Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Company

To sustain Federal Trade Commission's orders to cease certain practices, they must be unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce and commission's proceeding must be in public interest (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

Sale of flour under names falsely importing or false representations that sellers manufactured flour held unfair methods of competition within Federal Trade Commission Act (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

Public interest must be specific and substantial to justify proceeding by Federal Trade Commission to prevent unfair competition; mere misrepresentations and confusion or deception of purchasers being insufficient (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

Purchasing public's interest in protection from deception into purchasing flour from others than original grinders of grain held specific and substantial, so as to justify proceeding by Federal Trade Commission to prevent such sales (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

Federal Trade Commission's order to cease selling flour under long-used trade-names falsely importing that sellers manufactured flour held improper; it being sufficient to require use of proper qualifying words (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

Federal Trade Commission's orders to cease unfair competition should go no further than reasonably necessary to correct evil and preserve rights of competitors and public (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

Federal Trade Commission in first instance should determine whether unfair competition can be prevented without suppressing long-used trade-names by requiring proper qualifying words (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).

The Attorney General and Mr. John Lord O'Brian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Mr. Thomas H. Malone, of Nashville, Tenn., for respondents.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.