Galvestion Railway Company v. Woodbury/Opinion of the Court

On March 14, 1917, Mrs. Woodbury took the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway at San Antonio, Tex., for El Paso, Tex., and checked her trunk, which she took with her. It was lost and she sued the company in a state district court for the value of trunk and contents, which the jury found to be $500. Mrs. Woodbury was traveling on a coupon ticket purchased at Timmins, Ontario, from a Canadian railroad, entitling her to travel over it and connecting lines, from Timmins to El Paso and return, apparently with stop-over privileges. When the trunk was lost she was on her journey out. She was not told, when she purchased her ticket or when she checked her trunk, that there was any limitation upon the amount of the carrier's liability. It did not appear whether the ticket purchased contained notice of any such limitation, nor did it appear what was the law of Canada in this respect. The company insisted that Mrs. Woodbury was on an interstate journey, and that under the Act to Regulate Commerce (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended [Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.]), it was not liable for more than $100, since it had duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published a tariff limiting liability to that amount unless the passenger declared a higher value and paid excess charges, which Mrs. Woodbury had not done. She insisted that her transportation was not subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, because it began in a foreign country, and that the liability was governed by the law of Canada, which should, in the absence of evidence, be assumed to be like the law of Texas, the forum, and that by the law of Texas the limitation of liability was invalid. The trial court held that she was entitled to recover only $100, and entered judgment for that amount. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, which entered judgment for Mrs. Woodbury in the sum of $500. 209 S. W. 432. The case came here on writ of certiorari. 250 U.S. 637, 39 Sup. Ct. 493, 63 L. Ed. 1183. The only question before us is the amount of damages recoverable.

If Mrs. Woodbury's journey had started in New York, instead of across the border in Canada, the provision in the published tariff would clearly have limited the liability of the carrier to $100; for her journey would have been interstate, although the particular stage of it on which the trunk was lost lay wholly within the state of Texas. Compare Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Sabine Tramway Co., 227 U.S. 111, 33 Sup. Ct. 229, 57 L. Ed. 442. And the Carmack Amendment (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), under which carriers may limit liability by published tariff, applies to the baggage of a passenger carried in interstate commerce (Boston & Maine Railroad Co. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526, 58 L. Ed. 368, L. R. A. 1915B, 450 Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593), although it does not deal with liability for personal injuries suffered by the passenger (Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Maucher, 248 U.S. 359, 39 Sup. Ct. 108, 63 L. Ed. 294). The subsequent legislation, the Cummins Amendment (Act March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196), as amended by the Act of August 9, 1916, c. 301, 39 Stat. 441 (Comp. St. §§ 8592, 8604a), has not altered the rule regarding liability for baggage.

But counsel for Mrs. Woodbury insists that solely because her journey originated in Canada the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce do not apply. The contention is that section 1 of the act of 1887 does not apply to the transportation of passengers from a foreign country to a point in the United States. To this there are two answers. The first is that the transportation here in question is not that of a passenger, but of property. Boston & Maine Railroad Co. v. Hooker, supra. The second is that the act does apply to the transportation of both passengers and property from an adjacent foreign country, such as Canada. Section 1 declares that the act applies to 'any common carrier * *  * engaged in the transportation of passengers or property *  *  * from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country.' A carrier engaged in transportation by rail to an adjacent foreign country is, at least ordinarily, engaged in transportation also from that country to the United States. The test of the application of the act is not the direction of the movement, but the nature of the transportation as determined by the field of the carriers' operation. This is the construction placed upon the act by the Interstate Commerce Commission. International Paper Co. v. D. & H. Co., 33 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 270, 273, citing T. & P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U.S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940. It is in harmony with that placed upon the words of section 1 of the Harter Act (Act Feb. 13, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 445 [Comp. St. § 8029]), 'any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports,' which in Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69, 75, 21 Sup. Ct. 30, 45 L. Ed. 90, were construed to include vessels bringing cargoes from foreign ports to the United States. There is a later clause in section 1 which deals specifically with the transportation of property to or from foreign countries; but cases arising under that clause are not applicable here. That clause applies where the foreign country is not adjacent to the United States. The cases which hold that the act does not govern shipments from a foreign country in bond through the United States to another place in a foreign country, whether adjacent or not, are also not in point. Compare United States v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. (D. C.) 188 Fed. 484; In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 671, 726-729; M. Canales v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co., 37 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 573.

Since the transportation here in question was subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, both carrier and passenger were bound by the provisions of the published tariffs. As these limited the recovery for baggage carried to $100, in the absence of a declaration of higher value and the payment of an excess charge, and as no such declaration was made and excess charge paid, that sum only was recoverable.

Reversed.