Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp./Opinion of the Court

This case raises a variety of questions concerning the proper standards to be applied by a United States district court in passing on a motion for summary judgment in a civil antitrust action. Petitioner, Fortner Enterprises, Inc., filed this suit seeking treble damages and an injunction against alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. The complaint charged that respondents, United States Steel Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary, the United States Steel Homes Credit Corp., had engaged in a contract, combination, and conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize trade in the sale of prefabricated houses. It alleged that there was a continuing agreement between respondents 'to force corporations and individuals, including the plaintiff, as a condition to availing themselves of the services of United States Steel Homes Credit Corporation, to purchase at artificially high prices only United States Steel Homes * *  * .' Specifically, petitioner claimed that in order to obtain loans totaling over $2,000,000 from the Credit Corp. for the purchase and development of certain land in the Louisville, Kentucky, area, it had been required to agree, as a condition of the loans, to erect a prefabricated house manufactured by U.S. Steel on each of the lots purchased with the loan proceeds. Petitioner claimed that the prefabricated materials were then supplied by U.S. Steel at unreasonably high prices and proved to be defective and unusable, thus requiring the expenditure of additional sums and delaying the completion date for the development. Petitioner sought treble damages for the profits thus lost, along with a decree enjoining respondents from enforcing the requirement of the loan agreement that petitioner use only houses manufactured by U.S. Steel.

After pretrial proceedings in which a number of affidavits and answers to interrogatories were filed, the District Court entered summary judgment for respondents, holding that petitioner's allegations had failed to raise any question of fact as to a possible violation of the antitrust laws, 293 F.Supp. 762. Noting that the agreement involved here was essentially a tying arrangement, under which the purchaser was required to take a tied product-here prefabricated homes-as a condition of being allowed to purchase the tying product-here credit, the District Judge held that petitioner had failed to establish the prerequisites of illegality under our tying cases, namely sufficient market power over the tying product and foreclosure of a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion 6 Cir., 404 F.2d 936, and we granted certiorari, 393 U.S. 820, 89 S.Ct. 126, 21 L.Ed.2d 92 (1968). Since we find no basis for sustaining this summary judgment, we reverse and order that the case proceed to trial.

We agree with the District Court that the conduct challenged here primarily involves a tying arrangement of the traditional kind. The Credit Corp. sold its credit only on the condition that petitioner purchase a certain number of prefabricated houses from the Homes Division of U.S. Steel. Our cases have made clear that, at least when certain prerequisites are met, arrangements of this kind are illegal in and of themselves, and no specific showing of unreasonable competitive effect is required. The discussion in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6, 78 S.Ct. 514, 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958), is dispositive of this question:

'(T)here are certain agreements or practices which because of     their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any      redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable      and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the      precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for      their use. * *  *

' * *  * Where (tying) conditions are successfully exacted      competition on the merits with respect to the tied product is      inevitably curbed. Indeed 'tying agreements serve hardly any     purpose beyond the suppression of competition.' Standard Oil      Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-306, 69      S.Ct. 1051, 1058, 93 L.Ed. 1371. They deny competitors free     access to the market for the tied product, not because the      party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or      a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to     forego their free choice between competing products. For     these reasons 'tying agreements fare harshly under the laws      forbidding restraints of trade.' Times-Picayune Publishing      Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606, 73 S.Ct. 872, 879,     97 L.Ed. 1277. They are unreasonable in and of themselves     whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect      to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition      in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial'      amount of interstate commerce is affected. International Salt     Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20.' (Footnote omitted.)

Despite its recognition of this strict standard, the District Court held that petitioner had not even made out a case for the jury. The court held that respondents did not have 'sufficient economic power' over credit, the tying product here, because although the Credit Corp.'s terms evidently made the loans uniquely attractive to petitioner, petitioner had not proved that the Credit Corp. enjoyed the same unique attractiveness or economic contr l with respect to buyers generally. The court also held that the amount of interstate commerce affected was 'insubstantial' because only a very small percentage of the land available for development in the area was foreclosed to competing sellers of prefabricated houses by the contract with petitioner. We think it plain that the District Court misunderstood the two controlling standards and misconceived the extent of its authority to evaluate the evidence in ruling on this motion for summary judgment.

