Goodrich v. City of Chicago/Opinion of the Court

'But it is denied that this is a case of concurrent jurisdiction because of the different form and course of proceedings in a court of admiralty. This proceeding, it is said, is in rem, that all the world is a party, while the action of replevin is a mere personal action of trespass; that, in the one case, the thing passes into possession of the court; in the other, the delivery is made by the officer, without any order or judgment of the court. These distinctions, though ingenious, do not constitute a difference or furnish an argument to justify the court of admiralty in disregarding the disposition made of this property by the law of Pennsylvania, whether it be temporary or final.'

'It is true that the court of admiralty, from the peculiarity of her process and modes of proceeding, is more competent to render speedy and exact justice to the parties than courts of common law (more especially in disputes between part-owners); but it cannot, on that assumption, disregard the disposition made of this property by the law of Pennsylvania, whether it be temporary or final.'

This reasoning, though applied by his honor to what was in effect a plea of lis pendens, applies with equal, if not greater force, to a plea of res adjudicata.

Now, in this case, the declaration shows that the same parties are attempting to litigate the same subject-matter, or points or questions in admiralty that were adjudicated and settled in the State court.

Look at the declaration as set out supra, p. 568, and at the libel as set out just before it, at pp. 566-7. It will be seen that the allegations in both are, in legal substance, the same. And the parties and subject-matter of both actions are undeniably the same. They are both actions to recover damages sustained by reason of an alleged obstruction in the Chicago River. The vessel injured is the same,-the Huron; the time and cause of injury are the same; the liability of the city is placed on the same ground in both actions, to wit, a duty imposed in both cases by the same act of the legislature, and the same ordinances of the city, and the neglect to perform or discharge it.

Nothing in the libel or in the facts in the case changes the cause of action from what it was in the State court. The liability of the city is based on its nonfeasance in both courts; and does not the Supreme Court of Illinois decide the questions raised in the case at bar against the appellants?

It matters not, here, and so far as the defence of an estoppel is concerned, whether the decision in the State court was right or wrong. It is sufficient that the parties appellant selected that tribunal to litigate their supposed grievances. They must be content with the result. If a party, when defeated in one tribunal, is permitted to take his chance in another, there can be no end to litigation; for if defeated in the second, he may in like manner resort to a third, and so run the chance of all the courts in the country. Litigation is harassing and vexatious enough to parties at best, but break down and destroy the doctrine of res adjudicata, and it would be intolerable, wholly.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

In the view which we have taken of the case, it will be necessary to consider but a single point.

The appellants filed their libel to recover damages for the sinking of their steamer Huron, in the Chicago River, near its mouth. The casualty was caused by the steamer running against a sunken wreck. The libel alleges that it was the duty of the city to have it removed, and that it was guilty of negligence in not having done so. It alleges further, that the city entered upon the work of removal, but abandoned it before the result was accomplished.

Among the defences set up by the answer of the respondent was, that of a final judgment in the Supreme Court of Illinois, upon a general demurrer to a declaration in an action at law by the appellants against the respondent for the same cause of action.

The court below sustained the defence, and upon this ground, and another not necessary to be stated, dismissed the libel.

The record of the action at law is found among the proofs in this case. Upon a careful examination of the declaration and of the libel, we are constrained to say, there is no such difference in the cases which they respectively make as can take this case out of the operation of the principles of res adjudicata.

Whatever the result might be here, if this obstacle were out of the way, we have no choice but to apply the law in this as in other cases.

DECREE AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.