Eliason v. Wilborn/Opinion of the Court

The appellants had been holders of a certificate of title under the Torrens Act of Illinois. As a result of negotiations they entrusted this certificate to one Napletone, who is alleged to have presented it together with a forged conveyance to himself to the Registrar and by those means to have obtained from the Registrar a new certificate of title in Napletone, on May 19, 1926. Napletone a few days later sold and conveyed to the Wilborns, appellees, whose good faith is not questioned. After the Wilborns had bought but before a new certificate was issued to them, they had notice of the appellants' claim and the appellants notified the Registrar of the forgery and demanded a cancellation of the deeds and certificates to Napletone and the Wilborns and the issue of a certificate to themselves. The Registrar refused and this petition is brought to compel him to do what the appellants demand. It was dismissed on demurrer by the Circuit Court of the State, and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 335 Ill. 352, 167 N. E. 101. The Supreme Court construed the statutes as giving title to the Wilborns, who purchased in reliance upon the certificate held by Napletone. Whether we are bound to or not we accept that construction and its result. The petitioners appealed to this Court on the ground that the statute, construed as it was construed below, deprived the appellants of their property without due process of law contrary to the Constitution of the United States, by making the certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon a forged deed without notice to them conclusive against them.

The sections objected to are appended. They are as in the original Act of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 139), except section 40, amended by the Laws 1925, p. 250.

The appellants seem to claim a constitutional right to buy land that has been brought under the Torrens Act free from the restrictions that that Act imposes. But they have no right of any kind to buy it unless the present owner assents, and if, as in this case, the owner from whom the appellants bought, offered and sold nothing except a Torrens title we do not perceive how they can complain that that is all that they got. Even if the restrictions were of a kind that was open to constitutional objection the appellants bought knowing them and got what they paid for, and knew that they were liable to lose their title without having parted with it and without being heard. Even if they had been the original holders under the Torrens Act and had attempted to save their supposed rights by protest the answer would be that they were under no compulsion when they came into the system, that an elaborate plan was offered of which the provisions objected to were an important part, and that they could take it as it was or let it alone. There are plenty of cases in which a man may lose his title when he does not mean to. If he entrusts a check indorsed in blank to a servant or friend he takes his chance. So when he entrusts goods to a bailee under some factors' acts that are well known. So, more analogous to the present case, a man may be deprived of a title by one who has none; as when an owner who has conveyed his property by a deed not yet recorded executes a second deed to another person who takes and records the later deed without notice of the former. There are few constitutional rights that may not be waived.

But there is a narrower ground on which the appellants must be denied their demand. The statute requires the production of the outstanding certificate, as a condition to the issue of a new one. The appellants saw fit to entrust it to Napletone and they took the risk. They say that according to the construction of the act adopted the Registrar's certificate would have had the same effect even if the old certificate had not been produced. But that, if correct, is no answer. Presumably the Registrar will do his duty, and if he does he will require the old certificate to be handed in. It does not justify the omission of a precaution that probably would be sufficient, to point out that a dishonest official could get around it. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Napletone would have got a certificate on which the Wilborns could rely without the delivery of the old one by the appellants. As between two innocent persons one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.

Decree affirmed.