Estes v. Texas/Concurrence Harlan

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.

I concur in the opinion of the Court, subject, however, to the reservations and only to the extent indicated in this opinion.

The constitutional issue presented by this case is far-reaching in its implications for the administration of justice in this country. The precise question is whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State, over the objection of a defendant, from employing television in the courtroom to televise contemporaneously, or subsequently by means of videotape, the courtroom proceedings of a criminal trial of widespread public interest. The issue is no narrower than this because petitioner has not asserted any isolatable prejudice resulting from the presence of television apparatus within the courtroom or from the contemporaneous or subsequent broadcasting of the trial proceedings. On the other hand, the issue is no broader, for we are concerned here only with a criminal trial of great notoriety, and not with criminal proceedings of a more or less routine nature.

The question is fraught with unusual difficulties. Permitting television in the courtroom undeniably has mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere which should always surround the judicial process. Forbidding this innovation, however, would doubtless impinge upon one of the valued attributes of our federalism by preventing the States from pursuing a novel course of procedural experimentation. My conclusion is that there is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the considerations against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was done in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Some preliminary observations are in order: All would agree, I am sure, that at its worst, television is capable of distorting the trial process so as to deprive it of fundamental fairness. Cables, kleig lights, interviews with the principal participants, commentary on their performances, 'commercials' at frequent intervals, special wearing apparel and makeup for the trial participants-certainly such things would not conduce to the sound administration of justice by any acceptable standard. But that is not the case before us. We must judge television as we find it in this trial-relatively unobtrusive, with the cameras contained in a booth at the back of the courtroom.

No constitutional provision guarantees a right to televise trials. The 'public trial' guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, which reflects a concept fundamental to the administration of justice in this Country, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682, certainly does not require that television be admitted to the courtroom. See United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777. Essentially, the publictrial guarantee embodies a view of human nature, true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open court than in secret proceedings. In re Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. at 266-273, 68 S.Ct., at 504-507. A fair trial is the objective, and 'public trial' is an institutional safeguard for attaining it.

Thus the right of 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the accused, and inhering in the institutional process by which justice is administered. Obviously, the publictrial guarantee is not violated if an individual member of the public cannot gain admittance to a courtroom because there are no available seats. The guarantee will already have been met, for the 'public' will be present in the form of those persons who did gain admission. Even the actual presence of the public is not guaranteed. A public trial implies only that the court must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum, and observe the trial process. It does not give anyone a concomitant right to photograph, record, broadcast, or otherwise transmit the trial proceedings to those members of the public not present, although to be sure, the guarantee of public trial does not of itself prohibit such activity.

The free speech and press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are also asserted as embodying a positive right to televise trials, but the argument is greatly overdrawn. Unquestionably, television has become a very effective medium for transmitting news. Many trials are newsworthy, and televising them might well provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to the public. Furthermore, television is capable of performing an educational function by acquainting the public with the judicial process in action. Albeit these are credible policy arguments in favor of television, they are not arguments of constitutional proportions. The rights to print and speak, over television as elsewhere, do not embody an independent right to bring the mechanical facilities of the broadcasting and printing industries into the courtroom. Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Within the courthouse the only relevant constitutional consideration is that the accused be accorded a fair trial. If the presence of television substantially detracts from that goal, due process requires that its use be forbidden.

I see no force in the argument that to exclude television apparatus from the courtroom, while at the same time permitting newspaper reporters to bring in their pencils and notebooks, would discriminate in favor of the press as against the broadcasting services. The distinctions to be drawn between the accouterments of the press and the television media turn not on differences of size and shape but of function and effect. The presence of the press at trials may have a distorting effect, but it is not caused by their pencils and note books. If it were, I would not hesitate to say that such physical paraphernalia should be barred.

The probable impact of courtroom television on the fairness of a trial may vary according to the particular kind of case involved. The impact of television on a trial exciting wide popular interest may be one thing; the impact on a run-of-the-mill case may be quite another. Furthermore, the propriety of closed circuit television for the purpose of making a court recording or for limited use in educational institutions obviously presents markedly different considerations. The Estes trial was a heavily publicized and highly sensational affair. I therefore put aside all other types of cases; in so doing, however, I wish to make it perfectly clear that I am by no means prepared to say that the constitutional issue should ultimately turn upon the nature of the particular case involved. When the issue of television in a non-notorious trial is presented it may appear that no workable distinction can be drawn based on the type of case involved, or that the possibilities for prejudice, though less severe, are nonetheless of constitutional proportions. Compare Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. The resolution of those further questions should await an appropriate case; the Court should proceed only step by step in this unplowed field. The opinion of the Court necessarily goes no farther, for only the four members of the majority who unreservedly join the Court's opinion would resolve those questions now.

