Good Intent Tow-Boat Company v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York/Opinion of the Court

The sole question to be considered on the appeal of the appellants is whether the amounts which the circuit court awarded to them severally, as owners of the three steam-tugs, should be increased. The errors assigned by the appellants are (1) that the circuit court held that the contract for pumping out the ship was inequitable, and ought not, under the facts of the case, to be enforced; (2) that it held that the salvage service was of a low grade; (3) that it allowed to each boat only $1,000. These are all assigned as errors in conclusions of law. There is no complaint made by the libelants of the conclusion of law that the service was a salvage service.

In the case of The Connemara, at the last term, [2 SUP. CT. REP. 754,] this court said: 'The services performed being salvage services, the  amount of salvage to be awarded, although stated by the   circuit court in the form of a conclusion of law, is   largely a matter of fact and discretion, which cannot be   reduced to precise rules, but depends upon a   consideration of all the circumstances of each case.'

We are of opinion that no ground is shown, on the facts found, for awarding a larger sum to the appellants than the circuit court allowed them. The contract, as found, was a contract made by the master and the agent of the ship with the association to which the three tugs belonged, 'to pump out' the ship, for a compensation of $50 per hour for each boat, 'to be continued until the boats were discharged.' This does not give a very clear idea as to what the contract was. If the pumping out should be completed there could be no continuance of the service of pumping out the ship, or of the contract, as a contract to pump out the ship. If the contract was that the compensation named should continue, in any event, and whether the ship was pumped out or not, until the boats should be discharged, the attendance of the boats along-side of the ship after she was pumped out and raised and placed in a position of safety, the boats being ready to render assistance, in case it was needed, for a period of about 12 days, is found to have been unnecessary, and not required by any peril of the Tornado and cargo. It is not found, as a fact, that the boats were formally discharged by the master or agent of the ship. But it is found that after the contract was made, and while the ship still lay at the bottom of the river, and when the boats were about to begin to pump her out, the marshal seized the ship and cargo under a warrant on a libel for salvage filed against the ship and cargo, and took possession of the ship, and displaced the authority of the master, but permitted the boats to proceed and pump out the ship; and that they, with other assistance, pumped out the ship, and raised her and placed her in a position of safety by a pumping service of about 18 hours. It is not found that the marshal requested or sanctioned in any way the continued presence of the tugs after the ship was raised and made safe. The authority of the master was displaced by the marshal. On these facts we are of opinion that to enforce the contract as one continuing during the time claimed by the libelants would be highly inequitable; and that, as against the insurers of the cargo, the right of the boats to compensation must be regarded as having terminated when the ship and cargo were raised, and the boats must be regarded as having been then discharged, within any fair interpretation which can be given to the contract. A compensation of $50 per hour for the 18 hours of actual pumping would amount to $900. Every agreement for salvage compensation is subject, as to amount, to the judgment of the court as to its being equitable and conformable to the merits of the case. Pars. Shipp. 306; The Helen and George, Swab. 368; Jones, Salv. 94 et seq.

The final decree of the circuit court was entered on the twenty-fourth of May, 1880. On the twenty-sixth of June following, the underwriters on the cargo filed a petition in the circuit court, praying a cross-appeal to this court from the decree, and it was allowed, returnable at the October term, 1880. On the fifth of July following, the bond on the cross-appeal was filed in circuit court. But the appellants, in the cross-appeal, did not docket it, or enter their appearance on it, in this court, until September 27, 1883; and the appellees in it are entitled to have it dismissed. Grigsby v. Purcell, 99 U.S. 505; The S. S. Osborne, 105 U.S. 447.

The cross-appeal is dismissed, and, on the appeal of the libelants, the decree of the circuit court is affirmed.