Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 6

Chapter 6 - Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool, and the Battle of the Dogger Bank
IN the first months of the war many efforts had been made to conduct our operations in a way that would cause the enemy such losses as would enable us to speak of a real equalisation of forces. But in vain. The results of our mine-laying were unknown, while the successes of our submarines did not weigh much in the scale, as the ships they torpedoed had no fighting value. On the other hand, raids by our cruisers were much more likely to bring considerable portions of the English Fleet out of their harbours and thus give our Fleet a favourable chance of intervening if it kept in close touch with its cruisers. For this purpose our cruisers would in any case have to go far beyond the limits of distance they had hitherto observed - not more than ioo nautical miles from Heligoland. Then only would our cruisers begin to have some real effect. Within the limits imposed upon him the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had described the efforts we had made - cruisers had put to sea, mine-laying was carried out continuously in spite of the losses we had suffered, submarines had done far more than was expected of them, were untiring in their efforts and had penetrated as far as the English coasts, yet for the Fleet itself these operations had proved a disappointment. Strategical reasons had made it necessary to keep our Fleet back, and this looked like a want of confidence and affected the moral of the men, and gradually lowered their belief in their own efficiency to a regrettable degree. An impressive recital of these facts with the request that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet should be allowed greater latitude was met with a decided rebuff. The grounds of this refusal, as communicated by the Naval Staff, ran somewhat as follows:


 * "The existence of our Fleet, ready to strike at any moment, has hitherto kept the enemy away from the North Sea and Baltic coasts and made it possible to resume trade with neutral countries in the Baltic. The Fleet has thus taken over the protection of the coast and troops required for that purpose are now available for use in the field. After even a successful battle, the ascendancy of the Fleet under the numerical superiority of the enemy would give way, and under the pressure of the enemy Fleet the attitude of the neutrals would be prejudiciously influenced. The Fleet must therefore be held back and avoid actions which might lead to heavy losses. This does not, however, prevent favourable opportunities being made use of to damage the enemy. An employment of the Fleet outside the German Bight, which the enemy tries to bring about through his movements in the Skagerrak, is not mentioned in the orders for operations as being one of the favourable opportunities. There is nothing to be said against an attempt of the big cruisers in the North Sea to damage the enemy."

These instructions served the purpose of the further enterprise against the English coast. On December 15 the big cruisers under the command of Vice-Admiral Hipper sailed under orders to bombard the fortified coast towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool and to lay mines along the coast, for there was constant traffic between the East Coast ports. Both these places, however, are 150 nautical miles nearer to the chief bases of the English Fleet in the North of the British Isles than is Yarmouth. It would, therefore, be much easier for vessels lying there or cruising at sea in the vicinity to beat off an attack, and the expedition would probably present a much greater risk, and a more urgent call for support from the Fleet.

The 2nd Scouting Division, composed of light cruisers and two torpedo-boat flotillas, was attached to the 1st Scouting Division of battle-cruisers. They left the Jade on the 15th at 3.20 a.m., followed late in the afternoon of the same day by squadrons of battleships. The hour of departure for both divisions was chosen in order to profit by the darkness and if possible put to sea unobserved. Judging from what ensued, this appears to have succeeded. A rendezvous at sea at 54° 30' N. Lat. and 7° 42' E. Long, was appointed for the squadrons coming from the Jade and the Elbe. In order to get there I left the anchorage at Cuxhaven with Squadron II at 4 p.m. From the meeting-place Squadron II took the course ordered by the Commander-in-Chief- W.N.W. by 1/2 W.-at a speed of 15 knots. As all the ships were most carefully darkened, nothing could be seen of the other squadrons. The navigation had therefore to be most accurate in order that the squadrons might be in their proper places the next morning. Seven to five nautical miles had been determined on as the distance between the squadrons from flagship to flagship. The sailing order of the units was: Squadrons I, III and II. To ensure the safety of the Main Fleet when under way, the two older armoured cruisers, Prinz Heinrich and Roon, were placed ahead, together with a torpedo-boat flotilla. To cover the flanks two light cruisers were utilised, each with a flotilla. The light cruiser Stettin, with two flotillas, covered the rear. During the night several fishing steamers were stopped by the escorting torpedo-boats but released as non-suspect.

