Gregory v. Ashcroft/Concurrence White

Justice WHITE, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the majority that neither the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits Missouri's mandatory retirement provision as applied to petitioners, and I therefore concur in the judgment and in Parts I and III of the majority's opinion. I cannot agree, however, with the majority's reasoning in Part II of its opinion, which ignores several areas of well-established precedent and announces a rule that is likely to prove both unwise and infeasible. That the majority's analysis in Part II is completely unnecessary to the proper resolution of this case makes it all the more remarkable.

* In addition to petitioners' equal protection claim, we granted certiorari to decide the following question:

"Whether appointed Missouri state court judges are     'appointee[s] on the policymaking level' within the meaning      of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ('ADEA'), 28      U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp.V 1987), and therefore exempted      from the ADEA's general prohibition of mandatory retirement      and thus subject to the mandatory retirement provision of      Article V, Section 26 of the Missouri Constitution." Pet. for Cert. i.

The majority, however, chooses not to resolve that issue of statutory construction. Instead, it holds that whether or not the ADEA can fairly be read to exclude state judges from its scope, "[w]e will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included." Ante, at 467 (emphasis in original). I cannot agree with this "plain statement" rule because it is unsupported by the decisions upon which the majority relies, contrary to our Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and fundamentally unsound.

Among other things, the ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). In 1974, Congress amended the definition of "employer" in the ADEA to include "a State or political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2). With that amendment, "there is no doubt what the intent of Congress was: to extend the application of the ADEA to the States." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244, n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1064, n. 18, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983).

The dispute in this case therefore is not whether Congress has outlawed age discrimination by the States. It clearly has. The only question is whether petitioners fall within the definition of "employee" in the Act, § 630(f), which contains exceptions for elected officials and certain appointed officials. If petitioners are "employee[s]," Missouri's mandatory retirement provision clearly conflicts with the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA. Indeed, we have noted that the "policies and substantive provisions of the [ADEA] apply with especial force in the case of mandatory retirement provisions." Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 410, 105 S.Ct. 2743, 2750, 86 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). Pre-emption therefore is automatic, since "state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). The majority's federalism concerns are irrelevant to such "actual conflict" pre-emption. " 'The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.' " Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982), quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962).

While acknowledging this principle of federal legislative supremacy, see ante, at 460, the majority nevertheless imposes upon Congress a "plain statement" requirement. The majority claims to derive this requirement from the plain statement approach developed in our Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e.g., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985), and applied two Terms ago in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The issue in those cases, however, was whether Congress intended a particular statute to extend to the States at all. In Atascadero, for example, the issue was whether States could be sued under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Similarly, the issue in Will was whether States could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the present case, by contrast, Congress has expressly extended the coverage of the ADEA to the States and their employees. Its intention to regulate age discrimination by States is thus "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Atascadero, supra, 473 U.S., at 242, 105 S.Ct., at 3147. See Davidson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (CA7 1990) (ADEA satisfies "clear statement" requirement). The only dispute is over the precise details of the statute's application. We have never extended the plain statement approach that far, and the majority offers no compelling reason for doing so.

The majority also relies heavily on our cases addressing the constitutionality of state exclusion of aliens from public employment. See ante, at 461-463, 468-470. In those cases, we held that although restrictions based on alienage ordinarily are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), the scrutiny will be less demanding for exclusion of aliens "from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220, 104 S.Ct. 2312, 2316, 81 L.Ed.2d 175 (1984). This narrow "political function" exception to the strict scrutiny standard is based on the "State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2850-2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973).

It is difficult to see how the "political function" exception supports the majority's plain statement rule. First, the exception merely reflects a determination of the scope of the rights of aliens under the Equal Protection Clause. Reduced scrutiny is appropriate for certain political functions because "the right to govern is reserved to citizens." Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 1071, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978); see also Sugarman, supra, 413 U.S., at 648-649, 93 S.Ct., at 2850-2851. This conclusion in no way establishes a method for interpreting rights that are statutorily created by Congress, such as the protection from age discrimination in the ADEA. Second, it is one thing to limit judicially-created scrutiny, and it is quite another to fashion a restraint on Congress' legislative authority, as does the majority; the latter is both counter-majoritarian and an intrusion on a co-equal branch of the federal government. Finally, the majority does not explicitly restrict its rule to "functions that go to the heart of representative government," id., at 647, 93 S.Ct., at 2850, and may in fact be extending it much further to all "state governmental functions." See ante, at 470.

