Fichte (Adamson)/Chapter I

CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.

happens but rarely that the life of a philosopher has been so closely connected with the historical development of his people, that his name should be remembered rather on account of his practical activity than for his speculative researches. Yet if one does not misinterpret the evidence supplied in ample quantity by the numerous speeches, addresses, essays, memorials, and other documents which marked the celebration of the centenary of Fichte in 1862, circumstances in his case must have combined to bring about this result. Many occasional references were made by various speakers and writers to the philosophy of Fichte, and much was said of the speculative depth and richness of his writings, but all such remarks were manifestly external and by the way. The subtle metaphysician of the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ had evidently, in the estimation of his admirers, been overshadowed by the patriotic orator of the ‘Addresses to the German Nation.’ There exists not now, there never did exist to any extent, a school of followers of Fichte; it may well be doubted if there are at present half-a-dozen students of his works. As a patriot, as representative of what seems noblest and loftiest in the German character, he lives, and will doubtless continue to live, in the grateful remembrance of his countrymen; as a metaphysician, he lives not at all beyond the learned pages of the historians of philosophy.

That such should be the case will not appear surprising when there are taken into consideration the nature of the historical surroundings of Fichte’s career, and the relations in which he stood to them. His life coincided in time with the rise and partial development of the two events which have most affected the current of modern history,—the revolution in political ideas which originated in France, and the birth of intellectual activity in Germany. His life’s work was the part he played in the furtherance of these movements, and the durability of his fame has of necessity depended on the significance of his contributions to them, and the way in which they have worked themselves out.

Although the revolution in political and social organisations and the rise of new forms of intellectual life in Germany differed widely in external features,—for they belonged to diverse spheres of practical activity,—they were in fundamental agreement, not only as regards their ultimate aim, but also as regards the idea on which they proceeded. Both were in character reconstructive; in both the foundation for the new edifice was sought in the common, universal nature of humanity itself. The new political idea of the French Revolution—an idea expressed clearly, though with some contradictoriness, in the Contrat social—was that of the human agent, endowed by nature with certain primitive and inalienable rights, as the unit in the organisation of the state. The individual, on this view, was no longer to be regarded as receiving all state-rights by historical accident; distinctions of rank among citizens were no longer to be accepted on mere ground of fact; the state itself was to be looked upon as the mechanism in and through which the primitive rights of all individuals may receive due and adequate realisation; and the final standard of judgment as to the forms of the state organisation was placed in the reason of the individual The body politic thus appeared not as the accidental result of the conflict of individual, arbitrary volitions, but as the necessary product of the conjoint will of individuals with common characteristics, with primitive and equal rights. The individual was thought of, not as the embodiment of pure arbitrary caprice, but as the expression of a certain common nature, to the development of which he has an original, indefeasible right. A doctrine like this is liable to misuse, for the notion of rational liberty may easily degenerate, and historically did degenerate, into the apotheosis of mere power of will; and the positive element in it, the idea of the abstract rights of the individual, probably requires much modification: but it was an important advance upon the previous theory and practice of politics.

When one examines the general characteristics of the new intellectual productions of Germany, more especially in the sphere of philosophy, one is struck by the close resemblance in fundamental idea to that just noted. It was the essence of Kant’s endeavour, both in speculative and in ethical research, to show that the ultimate unit, the conscious subject, was not a mere atom, devoid of intrinsic characteristics, receiving all knowledge from without, and impelled to act solely by the natural relations between his individual impulses and things. In his view, the nature of the thinking subject was an indispensable factor both in knowledge and in action. In all knowledge, as he strove to show, there is a common element which springs from the very essence of the subject as cognitive or conscious; in all action, the indispensable element is the conscious exercise of will under common, universal law. Thus in the Kantian philosophy, the ultimate standard, both of intellectual and of ethical judgment, was indeed the individual, but the individual only as containing a universal or common feature. On the basis supplied by this common element, philosophy might proceed to reconstruct what had been dissolved by the speculative atomism of Hume.