At 5.20 a.m. a torpedo-boat in the vanguard reported four enemy destroyers in Square 105. This was at 54° 55' N. Lat. and 2° 10' E. Long. This spot was about 20 nautical miles north-west of the appointed meeting-place for the cruisers, to which destination the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was also steaming. As several hours must elapse before we could reach our destination, and no further message followed the first one, we continued on our way. An hour later there was another message from a torpedo-boat in the vanguard to the effect that ten enemy destroyers had been sighted and that flashes from guns were visible. A quarter of an hour later the same boat reported that a chase had started. Thereupon at 6.45 the Commander-in-Chief gave the signal for all the squadrons to turn into a S.E. course as it still wanted an hour and a half to daylight. By issuing that order he carried out his purpose of avoiding an encounter with the enemy torpedo-boats and denying them the opportunity to attack in the dark.

Meanwhile our vanguard had begun to fight with the enemy destroyers. At 6.58 the light cruiser Hamburg (Captain von Gaudecker) reported that he had sunk an enemy destroyer. At 7.10 the Fleet turned again to the E.S.E.-1/24E. and started on the return journey.

It had passed considerably beyond the arc from Terschelling to Horns Reef that shuts off the Bight. Having set out with the object of supporting our cruisers, there was now no possibility of carrying out that plan, seeing the great distance that lay between the two divisions. In this case, therefore, the success of the cruisers' enterprise was entirely dependent on their taking the enemy by surprise and avoiding the enemy's superior forces.

Towards daybreak, when our cruisers were approaching the English coast, the wind rose to such a pitch and the sea ran so high that the light cruiser Strassburg reported at 7 a.m. that, owing to heavy seas off the land, firing was no longer possible and the ship had been obliged to turn on an easterly course. As, under these conditions, the light cruisers and torpedo-boats could only be a hindrance to the big cruisers, the Commander-in-Chief decided to dispatch those vessels in the direction of the Main Fleet, with the exception of the light cruiser Kolberg, which was to continue laying mines at the places determined on.

The big cruisers then divided into two groups for the bombardment of the coastal towns, the northern section, the Seydlitz, Moltke and Blücher, making for Hartlepool. An officer of one of the U-boats who had reconnoitred the area beforehand rendered good service in locating the place. Shortly before they were off Hartlepool the cruisers were attacked by four torpedo-boat destroyers of the "River" class that ran out to sea and were brought under fire at a distance of about 50 hm. The sinking of one destroyer and heavy damage to another were observed. After firing some torpedoes without any result, they turned away. We gave up pursuing them so as not to lose time for the bombardment. The Seydlitz opened fire on the Cemetery Battery and scored several hits, so that at last the fire was only returned by one 15 cm. gun and one light gun from the battery. The Moltke was hit above the water-line, causing much damage between decks but no loss of life. From the first, the Blücher came under a lively fire from the land batteries; she had nine killed and three wounded by one hit alone. 15 cm. howitzers and light artillery were used on land; the Blücher was hit six times altogether.

The southern group, Von der Tann and Derfflinger, made for Scarborough which was easily distinguishable. The coastguard station at Scarborough and the signalling and coastguard stations at Whitby were destroyed. At the latter place the second round brought down the signalling flagstaff with the English ensign and the entire station building as well. The Derfflinger also bombarded trenches and barracks at Scarborough. As there was no counter-action it must be assumed that the battery at Scarborough was either not manned, in proper time, or had been evacuated by the garrison.