The majority's plain statement rule is not only unprecedented, it directly contravenes our decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), and South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). In those cases we made it clear "that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity." Id., at 512, 108 S.Ct., at 1360. We also rejected as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" any test for state immunity that requires a judicial determination of which state activities are "traditional," "integral," or "necessary." Garcia, supra, 469 U.S., at 546, 105 S.Ct., at 1015. The majority disregards those decisions in its attempt to carve out areas of state activity that will receive special protection from federal legislation.

The majority's approach is also unsound because it will serve only to confuse the law. First, the majority fails to explain the scope of its rule. Is the rule limited to federal regulation of the qualifications of state officials? See ante, at 464. Or does it apply more broadly to the regulation of any "state governmental functions"? See ante, at 470. Second, the majority does not explain its requirement that Congress' intent to regulate a particular state activity be "plain to anyone reading [the federal statute]." See ante, at 467. Does that mean that it is now improper to look to the purpose or history of a federal statute in determining the scope of the statute's limitations on state activities? If so, the majority's rule is completely inconsistent with our pre-emption jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2376, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (pre-emption will be found where there is a "clear and manifest purpose " to displace state law; emphasis added). The vagueness of the majority's rule undoubtedly will lead States to assert that various federal statutes no longer apply to a wide variety of State activities if Congress has not expressly referred to those activities in the statute. Congress, in turn, will be forced to draft long and detailed lists of which particular state functions it meant to regulate.

The imposition of such a burden on Congress is particularly out of place in the context of the ADEA. Congress already has stated that all "individual[s] employed by any employer" are protected by the ADEA unless they are expressly excluded by one of the exceptions in the definition of "employee." See 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). The majority, however, turns the statute on its head, holding that state judges are not protected by the ADEA because "Congress has [not] made it clear that judges are included." Ante, at 467 (emphasis in original). Cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983), where we held that state game wardens are covered by the ADEA, even though such employees are not expressly included within the ADEA's scope.

The majority asserts that its plain statement rule is helpful in avoiding a "potential constitutional problem." Ante, at 464. It is far from clear, however, why there would be a constitutional problem if the ADEA applied to state judges, in light of our decisions in Garcia and Baker, discussed above. As long as "the national political process did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated." Baker, supra, 485 U.S., at 512, 108 S.Ct., at 1360. There is no claim in this case that the political process by which the ADEA was extended to state employees was inadequate to protect the States from being "unduly burden[ed]" by the Federal Government. See Garcia, supra, 469 U.S., at 556, 105 S.Ct., at 1020. In any event, as discussed below, a straightforward analysis of the ADEA's definition of "employee" reveals that the ADEA does not apply here. Thus, even if there were potential constitutional problems in extending the ADEA to state judges, the majority's proposed plain statement rule would not be necessary to avoid them in this case. Indeed, because this case can be decided purely on the basis of statutory interpretation, the majority's announcement of its plain statement rule, which purportedly is derived from constitutional principles, violates our general practice of avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues.

My disagreement with the majority does not end with its unwarranted announcement of the plain statement rule. Even more disturbing is its treatment of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ante, at 467-470. Section 5 provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Despite that sweeping constitutional delegation of authority to Congress, the majority holds that its plain statement rule will apply with full force to legislation enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority states: "In the face of . . . ambiguity, we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Ante, at 470 (emphasis added).

The majority's failure to recognize the special status of legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 ignores that, unlike Congress' Commerce Clause power, "[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). Indeed, we have held that "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.' Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty." City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1562-1563, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at 243, n. 18, 103 S.Ct., at 1064, n. 18.

The majority relies upon Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), see ante, at 469-470, but that case does not support its approach. There, the Court merely stated that "we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." 451 U.S., at 16, 101 S.Ct., at 1539. In other words, the Pennhurst presumption was designed only to answer the question whether a particular piece of legislation was enacted pursuant to § 5. That is very different from the majority's apparent holding that even when Congress is acting pursuant to § 5, it nevertheless must specify the precise details of its enactment.