I do not deem the constitutional inquiry in this case ended by the finding in effect conceded by petitioner's counsel, that no isolatable prejudice was occasioned by the manner in which television was employed in this case. Courtroom television introduces into the conduct of a criminal trial the element of professional 'showmanship,' an extraneous influence whose subtle capacities for serious mischief in a case of this sort will not be underestimated by any lawyer experienced in the elusive imponderables of the trial arena. In the context of a trial of intense public interest, there is certainly a strong possibility that the timid or reluctant witness, for whom a court appearance even at its traditional best is a harrowing affair, will become more timid or reluctant when he finds that he will also be appearing before a 'hidden audience' of unknown but large dimensions. There is certainly a strong possibility that the 'cocky' witness having a thirst for the limelight will become more 'cocky' under the influence of television. And who can say that the juror who is gratified by having been chosen for a front-line case, an ambitious prosecutor, a publicity-minded defense counsel, and even a conscientious judge will not stray, albeit unconsciously, from doing what 'comes naturally' into pluming themselves for a satisfactory television 'performance'? Surely possibilities of this kind carry grave potentialities for distorting the integrity of the judicial process bearing on the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and, more particularly, for casting doubt on the reliability of the fact-finding process carried on under such conditions. See Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960). To be sure, such distortions may produce no telltale signs, but in a highly publicized trial the danger of their presence is substantial, and their effects may be far more pervasive and deleterious than the physical disruptions which all concede would vitiate a conviction. A lively public interest could increase the size of the viewing audience immensely, and the masses of spectators to whom the trial is telecast would have become emotionally involved with the case through the dissemination of pretrial publicity, the usual concomitant of such a case. The presence of television would certainly emphasize to the trial participants that the case is something 'special.' Particularly treacherous situations are presented in cases where pretrial publicity has been massive even when jurors positively state they will not be influenced by it; see Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751. To increase the possibility of influence and the danger of a 'popular verdict' by subjecting the jurors to the view of a mass audience whose approach to the case has been conditioned by pretrial publicity can only make a bad situation worse. The entire thrust of rules of evidence and the other protections attendant upon the modern trial is to keep extraneous influences out of the courtroom. Turner v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473, 85 ,S.Ct. 546, 549-550, 13 L.Ed.2d 424. As we recently observed in Turner, 'Mr. Justice Holmes stated no more than a truism when he observed that 'Any judge who has sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.' Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, at 349, 35 S.Ct. 582, at 595, 59 L.Ed. 969 (dissenting opinion).' Id., at 472, 85 S.Ct., at 549. The knowledge on the part of the jury and other trial participants that they are being televised to an emotionally involved audience can only aggravate the atmosphere created by pretrial publicity.

The State argues that specific prejudice must be shown for the Due Process Clause to apply. I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment is so impotent when the trial practices in question are instinct with dangers to constitutional guarantees. I am at a loss to understand how the Fourteenth Amendment can be thought not to encompass protection of a state criminal trial from the dangers created by the intrusion of collateral and wholly irrelevant influences into the courtroom. The Court has not hesitated in the past to condemn such practices, even without any positive showing of isolatable prejudice. In Turner v. State of Louisiana, supra, decided just this Term, we held that the 'potentialities' for distortion of the trial created by a key witness serving as bailiff to a sequestered jury were sufficient to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, the Court made the judgment that a trial judge's determination of a coerced-confession issue is more likely to avoid prejudice than a jury determination, a judgment which indeed overrode a long-standing contrary state practice. And in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, we held that flamboyant pretrial publicity cast sufficient doubt on the impartiality of the jury to vitiate a conviction, even in the face of statements by all the jurors that they were not subject to its influence. See 366 U.S., at 729, 81 S.Ct., at 1646 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Other examples of instances in which the Court has exercised its judgment as to the effects of one thing or another on human behavior are plentiful. See, e.g., Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. --, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106; Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19, 85 S.Ct. 157, 13 L.Ed.2d 91; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (compare People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585); Avery v. State of Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873; Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749.