The light cruiser Kolberg laid her mines at the appointed place without much difficulty, although the ship heeled over to 12 degrees and the tip apparatus (for dropping the mines overboard) drew water. At 9.45 the cruisers assembled round the Seydlitz and started to retire in the direction of the meeting-place agreed on with the Main Fleet. An hour later, at 10.45, a wireless message was received from the Chief of Reconnaissance with the Fleet that the task was accomplished and that he was stationed at 54° 45' N., 0° 30' W. At 12.30 noon the Stralsund, of the Second Scouting Division, with Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II attached, sighted a number of enemy cruisers and, turning in a south-westerly direction, evaded them to try and join the large cruisers. The English cruisers were again lost to sight, as the weather was very misty. Soon afterwards the Stralsund sighted six large enemy ships which were made out to be battleships of the "Orion" class, and therefore the Second English Battle Squadron. The Stralsund kept in touch with them and continued to report on the course and the speed of the enemy. At 1 p.m. these groups were at 54° 20' N. lat., 2° 0' E. long. This report caused our big cruisers to turn off in a north-easterly direction, as owing to the bad visibility they were compelled to avoid an unexpected encounter with battleships of superior fighting strength than that of our own. At that time the position of the two forces facing each other was approximately as follows:



Great disappointment was caused on board my flagship by this report. If our big cruisers had got into difficulties between the enemy battle-squadron and other cruisers already reported and still in the vicinity, our help would be too late. There was no longer any possibility while it was still day of coming up with the enemy battle-squadron, which at one o'clock was 130 nautical miles distant from us. Our premature turning on to a E.S.E. course had robbed us of the opportunity of meeting certain divisions of the enemy according to the prearranged plan, which was now seen to have been correct. At all events the restrictions imposed on the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet brought about the failure of the bold and promising plan, owing to its not having been carried out in the proper manner. As we now know from an English source, the destroyers fired at by the Hamburg were about 10 nautical miles in front of the Second Battle Squadron which had come down on a southerly course - the vanguard of which had got into touch with ours between 6 and 7 a.m.; and since the position at 1 p.m., reported by the Stralsund, coincides exactly with the English statement, it proves that at 7 a.m. both the main fleets were only about 50 nautical miles apart. It is extremely probable that by continuing in our original direction the two courses would have crossed within sight of each other during the morning.

The advantage in a battle ensuing therefrom was distinctly on our side. The English had at their disposal on the spot the Second Battle Squadron with six ships, the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron with four ships was within attacking distance, and added to these were a few light cruisers and the Third Cruiser Squadron attached to the Second Battle Squadron.

According to his own statement, the English admiral in command did not leave Scapa Flow with the other ships till 12 noon, after receiving news of the bombardment at 9 a.m. He could not possibly have been in time; while the Third English Squadron, which had been sighted at 10 o'clock, would not have had the advantage over our Fleet.

On the part of the English, disappointment was felt that coastal towns had again been bombarded by our cruisers and that they could not succeed in stopping it, although the necessary forces chanced to be at sea and had even got into touch with our light cruisers. This, according to Admiral Jellicoe's account, may have been due to the fact that the squadrons at sea had received instructions from him how to act so as to cut off the enemy, but had also had direct orders from the English Admiralty which were totally different and which were acted upon by Sir George Warrender, in command of the Second Battle Squadron.

The weather conditions were remarkable on that day. In the east section of the North Sea - the area through which our Fleet had passed - there was a slight easterly wind, no sea running, and perfect visibility. At the 3rd deg. E. Long, there was a sharply defined spot where the weather changed. A north-westerly storm raged off the English coast and the sea was correspondingly rough, making it extremely difficult to serve the guns even on board the big cruisers. Between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m., as our Fleet withdrew, an extraordinary number of drifting mines were observed, more than 70, some of them already exploded. They must have broken loose from the big minefield at the entrance to the Canal. It was a lucky chance that we escaped damage when, on the preceding night, the ships passed through that area without being able to observe them. At 8 p.m. on December 16, Squadron II ran into the Elbe again, and the others returned to the Jade.

The impression that a specially favourable opportunity had been missed still prevailed, and the chance of another such arising could hardly be expected.

