Foster v. Illinois/Dissent Rutledge

Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, and Mr. Justice MURPHY concur, dissenting.

I think the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of the right to counsel in criminal causes is applicable to such proceedings as this in state courts.

Apart from that view and upon the Court's basis that the Fourteenth Amendment by its own force independently prescribes a partial similar guaranty, cf. Palkov. Connect icut, 302 U.S. 319, 327, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527, I am unable to accept its conclusion in this case. Of course if the so-called presumption of regularity is to be effective to sustain the denial of counsel in circumstances as bald as those presented in Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1711, decided today, that presumption must work the same denial in the somewhat less startling facts of this case.

But when a record discloses as much as the record here shows, I do not think any presumption of regularity should be permitted to overcome the substance of the violated constitutional right. Such a presumption indeed, if valid by mere force of the fact that a judgment has been rendered, may always be indulged. Cf. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S.Ct. 370, 89 L.Ed. 407; De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596. And the consequences of such a course of action here, for the observance and preservation of constitutional rights, more especially of the indigent and ignorant who are unable to employ counsel from their own resources and do not know their rights, must be, not merely a denial of the basic right of counsel, but also a denial of the equal protection of the laws in sweeping application. Poverty or wealth will make all the difference in securing the substance or only the shadow of constitutional protections.

Here petitioners were charged with the serious crimes of burglary and larceny, handed a copy of the indictment, and arraigned. Every lawyer knows the difficulties of pleading to such charges, including the technicalities of the applicable statutes and especially of the practice relating to included or lesser offenses. The crimes charged involved penalties of imprisonment for from one year to life, the penalty actually imposed upon these petitioners.

On the very day the indictment was handed down, petitioners were arraigned, their pleas of guilty were accepted, and they were sentenced. At no time were they offered counsel or advised of their right to counsel, nor did they receive any assistance from counsel. The record, it is true, recites that they were 'advised of their rights of Trial and of the consequences of an entry of a plea of guilty,' notwithstanding which each said that he was guilty, whereupon the court 'advises and admonishes each of said defendants of the consequences of entering such pleas of guilty,' despite which each persisted in his plea.

However this vague and formal recital might be taken in other circumstances, it cannot be regarded in this case as meaning that petitioners were either offered counsel or informed of any right to counsel. Indeed the recital must be taken as having deliberately avoided including statements in either respect. And, upon the record as a whole, we are required not only to read it in this light but to conclude that the recital and the intentional omission of statements concerning the right to counsel were effective to establish that the petitioners were in fact denied that right.

The Court does not point out, but it is the very heart of this case, that under Illinois law these petitioners were, in effect, denied the right to have counsel tendered or appointed by the court. It was under no duty imposed by state law to tender counsel, to inquire into the need for counsel, or to inform the defendants of any right to counsel. Indeed, under the law of the state, it seems, the court would have exceeded its powers by taking action in any of these respects.

We are not only entitled, we are required, to read the record of the state's proceedings in the light of the state's law applicable to them. In Illinois by statute it is only in capital cases that the court is under an affirmative duty, when it appears that a defendant is indigent, to tender appointment of counsel. In non capital cases the following statute applies:

' * *  * Every person charged with crime shall be allowed counsel, and when he shall state upon oath that he is unable to procure counsel, the court shall assign him competent counsel, who shall conduct his defense.' Ill.Rev.Stat. (1945) c. 38, par. 730.

The Illinois Supreme Court consistently has construed this statute as requiring appointment of counsel only when a defendant requests counsel and states on oath that he cannot procure counsel. It is expressly held that the provision 'does not place upon the court the duty to proffer the services of counsel, * *  * .' People v. Lavendowski, 326 Ill. 173, 176, 157 N.E.193, 194, nor does it require advising defendants of their right to counsel. People v. Corrie, 387 Ill. 587, 589, 590, 56 N.E.2d 767. See also People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41, 55 N.E.2d 74; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312, 53 N.E.2d 878; People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67, 60 N.E.2d 205. And the failure of the defendant to state his need and inability to procure counsel under oath is taken apparently as a waiver of the right. Cf. People v. Stubblefield, 391 Ill. 609, 610, 63 N.E.2d 762.

Finally, the opinion of the Illinois court in this case shows that petitioners were denied relief on the basis of these rules.

In the light of the Illinois statutes and decisions, therefore, the present record can be taken to sustain no presumption that the trial court offered counsel to petitioners, inquired concerning their need for counsel or ability to secure such aid, or advised them in any way of their right to have that assistance. The only tenable presumption is that the court refrained deliberately, in accordance with the state law, from taking action in any of these respects.

Moreover, when men appear in court for trial or plea, obviously without counsel or so far as appears the means of securing such aid, under serious charges such as were made here involving penalties of the character imposed, it is altogether inconsistent with their federal constitutional right for the court to shut its eyes to their apparently helpless condition without so much as an inquiry concerning its cause. A system so callous of the rights of men, not only in their personal freedom but in their rights to trial comporting with any conception of fairness, as to tolerate such action, is in my opinion wholly contrary to the scheme of things the nation's charter establishes. Courts and judges, under that plan, owe something more than the negative duty to sit silent and blind while men go on their way to prison, for all that appears, for want of any hint of their rights.

Adding to this blindness a 'presumption of regularity' to sustain what has thus been done makes a mockery of judicial proceedings in any sense of the administration of justice and a snare and a delusion of constitutional rights for all unable to pay the cost of securing their observance.