The judgment that the presence of television in the courtroom represents a serious danger to the trial process is supported by a vast segment of the Bar of this country, as evidenced by Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association, counseling against such practices, the views of the Judicial Conference of the United States (infra, p. 601), Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and even the 'personal views' (post, pp. 601-602) of the Justices on the dissenting side of the present case.

The arguments advanced against the constitutional banning of televised trials seem to me peculiarly unpersuasive. It is said that the pictorial broadcasting of trials will serve to educate the public as to the nature of the judicial process. Whatever force such arguments might have in run-of-the-mill cases, they carry little weight in cases of the sort before us, where the public's interest in viewing the trial is likely to be engendered more by curiosity about the personality of the well-known figure who is the defendant (as here), or about famous witnesses or lawyers who will appear on the television screen, or about the details of the particular crime involved, than by innate curiosity to learn about the workings of the judicial process itself. Indeed it would be naive not to suppose that it would be largely such factors that would qualify a trial for commercial television 'billing,' and it is precisely that kind of case where the risks of permitting television coverage of the proceedings are at their greatest.

It is also asserted that televised trials will cause witnesses to be more truthful, and jurors, judges, and lawyers more diligent. To say the least this argument is sophistic, for it is impossible to believe that the reliability of a trial as a method of finding facts and determining guilt or innocence increases in relation to the size of the crowd which is watching it. Attendance by interested spectators in the courtroom will fully satisfy the safeguards of 'public trial.' Once openness is thus assured, the addition of masses of spectators would, I venture to say, detract rather than add to the reliability of the process. See Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562, 85 S.Ct. 476, 479, 13 L.Ed.2d 487. A trial in Yankee Stadium, even if the crowd sat in stony silence, would be a substantially different affair from a trial in a traditional courtroom under traditional conditions, and the difference would not, I think, be that the witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors in the stadium would be more truthful, diligent, and capable of reliably finding facts and determining guilt or innocence. There will be no disagreement, I am sure, among those competent to judge that precisely the opposite would likely be the case.

Finally, we should not be deterred from making the constitutional judgment which this case demands by the prospect that the day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process. If and when that day arrives the constitutional judgment called for now would of course be subject to re- examination in accordance with the traditional workings of the Due Process Clause. At the present juncture I can only conclude that televised trials, at least in cases like this one, possess such capabilities for interfering with the even course of the judicial process that they are constitutionally banned. On these premises I concur in the opinion of the Court.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, CONCURRING.
The development of Canon 35 is set out at length in the amicus curiae brief of the American Bar Association, pp. 3-8, as follows:

'It (Canon 35) was originally adopted on September 30, 1937 by the House of Delegates in the following form:

"Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting     dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court      room, during sessions of the court or recesses between      sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are      calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the      proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with      respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be      permitted.' 62 A.B.A.Rep. 1134-35 (1937).

'A Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar, as to Publicity Interfering with Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings had reported to the Association its grave concern with the dangers attendent upon the use of radio in connection with trials, particularly in light of the spectacular publicity and broadcast of the trial of Bruno Hauptmann. The Committee specifically referred to the evil of 'trial in the air'. 62 A.B.A.Rep. 860 (1937).

'After the adoption of Judicial Canon 35, the direct radio broadcasting of court proceedings was disapproved by the Association's Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances in its Opinion No. 212, March 15, 1941, as being specifically condemned. The Committee quoted with approval the following statement of the Michigan and Detroit Bar Associations:

"Such broadcasts are unfair to the defendant and to the     witnesses. The natural embarrassment and confusion of a      citizen on trial should not be increased by a realization      that his voice and his difficulties are being used as      entertainment for a vast radio audience. The fear expressed      by most persons when facing an audience or microphone is a      matter of common knowledge, and but few defendants or      witnesses can properly concentrate on facts and testify fully      and fairly when so handicapped.    Such broadcasts are      unfair to the Judge, who should be permitted to devote his      undivided attention to the case, unmindful of the effect      which his comments or decision may have upon the radio audience.' American Bar Association,      Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and      Grievances 426 (1957).