The behaviour of the English Fleet makes it obvious that our advance was a complete surprise to them, nor had they counted on our Main Fleet pushing forward to the Dogger Bank. Otherwise the English expedition would surely have comprised stronger forces than merely one battle squadron, a battle-cruiser squadron, and lighter forces. This combination certainly made them superior to our cruiser attack but not to an attack by our Fleet. The information that besides the German ships in action off the English coast a still greater number were out at sea was communicated to the English Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at 2 p.m. by the English Admiralty.

The English received the news through their "directional stations" which they already had in use, but which were only introduced by us at a much later period. They are wireless stations for taking the directional bearings of wireless messages, and in combination are capable of indicating the direction from which intercepted wireless messages come and thus locating the signalling ship's station. The stretch of the English east coast is very favourable for the erection of these "directional stations." In possessing them the English had a very great advantage in the conduct of the war, as they were able thus to obtain quite accurate information as to the locality of the enemy as soon as any wireless signals were sent by him. In the case of a large fleet, where separate units are stationed far apart and communication between them is essential, an absolute cessation of all wireless intercourse would be fatal to any enterprise.

Towards the end of December a change was made in the squadron command. Other ships had been added to Squadron III since the declaration of war. The König, Grosser Kurfürst and Markgraf had all made their trial trips. The Kronprinz was very near completion and on January 2 was enrolled as the eighth ship in the squadron. I was entrusted with the command of this squadron. It was no easy matter for me to separate from Squadron II, which had been under my command for nearly two whole years, as I had learnt to value the splendid spirit of the crews, who, in spite of the inferior fighting powers of the ships, made it a point of honour never to be behindhand in anything. But personal feelings were not to be considered, and I had to look upon it as a great distinction that the command of our most powerful fighting squadron was given to me. The command of Squadron II was taken over on December 26 by Rear-Admiral Funke, whereupon I left for Wilhelmshaven to take up my position on the Prinz Regent Luitpold. The ensuing time was fully occupied in learning to know the peculiarities of the new class of ship and the standard of fighting power of each individual vessel, and in judging the personality of the commanders and the corps of officers. The prevailing conditions of war made it more difficult to cultivate close relations with them than would have been the case in peace time. My chief object was so to train the unit as to make it absolutely reliable for implicit obedience to commands. I applied, therefore, to the Commander-in-Chief for an opportunity for a period of training in the Baltic towards the end of January. This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that since they were commissioned the four ships of the "König" class had had no practice in torpedo firing.

From a military point of view torpedo firing practice is an urgent necessity in the training and further development of all torpedo officers, those who are in charge of the torpedo tubes, and of those in reserve, in order to prove that the results from the use of the weapon are equal to expectations. Particular attention must be given to range practice and angle-discharging, which make a great demand on the ability of the torpedo men. During the war many ships were provided with torpedoes with all the latest improvements, without the crew having had an opportunity to fire them or become familiar with the handling of them. Experience showed that it was necessary to test every torpedo that had lain unused for more than five months to make sure that it would act when needed. So long as enemy submarines remained in those waters the inner Bight of the North Sea was not a suitable place for gun-practice; these craft could not have had a better opportunity for firing their torpedoes. The mouths of the rivers certainly offered chances to our gunners of practice on objects passing by, but there was very little scope for gun practice at long range under fighting conditions. The necessity of combining the training period with the time required for unavoidable repairs, as also with the war activities of the Fleet which called for the participation of the highest possible number of ships, was a matter of extreme difficulty from the point of view of organisation.

Before Squadron III could sail for the Baltic there was to be another enterprise by the Fleet in the North Sea, which, owing to bad weather, was postponed from day to day. January, 1915, opened with most unfavourable weather, and one violent storm followed rapidly on another. But when, in searching for a passage for the Fleet through the minefields, it was discovered that many new ones had been laid down, both north of Amrum and west of Borkum, and also in the gap between Norderney and the safety barrier we had put down, the plan for an advance by the Fleet was abandoned. These mines would first have had to be removed, which would have been slow work owing to the bad weather. Instead of a big action by the Fleet, two light cruisers went out to lay mines and succeeded in placing a barrier 50 nautical miles from the English coast, close to the mouth of the Humber, presumably just in the enemy's outgoing course.