The majority's departures from established precedent are even more disturbing when it is realized, as discussed below, that this case can be affirmed based on simple statutory construction.

The statute at issue in this case is the ADEA's definition of "employee," which provides:

"The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any     employer except that the term 'employee' shall not include      any person elected to public office in any State or political      subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or      any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's      personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or      an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the      constitutional or legal powers of the office.  The exemption      set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include      employees subject to the civil service laws of a State      government, governmental agency, or political subdivision." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).

A parsing of that definition reveals that it excludes from the definition of "employee" (and thus the coverage of the ADEA) four types of (non-civil service) state and local employees: (1) persons elected to public office;  (2) the personal staff of elected officials;  (3) persons appointed by elected officials to be on the policymaking level;  and (4) the immediate advisers of elected officials with respect to the constitutional or legal powers of the officials' offices.

The question before us is whether petitioners fall within the third exception. Like the Court of Appeals, see 898 F.2d 598, 600 (CA8 1990), I assume that petitioners, who were initially appointed to their positions by the Governor of Missouri, are "appointed" rather than "elected" within the meaning of the ADEA. For the reasons below, I also conclude that petitioners are "on the policymaking level."

"Policy" is defined as "a definite course or method of action selected (as by a government, institution, group, or individual) from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usu[ally] determine present and future decisions." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1754 (1976). Applying that definition, it is clear that the decisionmaking engaged in by common-law judges, such as petitioners, places them "on the policymaking level." In resolving disputes, although judges do not operate with unconstrained discretion, they do choose "from among alternatives" and elaborate their choices in order "to guide and . . . determine present and future decisions." The quotation from Justice Holmes in the majority's opinion, see ante, at 466, is an eloquent description of the policymaking nature of the judicial function. Justice Cardozo also stated it well:

"Each [common-law judge] indeed is legislating within the     limits of his competence.  No doubt the limits for the judge      are narrower.  He legislates only between gaps.  He fills the      open spaces in the law. . . .  [W]ithin the confines of these      open spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice      moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative.      The law which is the resulting product is not found, but      made." B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process     113-115 (1921).

Moreover, it should be remembered that the statutory exception refers to appointees "on the policymaking level," not "policymaking employees." Thus, whether or not judges actually make policy, they certainly are on the same level as policymaking officials in other branches of government and therefore are covered by the exception. The degree of responsibility vested in judges, for example, is comparable to that of other officials that have been found by the lower courts to be on the policymaking level. See, e.g., EEOC v. Reno, 758 F.3d 581 (CA11 1985) (assistant state attorney); ''EEOC v. Board of Trustees of Wayne Cty. Comm. Coll.,'' 723 F.3d 509 (CA6 1983) (president of community college).

Petitioners argue that the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" exception should be construed to apply "only to persons who advise or work closely with the elected official that chose the appointee." Brief for Petitioners 18. In support of that claim, petitioners point out that the exception is "sandwiched" between the "personal staff" and "immediate adviser" exceptions in § 630(f), and thus should be read as covering only similar employees.

Petitioners' premise, however, does not prove their conclusion. It is true that the placement of the "appointee" exception between the "personal staff" and "immediate adviser" exceptions suggests a similarity among the three. But the most obvious similarity is simply that each of the three sets of employees are connected in some way with elected officials: the first and third sets have a certain working relationship with elected officials, while the second is appointed by elected officials. There is no textual support for concluding that the second set must also have a close working relationship with elected officials. Indeed, such a reading would tend to make the "appointee" exception superfluous since the "personal staff" and "immediate adviser" exceptions would seem to cover most appointees who are in a close working relationship with elected officials.

Petitioners seek to rely on legislative history, but it does not help their position. There is little legislative history discussing the definition of "employee" in the ADEA, so petitioners point to the legislative history of the identical definition in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). If anything, that history tends to confirm that the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" exception was designed to exclude from the coverage of the ADEA all high-level appointments throughout state government structures, including judicial appointments.