Although, from the nature of the matter, no similarly exact statement can be given for the essence of the intellectual efforts in the direction of pure literature, there was manifest in them in various degrees the same tendency towards expression of the universal common elements in human life, as opposed to the treatment of trivial, personal, and accidental aims and occurrences which had characterised much of the earlier eighteenth century literature. If evidence of this were otherwise wanting, it would be amply supplied by considering the excesses of the principle in the writings of the first Romantic school. Not every one could bend the bow of Kant and Fichte: the philosophic principle that the individual consciousness is the ultimate test of truth and goodness, became for weaker minds a practical precept of moral and intellectual scepticism. The universal element sank out of sight, and there remained only, as aim of life, the satisfaction of individual, personal caprice. ‘Wilhelm Lovell’ is but a reckless parody of the Kantian system; ‘Lucinde,’ a hideous misapplication of Fichte’s ‘Wissenschaftslehre.’

Now the historic results of these two movements have been, for Germany at least, very different in character. On the one hand, the rude shock given by the political revolution and its consequences to the amorphous organisation of the German States, absolutely forced upon the German mind a conception which otherwise might long have remained dormant—the conception of a united, single German power. History amply shows us that it is often by what we in our ignorance call the brutal necessity of facts that an idea gains for itself a place among the realities of life; and there can be no question that the unity of the German people, foreshadowed in eloquent language by her patriotic thinkers at the beginning of this century, has been wrought out, with much swaying and struggling, rather by the pressure of external forces than by the unanimous acceptance of the idea. However this may be, and however widely the united German empire may differ in inner characteristics from that patriotic state to which Fichte, in his famous ‘Addresses,’ summoned his countrymen, no German who feels the full significance of the unity of his nation can fail to look back with pride and gratitude to the eloquent thinker, who, with the thoroughness of a philosopher and the zeal of a patriot, drew in ideal form the outlines of that which has now been happily realised. The part which Fichte has played in this movement is a warrant of undying fame.

On the other hand, the speculative movement begun by Kant is yet far from having exhausted itself: it can hardly be said to have begun to produce its full fruits. The contributions made here by Fichte were of the highest importance, and, as will afterwards become clear, they form an integral portion of the completed philosophic view, which in partial fashion was first presented by Kant. Nevertheless, Fichte’s work as a philosopher was never, even for himself, a finished whole, and the permanent results of his activity have been absorbed in the more comprehensive elaboration of the Kantian principles which make up the philosophy of Hegel. It is not probable, therefore, that Fichte’s system, as a system, will ever discharge a more important function than that which has already been its work in the history of philosophy. It has made clear much that was obscure in Kant; it has contributed to give a wider range to the method of philosophy characteristic of the Kantian system, and it has served to effect the transition from Kant to Hegel. More than this it has not done, and cannot do. Not without a certain historic justification, therefore, has it come about that the fame of Fichte depends more on his patriotic and practical efforts than on his speculative labours.

Ample materials for the life of Fichte are supplied by the biographical work of his son, I. H. Fichte, ‘J. G. Fichte’s Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel,’ 2 vols., 2d ed., 1862. An interesting sketch, from these materials, has been long before the English reader in Dr W. Smith’s ‘Memoir of Fichte,’ 3d ed., 1873. I. H. Fichte’s work should be supplemented by Weinhold, ‘Achtundvierzig Briefe von J. G. Fichte und seinen Verwandten,’ 1862; and by Noack, ‘J. G. Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren und Wirken,’ which is somewhat ill-tempered but amusing.

The complete works of the philosopher fill eleven volumes. The last three, ‘Nachgelassene Werke,’ consisting mainly of the notes of lecture courses, were published by I. H. Fichte in 1834-35. The other works, most of which had been separately published, were collected, arranged, and edited, also by I. H. Fichte, in 1845-46. The arrangement is systematic, but not free from faults. Several of the more important of the popular writings of Fichte have been translated with great elegance and skill by Dr W. Smith, to whom it is due that Fichte is more than a name in this country. Translations of some of the philosophic works have appeared in America, where the earnest study of German thought has been fostered by the unwearied and self-sacrificing zeal of Dr W. T. Harris, the editor of the ‘Journal of Speculative Philosophy.’ There is no English work upon Fichte’s system; in German the best expositions are those of Löwe, Fortlage, Erdmann, and Kuno Fischer.