Towards the middle of the month the Fleet was kept at a high pitch of readiness as there was reason to believe the English were planning a blockade of our estuaries. The idea was extremely probable, as the poor visibility in winter weather offered the most favourable conditions for carrying it out. In the Jade particularly the channel for large vessels was so narrow and so shallow that the traffic was greatly hindered, especially in the case of certain vessels. There could be no warding off such an attack by a coast battery, as Wangeroog was not yet fortified. In any case, we could not afford to over-estimate the difficulty of carrying out such an undertaking; in view of the vast amount of material possessed by England for such a purpose, success in it was by no means out of the question. The fact that the Fleet would be obliged to push the undertaking to our very river mouths doubtless formed their chief reason for not making such an attempt, the success of which would have been very detrimental to the carrying out of our U-boat and mining warfare.

On the morning of January 19, an aeroplane having sighted 60 miles north-west of Heligoland numerous English ships bound on an easterly course, among them several battle-cruisers and close upon ioo small craft, we made sure that their plan was to be put into execution. It is quite possible that the aeroplane was mistaken as to the number and type of the ships, although the report was confirmed from another source - two U-boats that returned from sea. However, the torpedo-boats which were sent out to reconnoitre and to attack at night if necessary saw nothing of the enemy forces, so they probably had withdrawn early. At any rate we considered the danger of a blockade to be at an end.

On January 21 Squadron III sailed for the Elbe. During the passage there was a violent snowstorm which made it very difficult to locate the mouth of the river. Owing to the rapidly falling depth of water as shown by the soundings taken, we were forced to anchor, a manoeuvre carried out in exemplary fashion by the big ships, in spite of the current and the mist. It showed very clearly the difference between the navigation of a squadron of such large vessels and that of Squadron II where the ships had not half the displacement. The next morning the weather was calm and clear, and the passage through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was accomplished without accident. It took us only 10 hours to cover the long stretch of 100 kilometres from the lock gates at Brunnsbiittel to the entrance into the lock at Holtenau in Kiel Harbour.

While the training of Squadron III was proceeding in the Baltic, the first regular cruiser action took place in the North Sea.

Battle of Cruisers off the Dogger Bank
After a long period of inaction, the weather being apparently favourable, the commander of the scouting ships was ordered on January 23 to reconnoitre off the Dogger Bank with the cruisers of the 1st and 2nd Scouting Divisions, the First Leader of the Torpedo-boat Forces, and the Second Flotilla, and there to destroy any of the enemy's light forces to be met with. They were to set out in the evening, when darkness fell, and were expected back the following evening when it was again dark.

The speed of the advance was to be such that the cruisers, at daybreak on the 24th, would have reached the south-east edge of the Dogger Bank. It was not intended to push farther on towards the Bank while it was still dark, otherwise enemy forces might make their way unobserved in between Heligoland and the cruisers. On the way there no trade or fishing steamers were to be examined, if it could be avoided, so as not to be forced to leave any of our torpedo-boats behind; but the plan of action for the homeward run included the examination and, where necessary, seizure of all the fishing steamers encountered.



The big cruiser Von der Tann was missing from our cruiser squadron, being in dock for urgently needed repairs, as was also the light cruiser Strassburg. The fighting force, therefore, comprised the cruisers Seydlitz - the flagship of Rear-Admiral Hipper - Derfflinger, Moltke and Blücher, the light cruisers Graudenz, Stralsund, Kolberg and Rostock, Torpedo-Boat Flotilla V, and the 2nd and i8th Half-Flotillas. The Graudenz and Stralsund formed the vanguard, the flanks were supported by the Rostock on the starboard and by the Kolberg on the larboard side. A half-flotilla was attached to each light cruiser.

At 8.15 a.m. on the 24th the Kolberg encountered an enemy light cruiser and destroyers. The enemy's signal of recognition was answered by the Kolberg turning on the searchlight and shortly afterwards opening fire, which was returned a few minutes later. The Kolberg was hit twice and had two men killed. At the same time she sighted thick clouds of smoke in a west-south-westerly direction, and the Stralsund also reported to the same effect to the north-north-west.