For example, during the debates concerning the proposed extension of Title VII to the States, Senator Ervin repeatedly expressed his concern that the (unamended) definition of "employee" would be construed to reach those "persons who exercise the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the States and political subdivisions of the States." 118 Cong.Rec. 1838 (1972) (emphasis added). Indeed, he expressly complained that "[t]here is not even an exception in the [unamended] bill to the effect that the EEOC will not have jurisdiction over . . . State judges, whether they are elected or appointed to office." Id., at 1677. Also relevant is Senator Taft's comment that, in order to respond to Senator Ervin's concerns, he was willing to agree to an exception not only for elected officials, but also for "those at the top decisionmaking levels in the executive and judicial branch as well." Id., at 1838.

The definition of "employee" subsequently was modified to exclude the four categories of employees discussed above. The Conference Committee that added the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" exception made clear the separate nature of that exception:

"It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected     officials and members of their personal staffs, and persons      appointed by such elected officials as advisors or to      policymaking positions at the highest levels of the      departments or agencies of State or local governments, such      as cabinet officers, and persons with comparable      responsibilities at the local level." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 92-899, pp. 15-16 (1972) (emphasis added).

The italicized "or" in that statement indicates, contrary to petitioners' argument, that appointed officials need not be advisers to be covered by the exception. Rather, it appears that "Congress intended two categories: policymakers, who need not be advisers;  and advisers, who need not be policymakers." EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56 (CA1 1988). This reading is confirmed by a statement by one of the House Managers, Representative Erlenborn, who explained that "[i]n the conference, an additional qualification was added, exempting those people appointed by officials at the State and local level in policymaking positions." 118 Cong.Rec., at 7567.

In addition, the phrase "the highest levels" in the Conference Report suggests that Congress' intent was to limit the exception "down the chain of command, and not so much across agencies or departments." EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d, at 56. I also agree with the First Circuit's conclusion that even lower court judges fall within the exception because "each judge, as a separate and independent judicial officer, is at the very top of his particular 'policymaking' chain of command, responding . . . only to a higher appellate court." Ibid.

For these reasons, I would hold that petitioners are excluded from the coverage of the ADEA because they are "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" under 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).

I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion and concur in its judgment.

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

I agree entirely with the cogent analysis contained in Part I of Justice WHITE's opinion, ante. For the reasons well stated by Justice WHITE, the question we must resolve is whether appointed Missouri state judges are excluded from the general prohibition of mandatory retirement that Congress established in the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. I part company with Justice WHITE, however, in his determination that appointed state judges fall within the narrow exclusion from ADEA coverage that Congress created for an "appointee on the policymaking level." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).

* For two reasons, I do not accept the notion that an appointed state judge is an "appointee on the policymaking level." First, even assuming that judges may be described as policymakers in certain circumstances, the structure and legislative history of the policymaker exclusion make clear that judges are not the kind of policymakers whom Congress intended to exclude from the ADEA's broad reach. Second, whether or not a plausible argument may be made for judges' being policymakers, I would defer to the EEOC's reasonable construction of the ADEA as covering appointed state judges.

Although it may be possible to define an appointed judge as a "policymaker" with only a dictionary as a guide, we have an obligation to construe the exclusion of an "appointee on the policymaking level" with a sensitivity to the context in which Congress placed it. In construing an undefined statutory term, this Court has adhered steadfastly to the rule that " ' " 'words grouped in a list should be given related meaning,' " ' " Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26,, 110 S.Ct. 929, 930, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990), quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-115, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 1672-1673, 104 L.Ed.2d 98 (1989), quoting Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 2458, 2462, 86 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), quoting Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors, FRS, 468 U.S. 207, 218, 104 S.Ct. 3003, 3009, 82 L.Ed.2d 158 (1984), and that " 'in expounding a statute, we [are] not . . . guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " Morash, 490 U.S., at 115, 109 S.Ct., at 1673, quoting Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1554-1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). Applying these maxims of statutory construction, I conclude that an appointed state judge is not the kind of "policymaker" whom Congress intended to exclude from the protection of the ADEA.

