct. 1926, 12 L.Ed.2d 1043, to consider whether comment on the failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment which we made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, decided after the Supreme Court of California had affirmed the present conviction.

If this were a federal trial, reversible error would have been committed. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 13 S.Ct. 765, 37 L.Ed. 650, so holds. It is said, however, that the Wilson decision rested not on the Fifth Amendment, but on an Act of Congress, now 18 U.S.C. § 3481. That indeed is the fact, as the opinion of the Court in the Wilson case states. And see Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, n. 6, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1674, 91 L.Ed. 1903; Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294, 60 S.Ct. 198, 200, 84 L.Ed. 257. But that is the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The question remains whether, statute or not, the comment rule, approved by California, violates the Fifth Amendment.

We think it does. It is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance. The Court in the Wilson case stated:

' * *  * the act was framed with a due regard also to those who      might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which      the law gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It     is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand,      though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive     timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to      explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses      charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to      such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices      against him. It is not every one, however, honest, who would     therefore willingly be placed on the witness stand. The     statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the      causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be witnesses,      particularly when they may have been in some degree      compromised by their association with others, declares that      the failure of a defendant in a criminal action to request to      be a witness shall not create any presumption against him.'      149 U.S., p. 66, 13 S.Ct. p. 766.

If the words 'fifth Amendment' are substituted for 'act' and for 'statute' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected. For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a consitutional privilege. People v. Modesto, 62 Cal.2d 436, 452-453, 42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 426-427, 398 P.2d 753, 762-763. What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another. That the inference of guilt is not always so natural or irresistible is brought out in the Modesto opinion itself:

'Defendant contends that the reason a defendant refuses to     testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced in      evidence to impeach him ((Cal.) Code Civ.Proc. § 2051) and      not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true     that the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will      prejudice the jury, and therefore another possible inference      can be drawn from his refusal to take the stand.' Id., p.      453, 42 Cal.Rptr., p. 427, 398 P.2d, p. 763.

We said in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 378 U.S. p. 11, 84 S.Ct. p. 1495, that 'the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified.' We take that in its literal sense and hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.

Reversed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case.