The conclusion thus to be drawn was that other and more numerous forces were lying off the Dogger Bank.



After Admiral Hipper had picked up the Kolberg he assembled his group on a south-easterly course, as it was still not sufficiently light to make out the number and type of the enemy forces. While the ships were assembling, four cruisers of the "Town" class, three cruisers of the "Arethusa" class, and a large number of destroyers were sighted on a parallel course north of our cruisers, but out of gun range. The Blücher was able to count more than twenty destroyers. Further clouds of smoke could be seen in their rear, and the Stralsund reported that at least eight large ships were observable in a north-north-westerly direction.

Admiral Hipper was bound therefore to assume that at the rear of these numerous light forces there must be other and stronger groups of ships, and, as he could not count on any support from our own Main Fleet, he decided to push on full speed ahead in a south-easterly direction. The torpedo-boats were sent on ahead. The Blücher, being the rear ship, was permitted at discretion to open fire, as some of the destroyers to the north approached very near, while the light cruisers with them stood off farther to the north.



At 9.35 a.m., however, five thick clouds of smoke were observed from starboard in a west to west-north-west direction, which were soon made out to be from the 1st English Battle-Cruiser Squadron. They came up at full speed and opened fire at a great distance, about 200 hm., and, at first at any rate, without reaching our cruisers.

The naval command at Wilhelmshaven received the first news of the encounter of our cruisers with the enemy at 8.50 a.m., when the Seydlitz reported herself as being at 54° 53' N. Lat. and 3° 30'E. Long., course S.E., speed 20 knots, and had sighted eight large ships, one light cruiser and twelve destroyers. The command at once issued orders for special preparation on board all ships and torpedo-boat flotillas and assembled them in the Schillig Roads. As the way to the Bight was open to our cruisers, and they were in touch with the enemy forces in the rear, it was assumed that so far our ships were not in any danger. Towards 10.30 a.m. the squadrons were all assembled in the Schillig Roads, and ran out to sea at 11. 10, as a wireless message had come from the Admiral at 11 o'clock, saying he was in urgent need of support. He was then at 54° 30' N. Lat. and 4° 35' E. Long.

These forces were, however, not called upon to take any active part in the battle, as the further- development of the fighting at that time showed it to be unnecessary.

Meanwhile the situation of the cruisers had developed as follows: At 10 a.m. our large cruisers were lying on a south-easterly course, so that all the ships could open fire from the starboard on the English large cruisers. Our light cruisers and both the flotillas were ahead of our large cruisers, slightly on the starboard side.



The enemy battle-cruisers came up very rapidly, and must have made a speed of at least 26 knots.

Our 1st Scouting Division was not favourably situated, owing to the prevailing east-north-east wind. There was nothing for it, however, but to keep to the south-east course, leading to the Bight, as the main direction for the fighting. The chances of support from our own forces were greater there, and the farther we could succeed in drawing the enemy into the Bight the greater prospect there would be of setting torpedo-boats on him during the ensuing night. Any other course leading farther south or still farther west would not greatly have improved the smoke conditions, but would from the first have placed the enemy battle-cruisers in a frontal position. On the other hand, a north-easterly course, so as to have the wind ahead, would have carried our forces straight up against the enemy destroyers, and thus offered them a good opportunity for attack. Soon after 10 o'clock our large cruisers opened fire at 180 hm.; the enemy manoeuvred so as to avoid our fire. At the same time our cruisers also turned about between E.S.E. and S.E. to a S. course. The range for the leading ship, the Seydlitz, varied between 180 to 145 hm. The enemy had separated and formed two groups, the leading one having three, and the other two ships.

They were trying, to keep at the farthest firing distance. Soon after the fighting began the Seydlitz was badly hit and both her after turrets, with their two 28-cm. guns, were put out of action, while fires were caused in them by the exploding ammunition. The gunners in both turrets were killed, and the turrets themselves jammed and put out of action, Owing to the fire, which took a long time to extinguish, the munition chamber had to be flooded.