The policymaker exclusion is placed between the exclusion of "any person chosen by such [elected] officer to be on such officer's personal staff" and the exclusion of "an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." See 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). Reading the policymaker exclusion in light of the other categories of employees listed with it, I conclude that the class of "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" should be limited to those officials who share the characteristics of personal staff members and immediate advisers, i.e., those who work closely with the appointing official and are directly accountable to that official. Additionally, I agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit in EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (1990):

"Had Congress intended to except a wide-ranging category of     policymaking individuals operating wholly independently of      the elected official, it would probably have placed that      expansive category at the end of the series, not in the      middle." Id., at 798.

Because appointed judges are not accountable to the official who appoints them and are precluded from working closely with that official once they have been appointed, they are not "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" for purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).

The evidence of Congress' intent in enacting the policymaking exclusion supports this narrow reading. As noted by Justice WHITE, ante, at 484, there is little in the legislative history of § 630(f) itself to aid our interpretive endeavor. Because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(f), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), contains language identical to that in the ADEA's policymaking exclusion, however, we accord substantial weight to the legislative history of the cognate Title VII provision in construing § 630(f). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (noting that "the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII"). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-622, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2071-2072, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979); EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d, at 798.

When Congress decided to amend Title VII to include States and local governments as employers, the original bill did not contain any employee exclusion. As Justice WHITE notes, ante, at 484, the absence of a provision excluding certain state employees was a matter of concern for Senator Ervin, who commented that the bill, as reported, did not contain a provision "to the effect that the EEOC will not have jurisdiction over . . . State judges, whether they are elected or appointed to office. . . ." 118 Cong.Rec. 1677 (1972). Because this floor comment refers to appointed judges, Justice WHITE concludes that the later amendment containing the exclusion of "an appointee on the policymaking level" was drafted in "response to the concerns raised by Senator Ervin and others," ante, at 484-485, and therefore should be read to include judges.

Even if the only legislative history available was the above-quoted statement of Senator Ervin and the final amendment containing the policymaking exclusion, I would be reluctant to accept Justice WHITE's analysis. It would be odd to conclude that the general exclusion of those "on the policymaking level" was added in response to Senator Ervin's very specific concern about appointed judges. Surely, if Congress had desired to exclude judges-and was responding to a specific complaint that judges would be within the jurisdiction of the EEOC-it would have chosen far clearer language to accomplish this end. In any case, a more detailed look at the genesis of the policymaking exclusion seriously undermines the suggestion that it was intended to include appointed judges.

After commenting on the absence of an employee exclusion, Senator Ervin proposed the following amendment:

"[T]he term 'employee' as set forth in the original act of     1964 and as modified in the pending bill shall not include      any person elected to public office in any State or political      subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or      any person chosen by such person to advise him in respect to      the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of his      office." 118 Cong.Rec. 4483 (1972).

Noticeably absent from this proposed amendment is any reference to those on the policymaking level or to judges. Senator Williams then suggested expanding the proposed amendment to include the personal staff of the elected individual, leading Senators Williams and Ervin to engage in the following discussion about the purpose of the amendment: "Mr. WILLIAMS: . . ..

"First, State and local governments are now included under     the bill as employers.  The amendment would provide, for the      purposes of the bill and for the basic law, that an elected      individual is not an employee and, th[e]refore, the law could      not cover him.  The next point is that the elected official      would, in his position as an employer, not be covered and      would be exempt in the employment of certain individuals.

.   .    .    ..

". . . [B]asically the purpose of the amendment . . . [is] to     exempt from coverage those who are chosen by the Governor or      the mayor or the county supervisor, whatever the elected      official is, and who are in a close personal relationship and      an immediate relationship with him.  Those who are his first      line of advisers.  Is that basically the purpose of the      Senator's amendment?

"Mr. ERVIN: I would say to my good friend from New Jersey      that that is the purpose of the amendment." Id., at     4492-4493.

Following this exchange, Senator Ervin's amendment was expanded to exclude "any person chosen by such officer to be a personal assistant." Id., at 4493. The Senate adopted these amendments, voting to exclude both personal staff members and immediate advisers from the scope of Title VII.