A preliminary error that should not pass unnoticed is the District Court's assumption that the two prerequisites mentioned in Northern Pacific are standards that petitioner must meet in order to prevail on the merits. On the contrary, these standards are necessary only to bring into play the doctrine of per se illegality. Where the standards were found satisfied in Northern Pacific, and in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947), this Court approved summary judgment against the defendants but by no means implied that inability to satisfy these standards would be fatal to a plaintiff's case. A plaintiff can still prevail on the merits whenever he can prove, on the basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the practices involved, that the general standards of the Sherman Act have been violated. Accordingly, even if we could agree with the District Court that the Northern Pacific standards were not satisfied here, the summary judgment against petitioner still could not be entered without further examination of petitioner's general allegations that respondents conspired together for the purpose of restraining competition and acquiring a monopoly in the market for prefabricated houses. And such an examination could rarely justify summary judgment with respect to a claim of this kind, for as we said in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962):

'We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly     in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play      leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the      alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to     cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be      given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is     no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the      hallmark of 'even handed justice." (Footnote omitted.)

We need not consider, however, whether petitioner is entitled to a trial on this more general theory, for it is clear that petitioner raised questions of fact which, if proved at trial, would bring this tying arrangement within the scope of the per se doctrine. The requirement that a 'not insubstantial' amount of commerce be involved makes no reference to the scope of any particular market or to the share of that market foreclosed by the tie, and hence we could not approve of the trial judge's conclusions on this issue even if we agreed that his definition of the relevant market was the proper one. An analysis of market shares might become relevant if it were alleged that an apparently small dollar-volume of business actually represented a substantial part of the sales for which competitors were bidding. But normally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie, for as we said in International Salt, it is 'unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market' by a tying arrangement, 332 U.S. at 396, 68 S.Ct. at 15.

The complaint and affidavits filed here leave no room for doubt that the volume of commerce allegedly foreclosed was substantial. It may be true, as respondents claim, that petitioner's annual purchases of houses from U.S. Steel under the tying arrangement never exceeded $190,000, while more than $500,000 in annual sales was involved in the tying arrangement held illegal in International Salt, but we cannot agree with respondents that a sum of almost $200,000 is paltry or 'insubstantial.' In any event, a narrow focus on the volume of commerce foreclosed by the particular contract or contracts in suit would not be appropriate in this context. As the special provision awarding treble damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates, Congress has encouraged private antitrust litigation not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but also to vindicate the important public interest in free competition. See Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-139, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 20 L.Ed.2d 982 (1968). For purposes of determining whether the amount of commerce foreclosed is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of the practice, therefore, the relevant figure is the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge, not the portion of this total accounted for by the particular plaintiff who brings suit. In International Salt the $500,000 total represented the volume of tied sales to all purchasers, and although this amount was directly involved because the case was brought by the Government against the practice generally, the case would have been no less worthy of judicial scrutiny if it had been brought by one individual purchaser who accounted for only a fraction of the $500,000 in tied sales. In the present case, the annual sales allegedly foreclosed by respondents' tying arrangements throughout the country totaled almost $4,000,000 in 1960, more than $2,800,000 in 1961, and almost $2,300,000 in 1962. These amounts could scarcely be regarded as insubstantial.

The standard of 'sufficient economic power' does not, as the District Court held, require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying product can be sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market. See, e.g., International Salt; Northern Pacific; United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S.Ct. 97, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962). As we said in the Loew's case, 371 U.S. at 45, 83 S.Ct. at 102: 'Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.'