Meanwhile some of the light cruisers and destroyers were steaming up on the larboard [port] side, so that the near ships could fire on them occasionally. In doing so Blücher, the last ship, hit and heavily damaged a destroyer. At 11.30 the enemy appeared to be drawing nearer; at the same time the Blücher reported engine trouble and dropped slowly to the rear.

The order "Flotilla clear for attack" was then sent to the torpedo-boat leader. At 11.45 the leading enemy ship, with a heavy list on, turned off and drew out of the line. The ship following after her passed the leader, so as to keep up the running fight. The other enemy battle-cruisers followed at irregular distances. At 12 o'clock our cruisers turned towards the enemy, and the torpedo-boats were ordered to attack. The enemy battle-cruisers then turned at once to a northerly course to evade the torpedo-boats and to turn on the Blücher, which had been left behind. In view of this manoeuvre the torpedo-boats were recalled from the attack.



Our cruisers now took up a southerly course, intending to open an encircling fight with, the enemy, and if possible render help to the Blücher. But both turrets on board the Seydlitz, with two-fifths of the heavy guns, were definitely out of action, and the ship's stern was full of water which had spread to the other parts from the flooding of the munition chamber, so the Admiral of the cruisers therefore decided to profit by the increased distance caused by the enemy's manoeuvre to turn again to S.E. and break off the fight. At 1.45 the enemy was lost to view, the Seydlitz being then 25 nautical miles north of the mouth of the Elbe.



At 3.30 p.m. the forces that had run out from the Jade joined the returning cruisers and together entered the rivers.

Besides the explosion and the list on the leading enemy ship, many other hits and a big fire on the second ship were observed. Several officers asserted positively that they had seen one of the large cruisers sink, which gave rise to the report that it was the battle-cruiser Tiger. Contradictory reports from an English source appeared later in the Press and confirmed the opinion that the English wished to conceal the fact. The airship "L 5," which was hovering over the spot, reported that only four large ships were seen to withdraw. The torpedo-boat "V 5," Lieut.-Commander von Eichhorn, which, after being recalled from the attack, had dropped out from between the two fighting lines, fired two torpedoes at 70 hm., and thereupon observed the withdrawal of a battle-cruiser. There seems no obvious reason why the English cruisers should so soon have stopped fighting after their leader fell out and when the number of our cruisers had already dwindled to three, unless it was because our guns had severely handled them.

On our side we deplored the loss of the Blücher. Very soon after her engines were damaged another shot caused an explosion and a fire amidships, apparently in the big ammunition chamber, situated in that part of the vessel. It was observed how to the very last the ship's guns on both sides fired on the battle-cruisers which concentrated their fire on that one ship, as did also the numerous enemy light cruisers and destroyers, for whom the wrecked ship was a welcome target, until at 1.7 p.m. she turned over and sank. The survivors of the crew were picked up by English destroyers and other ships that were at hand, among them being the gallant commander, Captain Erdmann, who unfortunately died afterwards while a prisoner in England of pneumonia, the result of the immersion in the cold sea after his ship had gone down. The Derfflinger and Kolberg were slightly damaged; the Seydlitz was badly hit a second time on her armoured belt, the plate being pressed into the ship's side and causing a leakage. The first shell that hit her had a terrible effect. It pierced right through the upper deck in the ship's stern and through the barbette-armour of the near turret, where it exploded. All parts of the stern, the officers' quarters, mess, etc., that were near where the explosion took place were totally wrecked. In the reloading chamber, where the shell penetrated, part of the charge in readiness for loading was set on fire. The flames rose high up into the turret and down into the munition chamber, and thence through a connecting door usually kept shut, by which the men from the munition chamber tried to escape into the fore turret. The flames thus made their way through to the other munition chamber, and thence again up to the second turret, and from this cause the entire gun crews of both turrets perished almost instantly. The flames rose as high as a house above the turrets.