'In 1952, the growing prominence of television as a medium of mass communication was dealt with in a report of the Special Committee on Televising and Broadcasting Legislative and Judicial Proceedings (headed by the late John W. Davis). 77 A.B.A.Rep. 607 (1952). In condemning the practice of televising judicial proceedings, the Committee called attention to the fact that:

"The attention of the court, the jury, lawyers and witnesses     should be concentrated upon the trial itself and ought not to      be divided with the television or broadcast audience who for      the most part have merely the interest of curiosity in the      proceedings. It is not difficult to conceive that all      participants may become over-concerned with the impression      their actions, rulings or testimony will make on the absent      multitude.' Id. at 610.

'As a result of this report, and the recommendation of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Judicial Canon 35 was amended by inserting a ban on the 'televising' of court proceedings and inserting the descriptive phrase 'distract the witness in giving his testimony' before the phrase 'degrade the court.' In addition, a second paragraph was added providing for the televising and broadcasting of certain ceremonial proceedings. Id. at 110-11.

'In October, 1954, the Board of Governors authorized the appointment of a Special Bar-Media Conference Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press to meet with representatives of the press, radio, and television. The views of both sides were thoroughly explored and were presented in detail in the September, 1956 issue of the American Bar Association Journal. After extensive joint debate, no solutions or agreements were reached. 83 A.B.A.Rep. 790-91 (1958). The Committee did report that it was convinced that

"courtroom photographing or broadcasting or both would impose     undue police duties upon the trial judge    that the      broadcasting and the photographing in the courtroom might      have an adverse psychological effect upon trial participants,      judges, lawyers, witnesses and juries    (and) that      partial broadcasts of trials, particularly on television,      might influence public opinion which in turn might influence      trial results.   ' Id. at 645.

'Following the presentation of the Bar-Media Conference Committee report and in connection with the consideration of a report and recommendation of a Special Committee of the American Bar Foundation created in July, 1955 (83 A.B.A.Rep. 643-45 (1958)), the House of Delegates conducted a hearing as a 'Committee of the Whole' during its February, 1958 session at which proponents and opponents of Judicial Canon 35 were fully heard. 83 A.B.A.Rep. 648-69 (1958). Thereafter, at the August, 1958 meeting of the House of Delegates, it was decided to have a Special Committee study Canon 35 and

"conduct further studies of the problem, including the     obtaining of a body of reliable factual data on the      experience of judges and lawyers in those courts were either      photography, televising or broadcasting, or all of them, are      permitted.    The fundamental objective of the Committee      and of all others interested must be to consider and make      recommendations which will preserve the right of fair trial.'      83 A.B.A.Rep. 284 (1958).

'The Special Committee filed an Interim Report and Recommendations with the House of Delegates in August, 1962 setting forth the 'Area and Perspective' of its survey and studies. The report included portions of testimony by media representatives taken at a hearing held in Chicago on February 18, 1962, as well as a summary of the Committee's informal conference with certain representatives from Colorado and Texas. In addition, the report included written comments by officers of State Bar Associations responding to a Committee survey, and certain general correspondence received by the Committee regarding Judicial Canon 35. The report also listed significant publications favoring either revision or retention of the Canon. (Hereinafter cited Int. Rep.)

'The Special Committee thereafter submitted its final report and recommendations, concluding that the substantive provisions of Judicial Canon 35 remain valid and 'should be retained as essential safeguards of the individual's inviolate and personal right of fair trial.'   The Committee did recommend certain minor deletions    and changes    which were adopted by the House of Delegates, after full debate, on February 5, 1963:

"The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions     of the court or recesses between sessions, and the      broadcasting or televising of court proceedings (are      calculated to) detract from the essential dignity of the      proceedings, distract (the) participants and witnesses in      giving (his) testimony, (degrade the court) and create      misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public      and should not be permitted.'

'A vast majority of the states have voluntarily adopted Judicial Canon 35 in one form or another, and it has been embodied in principle in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In a recent Resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the philosophy of Canon 35 was unanimously reaffirmed:

"Resolved, That the Judicial Conference of the United States     condemns the taking of photographs in the courtroom or its      environs in connection with any judicial proceeding, and the      broadcasting of judicial proceedings by radio, television, or      other means, and considers such practices to be inconsistent      with fair judicial procedure and that they ought not to be      permitted in any federal court. Int. Rep. p. 97.'

(Footnotes numbered and partially omitted.)