These decisions rejecting the need for proof of truly dominant power over the tying product have all been based on a recognition that because tying arrangements generally served no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie. Such appreciable restraint results whenever the seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the market, even if his power is not complete over them and over all other buyers in the market. In fact, complete dominance throughout the market, the concept that the District Court apparently had in mind, would never exist even under a pure monopoly. Market power is usually stated to be the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output, for reduced output is the almost inevitable result of higher prices. Even a complete monopolist can seldom raise his price without losing some sales; many buyers will cease to buy the product, or buy less, as the price rises. Market power is therefore a source of serious concern for essentially the same reason, regardless of whether the seller has the greatest economic power possible or merely some lesser degree of appreciable economic power. In both instances, despite the freedom of some or many buyers from the seller's power, other buyers-whether few or many, whether scattered throughout the market or part of some group within the market-can be forced to accept the higher price because of their stronger preferences for the product, and the seller could therefore choose instead to force them to accept a tying arrangement that would prevent free competition for their patronage in the market for the tied product. Accordingly, the proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market.

The affidavits put forward by petitioner clearly entitle it to its day in court under the standard. The construction company president stated that competitors of U.S. Steel sold prefabricated houses and built conventional homes for at least $400 less than U.S. Steel's price for comparable models. Since in a freely competitive situation buyers would not accept a tying arrangement obligating them to buy a tied product at a price higher than the going market rate, this substantial price differential with respect to the tied product (prefabricated houses) in itself may suggest that respondents had some special economic power in the credit market. In addition, petitioner's president, A. B. Fortner, stated that he accepted the tying condition on respondents' loan solely because the offer to provide 100% financing, lending an amount equal to the full purchase price of the land to be acquired, was unusually and uniquely advantageous to him. He found that no such financing was available to his corporation on any such cheap terms from any other source during the 1959-1962 period. His views on this were supported by the president of a finance company in the Louisville area, who stated in an affidavit that the type of advantageous financing plan offered by U.S. Steel 'was not available to Fortner Enterprises or any other potential borrower from or through Louisville Mortgage Service Company or from or through any other lending institution or mortgage company to this affiant's knowledge during this period.'

We do not mean to accept petitioner's apparent argument that market power can be inferred simply because the kind of financing terms offered by a lending company are 'unique and unusual.' We do mean, however, that uniquely and unusually advantageous terms can reflect a creditor's unique economic advantages over his competitors. Since summary judgment in antitrust cases is disfavored, Poller, supra, the claims of uniqueness in this case should be read in the light most favorable to petitioner. They could well mean that U.S. Steel's subsidiary Credit Corp. had a unique economic ability to provide 100% financing at cheap rates. The affidavits show that for a three-to-four-year period no other financial institution in the Louisville area was willing to match the special credit terms and rates of interest available from U.S. Steel. Since the possibility of a decline in property values, along with the difficulty of recovering full market value in a foreclosure sale, makes it desirable for a creditor to obtain collateral greater in value than the loan it secures, the unwillingness of competing financial institutions in the area to offer 100% financing probably reflects their feeling that they could not profitably lend money on the risks involved. U.S. Steel's subsidiary Credit Corp., on the other hand, may well have had a substantial competitive advantage in providing this type of financing because of economies resulting from the nationwide character of its operations. In addition, potential competitors such as banks and savings and loan associations may have been prohibited from offering 100% financing by state or federal law. Under these circumstances the pleadings and affidavits sufficiently disclose the possibility of market power over borrowers in the credit market to entitle petitioner to go to trial on this issue.

It may also be, of course, that these allegations will not be sustained when the case goes to trial. It may turn out that the arrangement involved here serves legitimate business purposes and that U.S. Steel's subsidiary does not have a competitive advantage in the credit market. But on the record before us it would be impossible to reach such conclusions as a matter of law, and it is not our function to speculate as to the ultimate findings of fact. We therefore conclude that the showing made by petitioner was sufficient on the market power issue.