Up to 12 noon there had been no prospect of the torpedo-boat flotillas making a successful attack; the distances were too great. The torpedo-boats would have been obliged to get within 100 hm. of the enemy to secure an opportunity of firing. When the distances were reduced and there was an opening for attack the enemy turned away and gave up the fight. At that time Admiral Beatty, leader of the English battle-cruisers, was not in command. From information received later, it appeared he had stayed behind on the Lion, and had then boarded a torpedo-boat to hurry after his ships, but did not reach them till they were returning.

The spot where the Blücher was sunk is at 54° 25' N. Lat., 5° 25' E. Long. When Admiral Hipper decided to break off the fight he, according to his report, was guided by the conviction that it would be of no avail to send help to the already sinking Blücher, and in view of the enemy's superior strength would only involve us in further losses. The fighting had lasted more than three hours, and the Seydlitz had only 200 rounds of ammunition for the guns. The Naval Command fully recognised that no objection could be raised to the conduct of the forces in the battle, or to the tactical measures adopted, and also approved of the decision, hard though it was, to abandon the Blücher to her fate.

If our battle-cruisers, by turning round and risking the three remaining cruisers, had approached the Blücher, then unnavigable, they would have entangled themselves in the most unfavourable tactical position imaginable, as their own torpedo-boats would have been astern of them, while the enemy would have had his light cruisers and destroyers directly ahead, and could have used them for a torpedo attack. The result was, therefore, more than doubtful; there would probably have been heavy casualties without corresponding loss on the other side, and the Blücher could not possibly have been saved.

The enemy's behaviour obviously shows that it was his intention, relying on the heavier calibre of his guns, to carry on the fighting at the greatest distance, to knock out the central guns (15-cm.) of our ships, and above all to keep themselves beyond the range of our torpedoes. It would have been easy for him to draw nearer, as was proved when he steamed up so quickly. His superior speed enabled him to select the range at his own pleasure. In spite of superior guns and the more favourable position of the English line, their firing in the protracted running fight was not very successful when we take into consideration that three of their ships each had eight 34-cm. guns and the two others each eight 30.5-cm. guns. Opposed to them on our side were two ships each with ten 28-cm. guns, the Blücher with twelve 2i-cm., and the Derfflinger with eight 30.5-cm. It is not surprising that the Blücher was destroyed by gun-fire; her armour plating was not very thick, and, being the last ship of our line, most of the enemy's fire was concentrated on her.

However regrettable was the great loss of life on board the Seydlitz through the fire spreading to the munition chamber of each turret, a valuable lesson had been learned for the future in dealing with reserve ammunition, and it was applied in subsequent actions.

The unexpected presence of the English ships on the morning of the 24th leads to the conclusion that the encounter was not a matter of chance,, but that our plan in some way or other had got to the knowledge of the English. The leader of our cruisers, seeing so many ships assembled, must have considered it extremely probable that still more forces were behind. Whether there was any other reason for such a concentration cannot be maintained with certainty. It may possibly be that it was connected with the conduct of the English on the 19th, or with preparations for a new action.

As we know from the English accounts, the Lion was not able to reach harbour under her own steam but was taken in tow by the Indomitable during the afternoon, and towed to the Firth of Forth. The question as to whether our flotillas that stood by the cruisers could have kept in touch with the enemy so as to attack at night must be negatived, as they would not have had sufficient fuel. As regards the flotillas assembled in the Jade, when the news of the encounter reached them the enemy was already so far ahead as to exclude the prospect of a successful night attack.

This first serious fight with large ships which the Fleet had had the opportunity of participating in proved that the fighting preparedness of the ships as regards the training of all on board was on a very high level, that the ships were handled in a correct and reliable manner, and that the serving of the guns, the signalling, and the transmission of orders from ship to ship during the fight, as well as the measures necessitated by leakages, had all worked admirably. Everywhere the behaviour of the crews was exemplary. The case of the Seydlitz (Captain von Egidy), from which ship, in spite of the fierce fire raging on board, the command of the whole unit was calmly maintained, deserves special emphasis.