The policymaker exclusion appears to have arisen from Senator Javits' concern that the exclusion for advisers would sweep too broadly, including hundreds of functionaries such as "lawyers, . . . stenographers, subpena servers, researchers, and so forth." Id., at 4097. Senator Javits asked "to have overnight to check into what would be the status of that rather large group of employees," noting that he "realize[d] that . . . Senator [Ervin was] . . . seeking to confine it to the higher officials in a policymaking or policy advising capacity." [492]

Ibid. In an effort to clarify his point, Senator Javits later stated:

"The other thing, the immediate advisers, I was thinking     more in terms of a cabinet, of a Governor who would call his      commissioners a cabinet, or he may have a cabinet composed of      three or four executive officials, or five or six, who would      do the main and important things.  That is what I would      define these things expressly to mean." Id., at 4493.

Although Senator Ervin assured Senator Javits that the exclusion of personal staff and advisers affected only the classes of employees that Senator Javits had mentioned, ibid., the Conference Committee eventually adopted a specific exclusion of an "appointee on the policymaking level" as well as the exclusion of personal staff and immediate advisers contained in the Senate bill. In explaining the scope of the exclusion, the conferees stated:

"It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected     officials and members of their personal staffs, and persons      appointed by such officials as advisors or to policymaking      positions at the highest levels of the departments or      agencies of State or local governments, such as cabinet      officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the      local level.  It is the conferees['] intent that this      exemption shall be construed narrowly." S.Conf.Rep. No. 92-681, pp. 15-16 (1972).

The foregoing history decisively refutes the argument that the policymaker exclusion was added in response to Senator Ervin's concern that appointed state judges would be protected by Title VII. Senator Ervin's own proposed amendment did not exclude those on the policymaking level. Indeed, Senator Ervin indicated that all of the policymakers he sought to have excluded from the coverage of Title VII were encompassed in the exclusion of personal staff and immediate advisers. It is obvious that judges are neither staff nor immediate advisers of any elected official. The only indication as to whom Congress understood to be "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" is Senator Javits' reference to members of the Governor's cabinet, echoed in the Conference Committee's use of "cabinet officers" as an example of the type of appointee at the policymaking level excluded from Title VII's definition of "employee." When combined with the Conference Committee's exhortation that the exclusion be construed narrowly, this evidence indicates that Congress did not intend appointed state judges to be excluded from the reach of Title VII or the ADEA.

This Court has held that when a statutory term is ambiguous or undefined, a court construing the statute should defer to a reasonable interpretation of that term proffered by the agency entrusted with administering the statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Thus, even were I to conclude that one might read the exclusion of an "appointee on the policymaking level" to include state judges, our precedent would compel me to accept the EEOC's contrary reading of the exclusion if it were a "permissible" interpretation of this ambiguous term. Id., at 843, 104 S.Ct., at 2781-2782. This Court has recognized that "it is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference." EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1671, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988). The EEOC's interpretation of ADEA provisions is entitled to the same deference as its interpretation of analogous provisions in Title VII. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2074, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979), citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434, 91 S.Ct. 849, 855, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

The EEOC consistently has taken the position that an appointed judge is not an "appointee on the policymaking level" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (CA2 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (CA1 1988);  EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F.Supp. 156 (ND Ill.1989). Relying on the legislative history detailed above, the EEOC has asserted that Congress intended the policymaker exclusion to include only "an elected official's first line advisers." EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d, at 55. See also CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) ¶ 6725 (discussing the meaning of the policymaker exclusion under Title VII, and stating that policymakers "must work closely with elected officials and their advisors in developing policies that will implement the overall goals of the elected officials"). As is evident from the foregoing discussion, I believe this to be a correct reading of the statute and its history. At a minimum, it is a "permissible" reading of the indisputably ambiguous term "appointee on the policymaking level." Accordingly, I would defer to the EEOC's reasonable interpretation of this term.

The Missouri constitutional provision mandating the retirement of a judge who reaches the age of 70 violates the ADEA and is, therefore, invalid. Congress enacted the ADEA with the express purpose "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;  to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621. Congress provided for only limited exclusions from the coverage of the ADEA, and exhorted courts applying this law to construe such exclusions narrowly. The statute's structure and legislative history reveal that Congress did not intend an appointed state judge to be beyond the scope of the ADEA's protective reach. Further, the EEOC, which is charged with the enforcement of the ADEA, has determined that an appointed state judge is covered by the ADEA. This Court's precedent dictates that we defer to the EEOC's permissible interpretation of the ADEA.

I dissent.