Brief consideration should also be given to respondents' additional argument that even if their unique kind of financing reflected economic power in the credit market, and even if a substantial volume of commerce was affected, the arrangement involving credit should not be held illegal under normal tie-in principles. In support of this, respondents suggest that every sale on credit in effect involves a tie. They argue that the offering of favorable credit terms is simply a form of price competition equivalent to the offering of a comparable reduction in the cash price of the tied product. Consumers should not, they say, be deprived of such advantageous services, and they suffer no harm because they can buy the tangible product with credit obtained elsewhere if the combined price of the seller's credit-product package is less favorable than the cost of purchasing the components separately.

All of respondents' arguments amount essentially to the same claim-namely, that this opinion will somehow prevent those who manufacture goods from ever selling them on credit. But our holding in this case will have no such effect. There is, at the outset of every tie-in case, including the familiar cases involving physical goods, the problem of determining whether two separate products are in fact involved. In the usual sale on credit the seller, a single individual or corporation, simply makes an agreement determining when and how much he will be paid for his product. In such a sale the credit may constitute such an inseparable part of the purchase price for the item that the entire transaction could be considered to involve only a single product. It will be time enough to pass on the issue of credit sales when a case involving it actually arises. Sales such as that are a far cry from the arrangement involved here, where the credit is provided by one corporation on condition that a product be purchased from a separate corporation, and where the borrower contracts to obtain a large sum of money over and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical produ ts purchased. Whatever the standards for determining exactly when a transaction involves only a 'single product,' we cannot see how an arrangement such as that present in this case could ever be said to involve only a single product.

Nor does anything in respondents' arguments serve to distinguish credit from other kinds of goods and services, all of which may, when used as tying products, extend the seller's economic power to new markets and foreclose competition in the tied product. The asserted business justifications for a tie of credit are not essentially different from the justifications that can be advanced when the tying product is some other service or commodity. Although advantageous credit terms may be viewed as a form of price competition in the tied product, so is the offer of any other tying product on advantageous terms. In both instances, the seller can achieve his alleged purpose, without extending his economic power, by simply reducing the price of the tied product itself.

The potential harm is also essentially the same when the tying product is credit. The buyer may have the choice of buying the tangible commodity separately, but as in other cases the seller can use his power over the tying product to win customers that would otherwise have constituted a market available to competing producers of the tied product. '(C)ompetition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed.' Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 78 S.Ct. at 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545. Nor can it be assumed that because the product involved is money needed to finance a purchase, the buyer would not have been able to purchase from anyone else without the seller's attractive credit. A buyer might have a strong preference for a seller's credit because it would eliminate the need for him to lay out personal funds, borrow from relatives, put up additional collateral, or obtain guarantors, but any of these expedients might have been chosen to finance a purchase from a competing producer if the seller had not captured the sale by means of his tying arrangement.

In addition, barriers to entry in the market for the tied product are raised since, in order to sell to certain buyers, a new company not only must be able to manufacture the tied product but also must have sufficient financial strength to offer credit comparable to that provided by larger competitors under tying arrangements. If the larger companies have achieved economies of scale in their credit operations, they can of course exploit these economies legitimately by lowering their credit charges to consumers who purchase credit only, but economies in financing should not, any more than economies in other lines of business, be used to exert economic power over other products that the company produces no more efficiently than its competitors.

For all these reasons we can find no basis for treating credit differently in principle from other goods and services. Although money is a fungible commodity-like wheat or, for that matter, unfinished steel-credit markets, like other markets, are often imperfect, and it is easy to see how a big company with vast sums of money in its treasury could wield very substantial power in a credit market. Where this is true, tie-ins involving credit can cause all the evils that the antitrust laws have always been intended to prevent, crippling other companies that are equally, if not more, efficient in producing their own products. Therefore, the same inquiries must be made as to economic power over the tying product and substantial effect in the tied market, but where these factors are present no special treatment can be justified solely because credit, rather than some other product, is the source of the tying leverage used to restrain competition.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to let this suit proceed to trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN joins, dissenting.