Gilbert Secor v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The present claim for $72,742.82 is the difference in value between felt and tar sheathing, and copper sheathing, the latter of which, by their contract, Gilbert & Secor, the claimants, were required to put on the dock, and did put on it.

The claimants do not make any question that by the terms of the agreement signed by them, and by the Secretary of the Navy, they were bound to copper sheath the dock, and that this was included in the work which they agreed to do for the aggregate sum already mentioned. Nor do they contend that there was any mistake in reference to that particular, for they protested against that provision of the contract while they signed it.

But the proposition on which their claim is based seems, when fairly stated, to be this: That the act of Congress under which the secretary acted when he made the contract with them, was itself an acceptance of certain proposals made by plaintiffs, and, therefore, taken in connection with those proposals, constituted a contract binding on the government, and that under that contract the dock was built. That those proposals were framed on the basis of allowing the sum now claimed for copper sheathing if copper was used.

But it seems to us that the statement of the case sufficiently negatives the idea that the act of Congress completed a contract.

When did the claimants become bound to build such a work as that specified in their final contract? That work was much larger than the one for which they made proposals. When did they consent to the enlargement? Their proposals of the year previous had been rejected by the secretary. When did they renew them? The proposition which Congress authorized the secretary to accept was ten per cent. larger than any proposal they had made. Did Congress mean to say, we accept your proposal, and give you ten per cent. more than you have asked? Or did it mean to authorize the secretary to make the best terms he could, not exceeding that limit? Clearly it must have intended the latter.

It also appears from the agreement signed, and therefore accepted by the claimants, that the secretary was induced to exercise the option which the act gave him in regard to the two kinds of work, in favor of that of claimants, in consideration that they would copper-fasten the dock without additional charge. Having thus induced the secretary to decide in their favor, they are not at liberty to repudiate this part of their contract.

If these transactions are to be construed by the rules which govern agreements between private individuals, there does not appear to be any reason to infer a contract prior to the written agreement between the parties; not any reason why that agreement should not govern the rights of the parties.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.